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Chapter 1
Introduction
This Ph.D. thesis is a collection of four papers on economic analysis of access to justice. In the
introduction, I will introduce the reader to the concept of access to justice and its economic analysis.
The setup of the introduction is as follows. In Section 1.1, I give a verbal de¯nition of access to justice,
and de¯ne the scope of the thesis. In Section 1.2, I address the barriers to access to justice. Section
1.3 reviews the literature. In Section 1.4, I give an overview of the thesis, providing a summary of
each paper. Section 1.5 concludes.
1.1. Access to Legal Justice
In order to formally de¯ne access to justice, I start with the basic concepts of `legal right', `fairness'
and `e±ciency'.
Legal Right In this thesis, a legal right is de¯ned as a right where a party has the legal title to certain
property, bene¯ts or other interests, and in that case, her remedy for an infringement of it, is by an
action in a court of law. Furthermore, an infringement is de¯ned as the violation of a legal right. A
private legal right is a right that is vested in, and can be claimed in court by a private citizen. Private
rights include, for instance, the right of a victim of tortious injury to compensation, the right of a
parent to custody, and the right of an accused not to be deprived of his property or other interests
without due process of law. A private right is distinguished from a public right, which is vested in
and claimed only by political entities. In this thesis, we restrict ourselves to the infringement and
enforcement of private legal rights.
Legal Dispute A legal dispute refers to the disagreement over the existence of an infringement, or over
the type and amount of compensation that may be claimed by the injured party for the infringement.
Furthermore, a resolution to a legal dispute is a legally enforceable decision that prescribes the type
and amount of compensation to be received by the injured party from the party liable. A resolution
may take the form of, for instance, settlement agreement, mediation, or court decision.
Legal System A legal system is a system for interpreting the laws, enforcing the legal rights and
resolving legal disputes. A legal system is composed of people and legal institutions. The people
involved in the legal system include the litigants, their attorneys, the judges and other interested par-
ties. The institutions typically include di®erent levels of courts, law enforcing agencies and alternative
dispute resolution mechanisms.
To formally de¯ne `e±ciency', `fairness' and `access to justice', we need some notations. Consider
two litigants, plainti® p and defendant d, who are involved in a legal dispute over an asset of value v,
which has to be divided between the two parties. An example of this situation is a dispute between
two siblings over the inheritance of a sum of money. A court or an arbitrator has to divide the
inheritance between the two siblings. Assume that the \legally right resolution" will be the one that
the court or arbitrator would accurately reach after extensive investigation of the facts of the case
and the law applicable. Let µp (with 0 · µp · 1) (resp. µd (with 0 · µd · 1 and µp +µd = 1)) denote
the share of the disputed asset that party p (resp. d) is legally entitled to. µp = 0 indicates that pAccess to Justice: An Economic Approach 7
is not legally entitled to the asset and that d is not liable; µp = 0:5 indicates that p and d are each
entitled to 50 percent of the asset. Throughout the thesis I assume that the parties in dispute are risk
neutral. Let ¼ (with 0 · ¼ · v) denote the expected level of award, i.e., the (expected) payment p
will receive from d in the legal resolution. The 2-vector µ = (µp;µd) is called the right legal resolution.
Furthermore, let cp (resp. cd) denote the aggregate legal costs incurred by p (resp. d). The legal costs
include for instance attorney fees, court fees, the value of litigants' time, and out-of-pocket expenses.
Measures of E±ciency E±ciency refers to the ability of a legal system to avoid waste by using as
little input as required by technology to resolve a legal dispute. I say a resolution is e±cient if there
exists no other resolution that requires less legal costs. The ¯rst e±ciency measure is given by the





Because the value of a claimed legal right is not always directly observed or easily measured, I propose





The ¯rst e±ciency measure will be used in Chapter 3. The second e±ciency measure will be used in
Chapter 4. k
Fairness in Legal Dispute Resolution Fairness refers to the ability of a legal system to enforce legal
rights accurately. I say a dispute resolution is fair if ¼ = µp ¢ v, i.e., if p (resp. d) receives (resp.
pays) what he is legally entitled to (resp. liable for). The degree of unfairness of a legal outcome ½ is
measured by the (normalized) di®erence between what d should compensate p according to the law




j µpv ¡ ¼ j; (1)
where the normalization is introduced to make the measure invariant to the scale of the case. The
higher the value of ½, the more unfair is the resolution and the less accurate the legal system is
considered to be. The de¯nition of fairness will be used in Chapter 4. The measure of unfairness will
be used in Chapter 5. k
Measure of Access to Justice In this thesis, the term access to justice refers to the ability of a
legal system to produce legal outcomes that match the ones would be produced by an accurate and
transaction-cost-free system. Write the net payo®s for p and d as up = ¼ ¡ cp and ud = v ¡ ¼ ¡ cd:
Let the 2-vector u = (1
vup; 1
vud) be the (normalized) outcome of the legal dispute. The measure
of distortion to access to justice ¸ is given by the Euclidean distance between u and the right legal
resolution µ:
¸(cp;cd;¼ j µp;µd;v) =k u ¡ µ k = f[
1
v
(¼ ¡ cp) ¡ µp]2 + [
1
v
(v ¡ ¼ ¡ cd) ¡ µd]2g
1
2: (2)
1This share calculation adopts the same formulation of rate-of-rent-dissipation which is a measure for intensity of
rent-seeking activities that is commonly used in rent-seeking literature. See, e.g., Tullock (1980).
2This share calculation is similar to the formulation used in Hensler et al. (1987), Carroll et al.(2005), and Hersch
and Viscusi (2007).Access to Justice: An Economic Approach 8
± measures how di®erent or `distant' the actual legal outcome is from the `right legal resolution'. The
higher the value of ±, the more severe is the distortion to access to justice.
Substituting and rearranging, we have ¸ = [(½ + cp
v )2 + (½ ¡ cd
v )2]
1
2: By di®erentiation, we have
¸½ > 0: (3)
That is, the degree of distortion to access to justice is increasing with the magnitudes of unfairness.
An implication of this result is that given the levels of legal costs, it is su±cient to analyze the changes
in unfairness of a legal outcome to determine the pattern of changes in distortion to access to justice.
Furthermore, it follows from the de¯nitions of ½ and r that ± = 0 if ½ = 0 and r = 0 (or r0 = 0).
That is, distortion to access to justice vanishes if the legal system is accurate and the enforcement of
legal rights is immediate and cost-free. The measure of distortion to access to justice will be used in
Chapter 3.
In reality the legal systems are far from ideal. Judges and juries may not be able to accurately
determine the magnitude of damages: a severely injured victim may be under-compensated and a
lightly injured victim may be overcompensated. Parties to a legal dispute incur substantial lawyer
fees and court fees when they access the court system to secure their legal rights. Trials are frequently
delayed due to court congestion. To enhance access to courts and access to legal services, the matters
targeted for particular attention often include the speed of dispute resolution, the costs of legal services
and legal proceedings, the funding and allocation of legal aid, and the consistency and randomness of
jury awards. Chapters 2 - 5 of the thesis will investigate certain aspects of these issues. The premise
of this thesis is that access to justice can be enhanced through better design of legal systems. The
thesis will endeavor to investigate a small number of issues related to access to legal resolutions to
civil disputes (such as torts, contracts, property and competition) according to law. Many important
applied issues will be side-stepped in the thesis, including the e®ects of di®erent liability rules, the
consequence of litigants' optimism bias on litigation outcomes, and the e®ects of evidentiary rules,
etc.
1.2. Obstacles to Access to Justice
Access to justice is often diminished due to delay, congestion, high legal costs, lack of resources and
improperly designed legal rules. While not exhausting all the issues of importance, in my thesis I
restrict my discussion to ¯ve sources of ine±ciency that combine to diminish access to justice. They
are [1] the costs of litigation, [2] the delays in court system and in out-of-court settlement, [3] the
uncertainty associated with trial outcomes, [4] the divergent interests of lawyer and client and [5] the
technical di±culty associated with determining damage compensations.
Firstly, high costs associated with litigation can make it ¯nancially prohibitive for individuals
with limited resources to take legal actions. Calculation based on McQuillan et al. (2007) shows that
for ¯led tort cases in the U.S., attorney fees for a plainti® amounts to $ 99,458 on average, which is
approximately 41% of the damage compensation that the plainti® receives. Swanson (1988)3 shows
3In the U.K. the legal expenses are usually allocated to the \losing" party in the dispute. Since the reasonable legal
expenses must then be determined, a separate division of the judiciary has evolved to ful¯ll this function: the Taxing
Masters of the High Courts of Justice. In order to make fact-based determinations of claims for expenses, the regulations
of the High Court provide that a detailed account of the proceedings must be tendered to the Taxing Master. It was
this set of ¯les which were consulted for the construction of the data set in Swanson (1988)'s study. Swanson named
these legal cases as \taxed cases".Access to Justice: An Economic Approach 9
that for the tried cases (i.e., cases that went to trial) in the U.K. the plainti®s incurred on average
legal expenses in the neighborhood of $5,300, approximately 68:5% of the damage payments received
by the plainti®s in those cases.
Secondly, excessive delays in a court system may delay compensations to injured victims and
therefore obstruct early access to justice.4 Filed cases in Texas take, on average, 26 months to resolve.5
Statistics estimate that tort cases in the U.K. take, on average, ¯ve years to resolve (see NAO (2001),
Swanson (1998)). In Italy, 12 to 13 years are expected for the ¯nal determination of a civil dispute.6
Such delays can cause evidence to deteriorate, injured parties fail to receive compensation when they
most need it and individuals to be deterred from bringing cases.
Thirdly, parties' asymmetric information about trial outcomes may distort access to justice. Par-
ties to a dispute may have di®erent information about the likely trial outcomes. For instance, the
plainti® may be privately informed about the severity of her damages; or the defendant may be pri-
vately informed about whether he behaved negligently. Empirical evidence (see, e.g., Sieg (2000) and
Fournier and Zuehlke (1998)) veri¯es that if one side in a legal dispute has information about likely
trial outcomes that the other side does not have, then incentives can be created for uninformed party
to use delay as a means of gather information, and similarly, for the informed party to credibly convey
information to the uninformed party through ine±cient delay. Ine±cient litigations occur inevitably
when the bene¯ts of learning and of establishing credibility exceed the costs of waiting.
Fourthly, diverging interests of lawyer and client may put obstacles in the way of access to justice.
This argument rests on the simple observation that lawyers are not necessarily bene¯ted by the early
resolution of disputes. This is most obvious in the case of a lawyer who is paid solely on the time he
has spent on handling the dispute, according to an hourly fee; for such a lawyer, protracted litigation
is more pro¯table than an early settlement.7 To the extend this lawyer can act on this incentive,
litigation may occur even though it would be in the client's interest to settle. Even if the client
formally controls the decision to litigate or settle a claim, the lawyer may have substantial in°uence
over the client, for example by regulating the information available to the client (see Hay and Spier
(1998)).
Finally, judges and jurors may experience di±culties in determining the level of damages when
the damages are for intangible harms such as pain, physical and emotional distress and loss of com-
panionship. These damages are called noneconomic damages. There are no well-established legal
doctrines for determining when noneconomic damage should be awarded or how much of the wel-
fare loss it is intended to replace. Because these damages are not directly measurable and readily
quanti¯able, there has long been critics that ¯nancial compensations for these damages are random
outcomes. Since randomness implies that variation in awards for individuals with identical injury, the
tort system is not fair when damage awards are random. Furthermore, because noneconomic damages
are di±cult to measure and quantify, a signi¯cant amount of court time must be devoted to proving
4See Zhou (2008a) and Kessler (1996).
5See Zhou (2008a). Fenn and Rickman (1999) report similar delay ¯gures for medical negligence and employee claim
cases ¯led in UK, as do Worthington (1991) for motor vehicle accident cases in New South Wales and Kakalik et al.
(1990) for civil cases ¯led in Los Angelas.
6See Varano (1997).
7Helland and Klick (2006) ¯nds that lawyers systematically delay settlement to accrue additional fees when compen-
sated by hourly fees or through a lodestar calculation.Access to Justice: An Economic Approach 10
the noneconomic losses, giving rise to trial delays and high administration costs which will be turn
be borne by the litigants in the form of court fees.
My thesis will selectively investigate a number of issues related to the costs of litigation, the delays
in court system and in out-of-court settlement, the uncertainty associated with damage compensa-
tions, and the divergent interests of lawyer and client on access to justice, respectively. Furthermore,
I will provide an analysis to ascertain whether noneconomic damages are random outcomes and what
factors determine the incidence and magnitude of noneconomic damages.
1.3. Literature Review
My thesis is built on two bodies of literature on economic analysis of law. Particularly, the thesis
is related to the rich body of economic analysis of legal procedures and to the empirical analysis of
noneconomic damage compensations. To provide a meaningful context for my work, the section to
follow will selectively review some of the results of the two di®erent bodies of literature.
1.3.1. Review of Economic Analysis of Legal Procedures
The economics analysis of legal procedures is one of the liveliest research area in the ¯eld of law and
economics. Surveys of the theoretical literature are provided by Cooter and Rubinfeld (1989), Hay
and Spier (1998), Daughety (2000), and Spier (2007), (2008). The literature on legal procedures that
is most closely related to this thesis can be classi¯ed into four groups, according to the research ques-
tions addressed. They are: (1) private litigation spending;8 (2) settlement breakdown; (3) duration
of settlement; and (4) lawyer's role in settlement and litigation.
1.3.1.1. Private litigation spending
This literature abstracts from settlement decisions and considers litigants' decisions to invest in the
lawsuit. The central research question addressed in this literature is how much resources do the liti-
gants invest in the lawsuit. In this literature, the parties' private litigation expenditure is endogenous
rather than exogenous. The parties' investment choice will re°ect the beliefs that they hold about
the investments and responses of their opponents.
The structure of the game studied in this literature is similar to those of other types of contests,
including tournaments in internal labor markets, a variety of sports, and patent races. In these games,
the strategies employed by the parties hinge on the anticipated reaction of the opponent { each party
would like his rival to \back o®" and invest less resources in the lawsuit. To this end, the plainti®
might derive a strategic bene¯t from aggressive spending, for example, when the defendant's best
response function is decreasing in the plainti®'s e®ort level. Conversely, the plainti® would bene¯t
from a commitment to lower spending levels if the defendant's best-response function slopes upward.
Either scenario can arise in the general framework. Using this analytical framework, Hirshleifer and
Osborne (2001) compare the e®ort levels of the one-shot, simultaneous move legal contest with those
of two-stage sequential contests. They ¯nd that given the (exogenous) opportunity to exert e®ort
¯rst, the litigant with higher stakes at trial overcommits to his e®ort with respect to his one-shot
simultaneous Nash equilibrium level; the litigant with lower stakes at trial under-commits.
8The term \private litigation spending" is ¯rst used by Spier (2007).Access to Justice: An Economic Approach 11
1.3.1.2. Settlement breakdown
The central research questions of this literature have been: Why do parties to a dispute choose to go
to trial, rather than settling the case out-of-court? and what determines the likelihood that a case
will settle?
Static models of settlements with asymmetric information The most widely accepted explanation
on settlement breakdown, stemming from Bebchuk (1984) and advanced by Reinganum and Wilde
(1986) and Nalebu® (1987), is that litigants have asymmetric information (AI) about likely trial out-
comes. These models are inherently \static" in the sense that they assume that one party makes
a take-or-leave-it o®er to the other party, with trial commencing if the o®er is rejected. The way
these models work is as follows: when one side in a legal dispute has information that the other side
does not have, incentives are created for the former to credibly convey information to the latter. In
this way, the uninformed party may be able to draw inferences { from the privately informed player's
bargaining behavior { about the likely trial outcomes. However, informed parties with weak cases will
rationally attempt to pass themselves o® as strong case holders. The uninformed party, anticipating
this, will rationally refuse to settle with a positive fraction of opponents who claim that their cases
are strong. Trials occur inevitably when the bene¯ts of establishing credibility exceed the costs of
trial.9
However, static models cannot help us to understand how long it takes parties to reach settlement,
and whether the legal system can have an in°uence on the duration of bargaining. For this, we need
to allow litigants to make sequential o®ers, with trial only occurring after a series of these.
Alternative framework: mutual optimism10 Before the widespread adoption of modeling techniques
from information economics, economists took a non-Bayesian approach to settlement breakdowns.
The parties' divergent expectations about trial outcomes were at the heart of these earliest models
settlement and litigation (see Landes (1971), Posner (1973), Gould (1973), Shavell (1982), Danzon
and Lillard (1983), and Priest and Klein (1984)). The way these models work is as follows: To settle,
the parties need to identify settlement terms that make them both better o®, in their view, than
going to trial. A crucial determinant of settlement, therefore, is the parties' expectation about trial
outcomes. When both parties are su±ciently optimistic about their trial outcomes, there may be no
mutually acceptable settlement terms. Consequently, trial commences.
A major problem with these models is: central to all these models are the parties' di®erential
beliefs about trial outcomes between the parties. However, these models fail to explain why a party
would maintain her own optimistic belief about her prospects at trial, once she becomes aware of her
opponent's di®erent belief. Rational choice theory predicts that each party would revise downward
her optimistic belief of her own prospects once she discovers { during the process of bargaining {
how optimistic her opponent is (see Aumann (1976)). As a result, one would expect that the parties'
beliefs to converge during the bargaining process, eventually making settlement possible. Further
analysis is needed to explain why such a convergence does not occur.
9For an excellent review of this literature, see Waldfogel (1998).
10The term \mutual optimism" is ¯rst used by Spier (2007).Access to Justice: An Economic Approach 12
1.3.1.3. Duration of settlement
The most important questions addressed in this literature are: How long it takes parties to reach an
agreement? and whether the legal system can have an in°uence on the duration of bargaining?
Settlement over time and e±ciency of negotiations Spier (1992) was the ¯rst to examine the dynam-
ics of pretrial negotiation.11 The model presented in her paper is a dynamic extension of Bebchuk
(1984). The main contribution of Spier's (1992) work is that it describes the distribution of settlement
over time, and evaluates the e±ciency of the pretrial negotiations in a dynamic framework. Spier
(1992) assumes the plainti® has private information about the amount of the damages he has suf-
fered.12 Settlement bargaining takes place over a ¯nite period of time with the defendant making all
of the o®ers. In each period, the gains from settlement are the costs to be avoided in the subsequent
periods. Therefore, when the costs of continuing bargaining and going to trial are high, it bene¯ts the
defendant to raise the likelihood of settlement by making a high o®er. In subgame perfect equilibrium,
the sequence of o®ers is increasing over time. Low type plainti®s get less from a trial than high type
plainti®s and hence will settle early for lower damage payments, while high type plainti®s will be pre-
pared to delay agreement until settlement o®ers raise. The reason that the parties cannot do better
by avoiding the ine±cient delay and share the gains from early settlement is that there is no way for a
high type plainti® to \prove" that her damage level is high except by going through a costly litigation.
Institutional Determinants of Settlement Delays Much e®ort has been devoted to the development of
strategic models of pretrial bargaining with private information. At the same time, empirical analyses
of data on pretrial settlement and litigation have generated an interesting list of facts to be explained.
Chapter 2 of the thesis is closely related with the literature on the duration of civil litigation, espe-
cially with analysis on the e®ect of legal system on delay in litigation. Fournier and Zuehlke (1996)
develop an empirical model, based on Spier's theoretical analysis, of the causes of settlement delay.
They found that fee shifting (i.e., changing from the American to the English rule for allocating legal
fees) causes a greater delay in settlement.13 Hersch et al. (2007) investigate medical malpractice
claims from Texas and Florida to assess the consequence of the early o®er reform.14 Kessler empiri-
cally examines the causes of delay in automobile liability settlement, with focus on court congestion
and prejudgment interest. He found that (1) longer delays in trial courts translate into longer delays
in settlement, and that (2) prejudgment interest law increases delay.
11A related dynamic model is given by Ordover and Rubinstein (1986). However, in Ordover and Rubinstein (1986)
the magnitude of the settlement o®ers is given exogenously and the game reduces to a war of attrition.
12This private information may be due, inter alia, to knowledge of injury severity, the su®ering involved (damages are
often awarded for `pain and su®ering') or the earnings opportunities foregone as a result of the injury.
13With the so-called American rule, each side pays for its own costs in litigation. With the so-called English rule the
loser must pay for the winner's legal costs.
14Hersch et al. analyze the sample of medical malpractice claims from the Texas Department of Insurance Commercial
Liability Closed Claim Report for the years 1988-2004. I analyze ¯ve di®erent insurance lines of commercial claims from
the Texas dataset for the years 1988-2005.Access to Justice: An Economic Approach 13
1.3.1.4. Lawyer's role in settlement and litigation
The most important questions addressed in this literature are: how does lawyer's participation in the
bargaining process a®ect the likelihood and terms of settlement? and how do lawyer's and client's
incentives to settle a claim vary under di®erent fee arrangements?
Strategic e®ect of contingency fee on settlement process Starting from the seminal work of Schwartz
and Mitchell (1970), there has been a rich literature exploring the incentives created by contingent
fee arrangement for lawyers to settle. These models are usually based on the assumption that the
lawyer has control over the lawsuit (as opposed to leaving that control with the client). The studies
by Schwartz and Mitchell (1970), Miller (1987), Thomason (1991), and Gravelle and Waterson (1993)
and Watts (1994) show that contingency fee creates an excessive incentive, relative to the client's
interest, for the lawyer to settle the claim. The usual explanation is that, by settling, the lawyer
obtains his share of the damage awards and avoids the additional e®orts that would be required if the
case were to go to trial. Other studies (by Polinsky and Rubinfeld (2001), Miceli (1994), Rickman
(1999)) have reached the opposite conclusion that the lawyer may have an insu±cient incentive to
settle under the contingent fee system. Polinsky and Rubinfeld (2001) argue, for instance, if the case
were to go to trial, the lawyer would invest less e®orts on the case than is in the client's interest.
Therefore, lawyers' settlement demands could be higher than their clients would want, resulting in
settlements occurring too infrequently.
The strategic role that client's choice of fee arrangement plays in settlement bargaining was the
focus of the studies of Bebchuk and Guzman (1996), Farmer and Pecorino (2001) and Choi (2003).
These studies have shown that by using a contingent fee contract, a plainti® can improve her bar-
gaining position vis-µ a-vis a defendant in pretrial settlement.15 The intuition behind this result is
as follows: contingency fees put the plainti® in a position in which she does not have to pay ad-
ditional fees if the case is litigated rather than settled. In other words, the plainti®'s \reservation
value" { the smallest amount the she is willing to accept for not going to trial { is higher under
the contingency fee arrangement. Therefore, compared with the case of hourly fees, the plainti® will
reject more settlement o®ers and litigate more often when the lawyer is paid on a contingency fee basis.
Alternative frameworks Besides the standard analytical framework based on the theories of incen-
tives, two other creative approaches are worth mentioning.
The study by Bar-Gill (2006) relates the likelihood of settlement to lawyer's psychological or
behavioral characteristics. By using evolutionary game theory, Bar-Gill (2006) shows that by credibly
threatening to resort to costly litigation, lawyers with systematic tendency to be over-optimistic about
the outcome of trial succeed in extracting more favorable settlements than lawyers without such a
bias.16 In this way, market-selection forces dictate an equilibrium with a positive level of optimism
bias and a positive likelihood of litigation.
Instead of focusing on the e®ects of individual incentives or characteristics, the research by Had-
¯eld (2000) has taken a much wider scope to investigate the implications of legal service market
15However, Choi (2003) does not address the problem of information asymmetry between the plainti® and the lawyer
as I do in my study.
16I am grateful to an anonymous committee member for pointing out the relevance of this article to my work.Access to Justice: An Economic Approach 14
imperfection on the justice system.17 Had¯eld (2000) identi¯es various sources of market imperfec-
tions and discusses the implications of these imperfections on matters such as costs of litigation and
pattern of settlement. Had¯eld's (2000) study attributes the lack of supply of legal service to factors
such as arti¯cial barriers to entry, demanding cognitive skills, and a lack of opportunity for lawyers
to gain litigation experience. Had¯eld (2000) argues that insu±cient supply of legal skills enables
the lawyers to impose a price beyond the marginal cost of their service in litigation and settlement.
Empirical evidence provided in the paper substantiates the existence of these imperfections and their
adverse e®ects on the legal system.
1.3.2. Review of Economic Analysis of Noneconomic Damages
Victims of tortious injury su®er from accidents in more than ¯nancial ways. Adequate access to
justice requires that the victims be compensated fully for their losses without delay or transaction
costs. While the other parts of the thesis analyze the time and costs of compensation, Chapter
4 addresses the issue of full compensation: besides economic losses such as medical expenses and
lost earnings, also noneconomic losses such as pain, su®ering and loss of enjoyment of life should be
compensated. The main source of discomfort about noneconomic damages has been that they are hard
to quantify because they encompass highly intertwined elements, many of which have psychological
aspects. For this reason, there have long been claims that noneconomic damage awards are random.18
Randomness implies variation in awards for individuals of similar circumstances who su®er the same
type of injury. Therefore, the tort system is not fair and access to justice is distorted when damage
awards are provided randomly.
It is the intent of Chapter 4 to examine the validity of the claim that noneconomic damages
are random outcomes. This part of my work is closely related to the large empirical literature
on noneconomic damages and the e®ects of noneconomic damage reforms on litigation outcomes
and frequency, malpractice insurance payouts, malpractice premiums, defensive medicine, physician
supply, overall health insurance premiums, mortality rates, and more.19 But I focus, in this review,
on a much smaller, but not less important, body of work that investigates the unpredictability of
noneconomic damages. This is because the latter literature is more closely related to my work.
Viscusi (1988a) was among the ¯rst to examine the predictability of noneconomic damages. In
an insightful paper, Viscusi (1988a) studies product liability claims from Insurance Services O±ce
between mid-1976 and mid-1977. Viscusi (1988a) showed that the hypothesis that noneconomic
damage awards are entirely random outcomes should be rejected. Following Viscusi (1988a), Bovbjerg
et al. (1989) studied the predictability of noneconomic damages in personal injury lawsuits from
Florida and Kansas City. Bovbjerg et al. (1989) found that severity of injury signi¯cantly in°uenced
the magnitude of noneconomic damages and was the best single predictor of the awards, explaining
approximately 40% of the variance in noneconomic damage payments. But there are considerable
unexplained variations across injury categories.
17I am grateful to an anonymous defense committee member for pointing out the relevance of Had¯eld's (2000) work
to my study.
18See discussions in Daniels (1989); Daniels & Martin, (1995); Litan (1993); MacCoun (1993); Saks (1992); Vidmar
(1994), (1995); Weiler (1991).
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1.4. Overview of the Thesis
This Ph.D. thesis consists of a collection of four papers in economic analysis of access to justice. These
papers are classi¯ed into three topics: [1] economic analysis of legal procedures, [2] economic analysis
of substantive law, and [3] economic analysis of legal representations. In what follows an overview of
these papers will be given, respectively. Section 4.5 introduces some basic notions that will be used
throughout the thesis.
Economic analysis of litigation delays
In Chapter 2, I analyze the duration of bargaining and the causes of delay in pretrial negotiation.
Motivation. The analysis in this chapter is motivated by the fact that parties to a legal dispute will
frequently delay settlement. Such delays can mean that evidence deteriorates, that injured parties
fail to receive compensation when they most need it and that individuals are deterred from bringing
cases. As a result, the legal system may fail to provide access to justice timely. Questions about
the timing of pretrial negotiation are inherently di±cult to address because of the dynamic nature of
litigation and the complexity of factors that a®ect legal process, but the analysis can shed light on
the allocation of resources in the civil justice system.
Research question. The chapter is an attempt to understand (i) why it takes so long for parties
to reach an agreement, and (ii) can the legal system have an in°uence on the duration of litigation.
Data. I use data gathered from the Texas Department of Insurance Commercial Liability Insurance
Closed Claim Report to empirically model the determinants of the duration of negotiation in ¯ve
lines of commercial liability insurance. The cases cover the period 1988 to 2005. Particular emphasis
is placed on the durational e®ect of statues awarding prejudgment interest to prevailing plainti®s.
Methodology. I structure the empirical analysis of bargaining by using a model developed by Spier
(1992) and adapted by Fenn and Rickman (1999) where pretrial negotiation takes place over a ¯nite
period of time prior to a ¯xed trial date. Comparative statics results are then corroborated with
empirical estimates of a hazard function (that is, the conditional likelihood of settlement at a certain
time given that settlement has not occurred earlier). The hazard function is adjusted to account for
the heterogeneity of lawsuits and the time dependence suggested by theory.
Results. I present two major ¯ndings on this topic:
(a) I found no evidence supporting the theoretical prediction that higher prejudgment interest rates
lead to longer delays in settlement. This observation, if it is indeed correct, is inconsistent
with a theoretic model where only the plainti® has private information;
(b) Contrary to the basic premise of the theoretic model, longer delays in trial courts are asso-
ciated with longer delays in out-of-court settlement. This ¯nding suggests that policies that
streamline the court system by reducing court congestion will expedite both public and private
resolution of disputes. While not validating the prediction of Spier's (1992) model, the evi-
dence of time-dependent behavior found in my data lends credence to theorists who emphasizes
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(c) Inconsistent with my theoretical prediction, the empirical evidence reveals that cases with
higher prejudgment interest rates receive smaller settlement payment, holding claim and other
institutional characteristics constant. In other words a reform that is designed to compensate
plainti®s' loss from foregone investment opportunities through the imposition of prejudgment
interest has the unexpected e®ect of worsening the plainti®'s bargaining position vis-µ a-vis the
defendant in pretrial negotiation.
Economic analysis of asymmetric costs of access to justice.
The paper presented in Chapter 3 is Zhou (2007). I study the welfare and distributional implications
of asymmetric litigation costs. In particular, this chapter abstracts from settlement decisions and
focuses on the litigants' investment decisions in pursuing lawsuits.
Motivation. In economic analysis of legal contests, researchers often assume that access to court
interventions and legal representations is equally costly for the plainti® and the defendant and that
the parties choose their legal e®ort levels only once and simultaneously. In this chapter my main
objectives are to study the in°uence of asymmetric litigation costs on litigants' legal investment
incentives and the subsequent equilibrium of the `litigation game' and consider the dynamics of
legal process. This is worthwhile, because my model generates signi¯cantly di®erent e±ciency and
distributional implications than symmetric, static models. Moreover, when we are directly evaluating
the performance of legal institutions and making policy recommendations for litigation-system reform,
it is useful to proceed within a framework that is fully consistent with various asymmetry and timing
considerations.
Methodology. Building on the analytical framework of Dixit (1987), Hirshleifer and Osborne
(2001), Hamilton and Slutsky (1990), Baik and Shogren (1992) and Leininger (1993), I generate
a model of litigation where the litigants exert e®ort sequentially in multiple periods. The probability
of courtroom success depends on the cumulative investment levels. The litigants' investment choice
will re°ect the beliefs that they hold about the investments and responses of their opponents.
Results. Several empirically relevant observations emerge:
(a) Distortion to access to justice and total legal costs in a sequential litigation are typically larger
(resp. smaller) than that of static litigation model when the `have' (resp. `have not') leads.
(b) The °exibility of multiple actions neither bene¯ts nor harms the litigants.
(c) In all equilibria where the `have' is the plainti®, all actions of the `have' are necessarily taken
in the ¯rst period only, while the `have not' defendant may allocate her actions arbitrarily
throughout all the periods;20in all equilibria where the `have not' is the plainti®, both parties
may exert e®ort multiple times, but all leads to the same trial outcomes. This implies that
the Stackelberg outcome can be sustained as an equilibrium at which the litigation only lasts
for two rounds.
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(d) In an unevenly matched litigation contest, the Stackelberg outcome in which the `have not' (or
disadvantaged player or `underdog') leads will emerge as the only equilibrium outcome when
the sequencing is endogenous. This implies that endogenous sequencing protocol minimizes
litigation cost and may work to improve access to justice.
Economic Analysis of Noneconomic Damages
in Medical Malpractice Claims
Adequate access to justice requires that victims be compensated fully for their losses without delay or
expenses. The preceding chapters focused on the time and expenses associated with access to justice.
Chapter 4 will focus on the issue of full compensation: besides economic losses such as medical
expenses and lost earnings, also noneconomic losses such as pain, su®ering and loss of enjoyment of
life should be compensated. Chapter 4 contributes to the economic analysis of noneconomic damages.
The chapter studies whether noneconomic damages are random outcomes and what determents the
incidence and magnitude of damages.
Motivation. Noneconomic damages are key components of liability damage awards. For medical
professional liability claims in Texas, for example, noneconomic damages comprise from 20 percent to
46 percent of all awards in which damage payment has been received.21 Noneconomic damages have
attracted the most attention from tort reformers because the legal criteria for such compensation
are not well articulated. That is, there are no well-established legal doctrines for determining when
noneconomic damage should be awarded or how much of the welfare loss it is intended to replace.
For this reason, they have been the subjects of frequent and extensive amendments in recent years.22
There have been two major critiques against the provision of noneconomic damages. First, because
they are not directly measurable and readily quanti¯able, they are unpredictable. Second, because
they are di±cult to measure and quantify, a signi¯cant amount of court time must be devoted to
proving the noneconomic losses, giving rise to high administration costs.
Research question. The purpose of my analysis is (i) to understand what determines the incidence
and magnitude of damage payments for noneconomic losses and (ii) to clarify whether noneconomic
damage awards are entirely random phenomena.
Data. I use data gathered from the Texas Department of Insurance Commercial Liability Insurance
Closed Claim Report to empirically model the determinants of the noneconomic damages in medical
malpractice insurance claims. The cases cover the period 1988 to 2005.
20This implies that the 'have not' could also allocate all her actions solely in period 2.
21See Table 4.2. Viscusi (1988a) reports similar ¯gures for product liability closed claims ¯led in the US.
22By 2005, 24 states have enacted caps on noneconomic damages. From 1991 to 2005 alone caps on noneconomic
damages were enacted in 12 states. During this period, such caps were struck down by supreme courts in 5 states. In
some states, such as Illinois and Ohio, caps were struck down by state supreme courts and later reenacted in amended
form. Sometimes this cycle repeated itself. See Avraham (2006a) for a comprehensive survey on noneconomic damages
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Methodology. I provide a limited test to empirically estimate the likelihood and the amount of
noneconomic damage awards. In particular, I will isolate compensation for particular types of injuries
from e®ects such as the di®erences in the size of the ¯nancial losses (e.g. earning loss, medical expenses,
etc.) and victims' employment status associated with di®erent injury categories.
Results. My empirical evidence shows that
(a) Consistent with the ¯ndings of Viscusi (1988a) and Rodgers (1993), I ¯nd that noneconomic
damage awards are not completely random outcomes. They vary, in predictable ways, with
changes in the economic characteristics of the case: the victim's ¯nancial loss is the single best
predictor of noneconomic damages, accounting for 64 percent and 25 percent of the variance
in the incidence and magnitude of the awards, respectively;
(b) Moreover, the incidence of noneconomic damage awards are higher for unemployed or self-
employed victims than for employed ones; Furthermore, when compared to victims receiving
collateral insurance payment, victims without collateral insurance are more likely to be com-
pensated. These results suggest that when awarding noneconomic damages the tort system has
objectives other than merely making whole the victims for their physical and mental anguish.
(c) By going to trial a victim increases the amount of compensation for noneconomic harm by
nearly 73.5% when compared to a victim who settles out of court. This result indicates that
the various aspects of the litigation process, such as litigation costs and plainti®'s risk aversion,
lower the plainti®s' bargaining position vis-µ a-vis the defendant. Subsequently the defendant
lowers the settlement o®er amount below the expected court award.
(d) The incidence and magnitude of awards are not systematically related to the type of injury.
Permanent and catastrophic injuries do not necessarily receive more awards for noneconomic
damages than temporary, insigni¯cant injuries. This suggest that the tort system might not
be fair.23
Economic Analysis of Legal Delegations
Chapters 5 addresses a widespread but so far underappreciated issue in economic analysis of access
to justice: the delegation of bargaining and litigation.
Motivation. Central to all economic analysis of litigation and settlement is the informational dif-
ference about trial outcomes between the litigants. None of the informational di®erences, however,
has been adequately explained by any of the existing models; that is, it is not yet understood why
this system might generate the divergent expectations which must be the source of these di®erences in
perspectives. The incorporation of the attorneys as key participants in the bargaining game provides
a crucial link in the analysis of settlement-litigation decision. It explains why a di®erence in perspec-
tive on a lawsuit might exist; and how this di®erence might plausibly lead to litigation. Furthermore,
existing asymmetric information theories do not explain the absence of bargaining (i.e., absence of
settlement o®ers in pretrial negotiation) observed in the TCS study.24 Inspection of litigation and
23See Section 1.1 for the de¯nition of `fairness'.
24Swanson and Mason (1998) is an exception. But Swanson and Mason did not investigate the role of agency problems
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settlement data from the U.K. Courts of Justice25 shows that the likelihood of bargaining and the
plainti®s' chance of success at trial depend crucially on plainti® characteristics such as the type of
accident and the way litigation is ¯nanced. Particularly, for the types of cases associated with more
uncertain legal outcomes26, plainti®s are less likely to bargain with the defendants than plainti®s
involved in cases that are associated with less uncertainty27; plainti®s receiving legal aid from the
government or ¯nancial support from trade unions are more likely to negotiate with the defendants
than privately funded plainti®s. Furthermore, the plainti®s are more likely to win at trial if they face
less uncertainty about trial outcomes and if they receive ¯nancial support.
Research question. The theory presented in this chapter is an attempt to rigorously explain these
empirically signi¯cant observations of [1] partial bargaining.28 That is, the likelihood that the plainti®
bargains with the defendant prior to trial is neither zero nor one. [2] low plainti® trial success rate,29
and [3] plainti®-characteristics dependent settlement-litigation behavior.
Methodology. This chapter deals with the issue of litigation versus settlement by taking as its
starting point the asymmetric information between litigants and their attorneys. It examines the
plainti® and her attorney as an uniformed principal and an informed agent who are bargaining
with another principal { the tortfeasor's insurer. I consider the role played by information of claim
strength (i.e., defendant's liability for damages) in determining patterns of settlement and litigation.
The approach taken in this chapter to settlement-litigation decision under asymmetric information
is based on the work of Myerson (1979). It involves the design of a contract o®er by the client that
recognizes that the attorney may have an incentive to misinform him about the perspective of the
case in order to delay settlement and increase billable hours while working less.
Results. The major results in this chapter can be summarized as:
(a) A plainti® will refrain from litigation and opt for settlement when her case is strong and that
she is likely to prevail at trial. Bargaining may not occur, even if the plainti® could obtain
a higher payo® from bargaining than from going to trial without bargaining. The intuition is
easily conveyed: The attorney's productivity in settlement bargaining increases with the case
strength. Therefore, the plainti® wants to encourage the attorney to admit that the case is
strong, whenever it is true, so that the attorney will bargain hard with the defendant to obtain a
high settlement payment in settlement. However, to prevent the attorney from misrepresenting
the strength of the case when the case is strong, the plainti® must somehow `punish' the att-
25The data is a random sample from the ¯les of the Taxing Masters in the U.K. Courts of Justice for the year of 1987
selected by Timothy Swanson. See Swanson (1998).
26They are motor vehicle accidents and medical negligence cases.
27These are plainti®s involved in workplace injury cases and cases against the public body.
28This term was ¯rst used by Swanson and Mason (1998).
29Similar empirical observations were recorded by Farber and White (1991), Vidmar et al. (1998), Sieg (2000) and
Spurr (2000). Farber and White provide evidence from 252 U.S. medical malpractice cases from 1977 to 1989 and show
that the defendants have won all the cases tried to completion. Vidmar et al. report that plainti®s prevail in 22:5%
of the California medical malpractice cases from 1991 through 1997. Using data on 8,306 medical malpractice cases in
Florida, Sieg shows that only 29% of tried cases result in a verdict for the plainti®. Spurr (2000) provides evidence from
424 medical malpractice cases in Michigan that, the cases that went to trial are drawn disproportionately from claims
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orney for reporting that the case is weak. Such punishment takes the form of pushing cases
towards trial without negotiation (hence no payment to the attorney).
(b) The pattern of the plainti®'s settlement-litigation decision depends on the risks associated with
litigation and the plainti®'s ability to monitor the attorney. Litigation occurs more frequently
if it is a priori less pro¯table for the plainti® to pursue. The intuition behind this result is as
follows. The plainti®'s prospect at trial increases with the strength of her case. With a stronger
case, it is less costly for the attorney to obtain favorable settlement terms from the defendant.
Since the plainti® bears the full costs of pretrial negotiation, out-of-court settlement (resp.
litigation) becomes more (resp. less) attractive an option for the plainti® when negotiation is
less costly.
(c) Litigation occurs more frequently if it is a priori more risky for the plainti® to pursue. The
intuition behind this result is as follows. When the plainti®'s uncertainty about trial outcome
is low, she can better monitor her attorney's performance in settlement bargaining and the
principal-agent impediments to settlement is mitigated. Therefore, the plainti® pursues liti-
gation less often when the trial outcomes are more predictable. An implication of this result
is that institutional characteristics determining the degree of plainti® uncertainty about trial
outcomes ¯gure large in settlement-litigation strategies.
(d) There is another aspect of the attorney-client relationship regarding the ¯nancing of litiga-
tion that can a®ect a plainti®'s incentive regarding settlement: legal aid (for both settlement
and litigation) reduces the costs inherent in representative bargaining that impede settlement.
Therefore, plainti®s receiving legal aid go to court less often than those receiving no legal aid.
1.5. Conclusions and Lessons from the Overall Work
This thesis contributes to the economic analysis of access to justice. Particularly, the focus of my
analysis has been on the three independent but related aspects of access to justice: legal procedures,
substantive law and ¯nally legal service.
The stakes in the legal dispute are potentially high and the parties involved are often sophisticated
players. Parties to a legal dispute react strategically to the design and changes in substantive legal
rules and to the avenues through which legal rights are pursued and enforced. My work shows that
legal policies designed to improve access to justice may have unintended or counter-productive e®ects
due to the presence of such strategic interactions. Private parties might, for example, delay damage
settlement in the presence of high prejudgment interest whose policy intention is to constrain delay.
Furthermore, my work emphasizes the role of lawyers in distorting access to justice. Lawyers
may have an incentive to misinform their clients about the perspective of lawsuits in order to delay
settlement and increase billable hours while working less. My analysis has shown that when the clients
anticipating such strategic behavior of their lawyers, they may use ine±cient litigation as a way of
extracting information about the prospects of their cases.
Litigations are games of asymmetric information and application of unequal resources. The impli-
cation of my analysis is that legislatures and legal reform agencies need to be aware of the strategic
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takes into account of the strategy reaction of individuals to legal rules as well as the interactions of
individuals to one another.
Finally, the ¯ndings of this thesis rea±rm earlier analysis of settlement and litigation: when parties
to a dispute have incomplete information about trial outcomes, costly delay and court intervention
are more likely to occur despite of common knowledge that there are gains from early settlement.
This implies that authorities with a reputation for producing predictable legal outcomes can reduce
the ine±ciency inherent in access to justice.
The studies presented in this thesis has focused on but a small number of issues related to access to
justice, namely, [1] litigation costs, [2] delays in court and in out-of-court settlement, [3] predictability
of damage awards, and [4] divergent interests and information asymmetry between a lawyer and his
client. Many important applied issues were side-stepped in the thesis, including the e®ects of di®erent
liability rules, whether and how can a client provide incentives to his lawyer under an hourly-fee
arrangement which is the typical compensation structure for European jurisdictions, and what are
the e±ciency and welfare implications of \third party contingency fee" arrangement which has been
in place across several European jurisdictions.Access to Justice: An Economic Approach 22
Chapter 2
Determinants of Delay in Litigation: Theory and Evidence
2.1. Introduction
Settlements are frequently delayed in legal disputes. Filed cases in Texas take, on average, 25 months
to resolve.30 In the UK, cases sampled for Lord Chancellor's Department (1986) indicate that ¯led
cases take between 18 and 40 months to reach trial. In Italy, 12 to 13 years are expected for the ¯nal
determination of a civil dispute.31 The purpose of this chapter is to study what factors determine
the duration of litigation. My main interest is in the institutional causes of delay in the settlement
of legal disputes.
The decision to litigate or settle a civil dispute, as it relates to the process of pretrial bargaining,
has been the subject of extensive investigation in law and economics. Asymmetric information models,
starting with Cooter et al. (1982), P'ng (1983), Bebchuk (1984), and advanced by Reinganum and
Wilde (1986), Nalebu® (1987), Schweizer (1989) and Daughety and Reinganum (1994), o®er possible
explanations of the litigation puzzle.32 What most of these papers have in common is that the game
is formulated in extensive form and essentially consists of a sequence of two periods. After the suit
has been ¯led, one litigant, in the ¯rst period, making a settlement o®er which, in the second period,
the other litigant either accepts or rejects. If the last-moving litigant accepts, the case settles out
of court at the proposed terms. Otherwise, the case goes to trial. The way these models work is as
follows: when one side in a legal dispute has information that the other side does not have, incentives
are created for the former to credibly convey information to the latter; litigation occurs inevitably
when the bene¯ts of establishing credibility exceed the costs of litigation. The central ¯nding of this
literature has been that the presence of asymmetric information yields a positive probability of trial.
Less well understood is how long it takes parties to reach an agreement, and whether the le-
gal system can have an in°uence on the duration of bargaining. Questions about the duration of
negotiation are inherently di±cult to address because of the dynamic nature of litigation and the
complexity of factors that a®ect legal process, but the analysis can shed light on the allocation of
resources in the civil justice system. Using a novel dataset from the Texas Department of Insurance
(TDI) Commercial Liability Insurance Closed Claim Report, I empirically model the determinants of
the duration of litigation in ¯ve lines of commercial liability insurance. The cases cover the period
1988 to 2005. Particular emphasis is placed on the durational e®ect of statues awarding prejudgment
interest to prevailing plainti®s. Such statues impose interest on damage awards to victorious plainti®s
from the time the injury occurred until the date of judgment. Legislators, courts and commentators
favor these statues partly because they believe that prejudgment interest expedites settlement out-
of-court.33 The `rationale' behind these statues seems to be as follows: if defendants, who would
30See Table 2, Panel A. Fenn and Rickman (1999) report similar delay ¯gures for medical negligence and employee
claim cases ¯led in UK, as do Worthington (1991) for motor vehicle accident cases in New South Wales and Kakalik et
al. (1990) for civil cases ¯led in Los Angelas.
31See Varano (1997).
32Waldfogel (1998) reviews much of this literature.
33Prejudgment interest statues are also enacted to achieve \full compensation", on the grounds that a plainti® with
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otherwise delay settlement, are deprived the interest that they earn on claims that are unpaid but
adjudicated to be valid, then they will have less of an incentive to delay. Little research has inves-
tigated the validity of this simple policy rationale because of lack of data on prejudgment interest
laws and the impact of these laws.34 The TDI data provides an unique opportunity: the mandatory
prejudgment interest rate in Texas has fallen substantially in 2005, providing a \natural experiment"
to evaluate the impact of change in prejudgment interest rate on litigation durations.
I structure the empirical analysis of bargaining using a model developed by Spier (1992), and
adapted by Fenn and Rickman (1999), where pretrial negotiation takes place over a ¯nite period of
time prior to a ¯xed trial date. I formulate hypotheses to explain the e®ects of the legal system and
the bargaining environment on the duration of settlement and settlement payment. I then estimate
reduced form empirical speci¯cations which are based on the structural theoretical model. I present
three ¯ndings on this topic:
(a) I found no evidence supporting the theoretical prediction that higher prejudgment interest rates
lead to longer delays in settlement. This observation, if it is indeed correct, is inconsistent
with a theoretic model where only the plainti® has private information;
(b) Contrary to the basic premise of the theoretic model, longer delays in trial courts are asso-
ciated with longer delays in out-of-court settlement. This ¯nding suggests that policies that
streamline the court system by reducing court congestion will expedite both public and private
resolution of disputes. While not validating the prediction of Spier's (1992) model, the evi-
dence of time-dependent behavior found in my data lends credence to theorists who emphasizes
the dynamic structure of settlement negotiation;
(c) Inconsistent with my theoretical prediction, the empirical evidence reveals that cases with
higher prejudgment interest rates receive smaller settlement payment, holding claim and other
institutional characteristics constant. In other words a reform that is designed to compensate
plainti®s' loss from foregone investment opportunities through the imposition of prejudgment
interest has the unexpected e®ect of worsening the plainti®'s bargaining position vis-µ a-vis the
defendant in pretrial negotiation.
The analysis presented in this chapter extends the existing empirical literature that studies the
e®ect of legal system on settlement delay. Fournier and Zuehlke (1996) develop an empirical model,
based on Spier's theoretical analysis, of the causes of settlement delay. They found that fee shifting
(i.e., changing from the American to the English rule for allocating legal fees35) causes a greater delay
in settlement because fee shifting magni¯es the e®ect of asymmetric information between parties to a
legal dispute, making settlement more di±cult. Hersch et al. (2007) investigate medical malpractice
claims from Texas and Florida to assess the consequence of the early o®er reform.36 They ¯nd that
the reform expedites payments to claimants by two years. Most closely related to this chapter is by
34Kessler (1996) is an exception. Using a novel dataset on resolved automobile insurance bodily injury claims collected
by the Insurance Research Council, Kessler (1996) empirically examines the causes of delay in pretrial negotiation, with
a focus on court congestion and prejudgment interest.
35In the U.S. legal system, each party pays their own legal expenses, regardless of the trial decision. In the English
system, the loser pays the winner's legal expenses.
36Hersch et al. analyze the sample of medical malpractice claims from the Texas Department of Insurance Commercial
Liability Closed Claim Report for the years 1988-2004. I analyze ¯ve di®erent insurance lines of commercial claims from
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Kessler (1996). Kessler empirically examines the causes of delay in automobile liability settlement,
with a focus on court congestion and prejudgment interest. He found that (1) longer delays in trial
courts translate into longer delays in settlement, and that (2) prejudgment interest law increases
delay.
This chapter shares an obvious common thread with this earlier body of work. It departs in that,
¯rstly, I have the unusual opportunity to use information on the insurers' prior estimates on the level
of damages and the extent of legal costs provided by the TDI data.37 These prior estimates, which are
established based on the insurer's experience with the insurance type and the nature of injuries, are
reported before a suit is ¯led. They serve as exogenous variables in°uencing subsequent bargaining
durations.38 In contrast, Fournier and Zuehlke (1996) use the average court verdict amount as a proxy
for expected trial stake. However, there is usually a sample selection bias associated with using tried
claims: the group of court-adjudicated cases is a highly selected sample of cases that are brought for
damage compensation.39 Kessler (1996) uses ex post amounts to measure damages and legal costs.
Since actual damage payments and legal expenditure are endogenously determined by accumulation of
litigation duration, endogeneity arises when they are included as explanatory variables. The present
study contributes to this literature by overcoming the problems of selection bias and endogeneity that
plague earlier studies.
Secondly, whereas Kessler (1996) and Hersch et al. (2007) have restricted their analysis to single
insurance lines,40 the data I analyze cover a rich variety of insurance claims: general liability, auto
liability, multiperil liability, medical professional liability, and other professional liability. Thus a
comparison of these di®erent insurance lines is possible. Given the apparent prevalence of settlement
delay across di®erent insurance classes, a comparative analysis is of interest.41 In particular, I show
that claims associated with more complex and less routine insurance types take shorter to settle,
ceteris paribus. So far no theoretic work has investigated how claim complexity and usualness a®ect
the litigation duration. My result serves as evidence that there are considerable unexplained variations
in litigation durations across insurance issues and that there are numerous factors not quanti¯ed
(and perhaps not quanti¯able) in the analysis of dynamic pretrial negotiation that are important
determinants of delays.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.2 describes the legal environment of
my model. In particular, I will describe the time line of the litigation process and the functioning of
prejudgment interest. Section 2.3 considers the theoretical foundation for empirical hazard models
of the bargaining process. In particular, I present a version of the dynamic model developed by
37Exception is Fenn and Rickman (2001). They used insurers' initial estimates as exogenous measures of damages,
liability and expenses. However, Fenn and Rickman (2001) did not provide evidence on the predictive power of these
variables as proxies for actual amounts.
38In the empirical section, I provide supporting empirical evidence that these prior estimates are exogenous measures
of scale.
39See Priest and Klein (1984) for discussion on sample selection bias associated with litigated cases. See Viscusi
(1988b) for similar critiques.
40Similarly, Fenn and Rickman (2001) restricted their analysis to motor accident cases. Fenn and Rickman (1999)
restricted to medical negligence and employee cases but did not discuss the di®erence between them.
41Hensler et al. (1987) and Hersch and Viscusi (2007) specially notes that auto liability cases are less complex than
other insurance lines. Among the paid claims for the years 1988-2005, my calculation using the TDI data indicates that
more than 57% of auto claims do not result in a suit being ¯led. This ratio is approximately 20% for general liability,
30% for multiperil liability, 10% for medical professional liability and 20% for other professional liability.Access to Justice: An Economic Approach 25
Spier (1992) to examine how variation in the bargaining environment and the characteristics of the
legal system a®ect the hazard function of settlement. Section 2.4 describes the Texas Department of
Insurance data used in the analysis and provides summary statistics on litigation durations, as well
as information on trends over 1988-2005 period for which data are available. The limitation of the
data is also discussed. Section 2.5 describes estimation methods. Section 2.6 presents the empirical
results, discusses the limitations of my analysis and describes robustness checks of my results. Section
2.7 concludes.
2.2. Legal Environment
Litigation time line and litigation duration. Because they are the focus of my analysis, and
because their meaning is not always common parlance, the description of the time line of litigation
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Figure 2.1. Time Line of Litigation
Figure 2.1 shows the time line of litigation.42 Assume that an accident has taken place and the
plainti® and the defendant (\insurer" is a synonym) start bargaining over a sum of damage payment.
Bargaining takes place in two phases depending on whether the plainti® has ¯led a lawsuit or not:
the pre-litigation phase and the litigation phase. At any time in the pre-litigation phase, as long as no
agreement has reached, the plainti® has the option of ¯ling a lawsuit to initiate the litigation phase.
During the pre-litigation phase, a case may terminate by either of the three stages of disposition:
(a) alternative dispute resolution, (b) other informal agreement between the parties, or (c) statute
42Watanabe (2005) describes a similar, but less detailed, time line of pre-litigation and litigation. The setup of
insurer's reserve amounts will be discussed in detail in Section 2.4.Access to Justice: An Economic Approach 26
of limitation. The plainti® may no longer initiate a litigation if neither a lawsuit is ¯led nor an
agreement is reached by the end of the statute of limitation.43
If a case is ¯led, the court will notify the litigants about the date of trial. During the litigation-
phase, a case may terminate in either of the seven stages of disposition: (i) alternative dispute
resolution, (ii) settlement before trial, (iii) settlement during trial, (iv) court verdict, (v) settlement
after verdict, (vi) settlement after appeal ¯led and (vii) case dismissed. Before the trial starts, the
parties may choose to resolve their disputes either by alternative dispute resolution or by settlement
before trial. If the parties have not resolved their disputes prior to trial, they may still choose to settle
during trial until a court verdict is rendered. In addition, the court may dismiss the case during the
trial. If the plainti® or the defendant is dissatis¯ed with the court verdict, then they can appeal to
a higher court. The parties may choose to settle, with the knowledge of the court verdict, before or
after the ¯ling of an appeal.
In the TDI data, alternative dispute resolution refers to the informal proceedings that help parties
resolve their dispute outside of formal litigation. Unlike settlement, which is typically achieved by the
litigants themselves (and their lawyers), alternative dispute resolution proceedings often involve third
parties (arbitrators or mediators) who o®er opinions and advice.44 Settlement refers to the formal
procedure that parties resolve their dispute within the litigation process. Unlike alternative dispute
resolution, settlements are often reviewed by a judge to make sure they are adequate.
Definition. Throughout the chapter, litigation duration refers to the time elapsed between ¯ling
of a case and case termination. We say that settlement is delayed if a case's litigation duration is
positive.
Overwhelmingly higher costs and longer delays are associated with litigations than with non-
legal disputes.45 Consequently, the literature on litigation and settlement to date has predominantly
focused on the litigation process after the ¯ling of the lawsuit and before the date of trial.46;47
TDI data include 186,077 paid claims of which 40:6% are not ¯led claims and 59:4% ¯led claims.
Furthermore, a predominantly large share of cases in the sample (96%) of ¯led suits consists of cases
resolved prior to trial, either by an alternative dispute resolution (32%) or through formal judicial
process (64%).48 Given these facts and to make the analysis tractable, in the theory section I will
follow the literature to consider a simpli¯ed version of the litigation process by focusing on the parties'
bargaining behavior during the litigation-phase and prior to trial. In particular, I abstract, as do
43A statute of limitation is a length of time determined by law to be the maximum period of time, after the accident,
that litigation against the defendant may be initiated.
44See Spier (2005) for detailed description.
45In the TDI data, the average defense expenses for ¯led claims and for disputes resolved without ¯ling are $33,157
and $1,083, respectively. The average elapsed time between the date that the case reported to insurer and the date of
settlement is 860 days for ¯led cases and 354 days for cases resolved without ¯ling, respectively.
46It is usually assumed in this literature that court verdict is immediately reached when trial starts.
47Exceptions include Bebchuk (1996), Watanabe (2005), Waldfogel (1995) and Sieg (2000). Bebchuk (1996) considers
a multi-period bargaining model to explain why a plainti® may ¯le a lawsuit with negative expected value at trial. In
his model, however, the players have complete information over the likely trial outcomes, and in equilibrium settlement
occurs immediately after the bargaining starts. Sieg (2000) estimates a two-stage bargaining model with asymmetric
information to study the plainti®'s decision to ¯le a lawsuit, the magnitude of legal costs, and the terms of settlement
in medical malpractice cases.
48For detailed descriptive statistics, the interested reader is referred to Table 2.2, Panel A.Access to Justice: An Economic Approach 27
Spier (1992) and Fenn and Rickman (1999), from the plainti®'s decisions of whether and when to ¯le
a lawsuit. Furthermore, I will not distinguish between alternative dispute resolution or settlement
before trial. Such a distinction is not important for the present analysis. They are both referred as
\settlement before trial" in the theoretic model and in the empirical model. To further simplify the
exposition, I ignore bargaining after trial and ¯ling of appeal in the theoretic analysis and assume
that litigation ends on the date of trial.
¥ Description of prejudgment interest. Delays in litigation have fueled ongoing popular support
for tort reform in Europe and in the United States. There appear to be two major reasons for delay
in litigation: ¯rst, one or the other litigant may have strategic incentives to delay; and second, delay
may be caused by court congestion.49 Procedural rules have been put forward as remedies. Specially,
most European and U.S. jurisdictions have adopted laws to impose interest on damage awards to
prevailing plainti®s from the time the injury occurred until the date of judgment. Such interest is
called prejudgment interest.50 Suppose N is the number of days between the date of injury and date of
judgment, and R is the statutorily imposed daily prejudgment interest rate. Then, by a prejudgment
interest law, a defendant deemed liable for a damage of $µ in court will be required to pay the plainti®
$µ(1 + R)N.
The basic goal of the prejudgment interest law is to encourage early settlements. The `rationale'
behind this law seems to be as follows: Suppose that the defendant refuses to settle early; if the court
takes away from defendant the interest that he gains on damages that are unpaid but determined by
court to be valid, disincentives will be created for the defendant to prolong litigation.51 Following this
`logic', the prejudgment interest rates in Italy has doubled following the Italian civil justice reform of
1990.
However, prejudgment interest may have the counter e®ect of increasing delay. First, prejudgment
interest increases the value of cases to plainti®s.52 The e®ect will be to increase the number of case
¯lings thereby increasing court congestion, because some cases that would have negative expected
returns in the absence of prejudgment interest have now become pro¯table for plainti®s to pursue as
a consequence of the reform. Second, when litigants have incomplete information about the severity
of damage, then prejudgment interest can increase the parties' uncertainty about the value of the
case.53 Suppose that liability is not disputed, but that the plainti® has private information about the
level of damages. Further suppose that from the defendant's perspective, the value of the case in the
absence of prejudgment interest is distributed with variance ¾2. Prejudgment interest increases the
variance of the distribution of case values to ¾2(1 + R)2N. A key goal of this chapter is to explore
how and to what extent such an increase in the litigants' uncertainty about the case scale increases
delay.
49For empirical evidence that court congestion increases delay, see Fournier and Zuehlke (1998) and Kessler (1996).
50Prejudgment interest law varies among jurisdictions in the US. Some states (e.g. Alaska and Georgia) set a ¯xed
prejudgment interest rate by statute; others (e.g. Texas and Iowa) tie the rate to an established index. See Philips and
Freeman (2003) for a survey across the U.S. states.
51See, e.g., Pennsylvania Supreme Court (1981), Knoll (1996), Calhoun(1990), and Wilson et al. (1986), and Rubin
and Shepherd (2007).
52See Miller (1997).
53See Kessler (1996).Access to Justice: An Economic Approach 28
From the discussions above, we can see that theoretical analysis and empirical validation are
required to better understand the e®ects of prejudgment interest on delay. I found that, consistent
with the ¯ndings of Kessler, cases with high prejudgment interest rates at the date of closure are
less likely to settle early in the negotiations. These empirical results are consistent with a theoretical
model of wasteful delay, and they cut against using the prejudgment interest to expedite damage
payment.
¥ Description of major legal reforms in the same period. To produce an unbiased estimate
of the e®ect of prejudgment interest reform, it is necessary to separate the e®ect of prejudgment
interest from the potential e®ects of other legal reforms that took place in the same period.
2.3. Theoretical Foundation
¥ Basic model. I base my empirical analysis (as do Fournier and Zuehlke (1998), Kessler (1996)
and Fenn and Rickman (1999)) on Spier's (1992) dynamic model of pretrial bargaining. It should be
stressed that the model I am inheriting from Spier makes by necessity simplifying assumptions about
the bargaining structure. My purpose is to adopt a framework that can be estimated empirically,
rather than to produce a comprehensive model that contributes to the theoretical literature. There-
fore, my intention is to analyze a model in as parsimonious a fashion as possible, while at the same
time retaining enough of the key elements of the theoretical structure to capture the most salient
aspects of the litigation process. Apart from the role of prejudgment interest in the analysis and
the introduction of factors pertinent to empirical estimation, the general spirit of the model intro-
duced below follows an approach to the settlement-litigation decision that is broadly consistent with
a substantial body of research in the game theoretical analysis of bargaining.
Assume that an accident has taken place and that the plainti® has ¯led a suit to brought charges
against the defendant. Let µ be the value of damages for which the defendant is liable. Let ¼ 2 [0;1]
be the defendant's fault (\liability" and \negligence" are a synonyms). Suppose that the court will
enforce the payment of µ from the defendant to the plainti® with probability ¼ and without interest
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2.2. Diagram of Model Structure { Pretrial NegotiationAccess to Justice: An Economic Approach 29
in the event that the case goes to trial. Further assume µ is private knowledge to the plainti®.54 ¼ is
common knowledge.
Following the Bayesian approach, assume that the defendant has some subjective prior probabil-
ity distribution for the unknown parameter µ. For simplicity, assume that the defendant's prior is
uniformly distributed over [0;»]. Here, » > 0 is a \severity parameter": as » increases, both the mean
and variance of the defendant's priors increase. This is a reasonable assumption, as empirical evidence
suggests that claim types associated with higher expected damages usually have larger variances in
damages across claims as well.55
Settlement bargaining takes place over T periods. The defendant makes all of the o®ers.56 In
each period, t, the defendant makes a settlement o®er, st, which the plainti® may either accept or
reject.57 If she rejects, the game continues with the defendant making another o®er in the following
period. Trial takes place in period T + 1 if litigants cannot agree. In the event that the case goes to
trial, the court will transfer µ from the defendant to the plainti®.
The defendant incurs a cost c ¸ 0 at the beginning of each period and the litigants remain in
con°ict prior to the trial.58 In addition, the defendant incurs a cost k ¸ 0 if the case actually goes to
court. These costs are exogenously given. The litigants discount time at the same rate; their discount
factor is ± where ± 2 (0;1). The game is illustrated in Figure 2.2.
Following Spier (1992), I will now derive the probability of settlement over time. Let the lower
bound of the distribution of types at the beginning of period t be denoted µt. The defendant designs a
sequence of T o®ers which partitions the distribution of plainti® types. Following Spier (1992), when
c and k are su±ciently small, so that
(± + ::: + ±T¡1)c + ±Tk < ±T¼» (4)





1; t = 2:::T (5)
and the distribution of plainti®s remaining at the beginning of period t is uniform on [0;»], where:
µ1 = 0 (6)
54This is a reasonable assumption as the plainti® is likely to have more information on the actual damages she
has su®ered owing to a harm than is the defendant. Reinganum and Wilde (1986), Spier (1994) and Daughety and
Reinganum (1994) make the same assumption that the damages victims su®ers are privately observed.
55See Table 2.3, Panel B. Fenn and Rickman (1999) report similar evidence that the mean estimated damages and
their standard deviation of `insigni¯cant' injuries are lower than those of `permanent major' injuries, respectively.
56I found no empirical evidence supporting this assumption. In the United States, the claimant's lawyer generally
make the ¯rst move by making a speci¯c demand to the tortfeasor's insurer (see Kritzer (1989)). However, it can be
shown that some feature of the equilibrium outcome is robust to the order of o®ers or who make the o®ers in the
negotiation process.
57This assumption puts the whole bargaining power on the defendant's side, although generally the plainti® may make
counter o®ers. This assumption is made to avoid the multiplicity of equilibria associated with updating of beliefs.
58We may interpret c as the costs of the defendant's legal counsel. The plainti®'s attorney is usually paid on a
contingency fee basis. The model can be easily generalized to include costs for the plainti® as well. This extension




±ic; t = 2;:::;T (7)
µT+1 = µT + k (8)
If condition (4) is violated, then
at period t = 1 the defendant makes settlement o®er s¤
1 = ±T¼», and
the plainti® accepts regardless of her type. (9)
Interpretation. The formal proof the results (5)-(9) is similar to that in Spier (1992). I omit it.
But it is worth sketching it, because the comparative statics of this model are fairly intuitive and
could result quite reasonably from a variety of bargaining models. In subgame perfect equilibrium,
just enough high types must remain in the last period to make the high o®er, ±¼», credible. Since
at this time the costs c are sunk, µT depends on k but not on c (equation (8)). In each period, the
gains from settlement are the costs to be avoided in the subsequent periods. Therefore, when the
costs of continuing litigation are high (i.e., when T and c are high), it bene¯ts the defendant to raise
the likelihood of settlement by making a high o®er (equation (7)). Low type plainti®s get less from a
trial than high type plainti®s and hence will settle early for lower damage payments, while high type
plainti®s will be prepared to delay agreement until settlement o®ers raise (fµtgT
t=2 is an increasing
sequence). The reason that the parties cannot do better by avoiding the ine±cient delay and share
the gains from early settlement is that there is no way for a high type plainti® to \prove" that her
damage level is high except by going through a costly litigation.
From these results above, I derive the hypotheses that I will test empirically. They relate to the
probability of settlement in period t conditional on the fact that settlement has not occurred earlier,






±T(1 ¡ ±)¼» ¡ c(± ¡ ±t)
; t = 1;2;::::;T ¡ 1: (10)
By di®erentiation, we have




Di®erentiating (10) twice, we have
h»t S 0 ,
±c
±T(1 ¡ ±)
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Interpretation. Inequalities (11) suggest that, the hazard rate of settlement is decreasing in trial
stakes, uncertainty about the severity of damage (both captured by the size of »), and the defendant's
fault (captured by the size of ¼). The hazard rate is increasing in bargaining costs (as captured by
the magnitude of c) and the length of time to trial (as captured by the length of T). The settlement
hazard is increasing over time, when litigation costs are high, length of time-to-trial is long, and
expected damage and uncertainty are low. Furthermore, the model can also predict how changes inAccess to Justice: An Economic Approach 31
bargaining environment and legal system a®ect the settlement hazard over time. Inequalities (12)
and (13) suggest that, when the legal costs are high, length of time-to-trial is long, and trial stakes,
uncertainty and defendant fault are low, the negative e®ect of uncertainty, stakes and defendant fault
on settlement hazard diminishes as time elapses; the positive e®ects of costs and time-to-trial on
settlement hazard increase as time elapses.
In summary, the screening model of pretrial negotiation identi¯es two important determinants of
litigation duration: the dispersion in trial outcomes, and the costs of bargaining.
The results above lead to the following hypotheses:
Hypothesis 1. The duration of bargaining will decrease when the costs of continuing litigation incr-
ease.
Hypothesis 2. The duration of bargaining will increase when the severity of injury increases.
Hypothesis 3. The duration of bargaining will increase when the defendant is at fault, that is, when
the defendant is liable for the plainti®'s damage.
Hypothesis 4. The duration of bargaining will decrease when the defendant faces less uncertainty
about the level of damages.
Hypothesis 5. The longer time that it takes for a case to reach trial (i.e., the longer the length of
T), the shorter is the duration of bargaining.
¤ Prejudgment interest. Up to this point it has been assumed that the litigation is undertaken in
absence of prejudgment interest statue. In that case, delay results from inevitable information asym-
metry between the litigants. However, the laws of most European and U.S. jurisdictions provide that
interest is added to the original judgment from the time of the injury to the date of judgment. The
objective of this section is to understand the e®ect of such a statute on the duration of settlement. It
is shown that prejudgment interest worsens the adverse selection problem of the defendant, thereby
stretching out litigation.
Formally, let the R be the statutorily imposed prejudgment interest rate. Then in the event that
the case goes to trial, the court will enforce the payment of µ(1 + R)T from the defendant to the
plainti®. All other assumptions and notations remain the same as in the basic model.
Analogous to the analysis in the previous section, when c and k are su±ciently small so that the
maximum amount at stake is larger than what the settlement costs would be, that is
(± + ::: + ±T¡1)c + ±Tk < ±T¼»(1 + R)T (14)
then the equilibrium settlement o®ers are given by
s¤
1 = ±T¼»(1 + R)T
s¤
t = ±¡(t¡1)s¤
1; t = 2;:::;T (15)
and the distribution of plainti®s remaining at the beginning of period t is uniform on [0;»], where:




±ic; t = 2;:::;T (17)
µT+1 = µT + k (18)
If condition (14) is violated, then in period t = 1 the defendant makes settlement o®er s¤
1 = ±T¼»(1+
R)T, and the plainti® accepts regardless of her type. In particular, when the defendant's uncertainty
about the severity of damage is su±ciently small (i.e., when » · [(±+:::+±T¡1)c+±Tk]=±T¼(1+R)T)
so that condition (14) is violated, all the cases will settle in period t = 1 and prejudgment interest
will display no e®ect on the duration of settlement.






±T(1 ¡ ±)¼»(1 + R)T ¡ c(± ¡ ±t)
; t = 1;2;::::;T ¡ 1: (19)
By di®erentiation, we have
hR < 0: (20)
Di®erentiating (19) twice, we get
hRt S 0 , c T ±T¡1(1 + R)T(1 ¡ ±)¼»; (21)
hR» > 0: (22)
Remark. Comparing inequalities (4) and (14), we see that prejudgment interest provides a defen-
dant, who would otherwise settle immediately when bargaining and litigation costs are high, with
incentive to delay settlement. This is because prejudgment interest increases the expected trial stake
and thus increases the di®erence between the expected total amount at stake and what the settle-
ment costs would be. Furthermore, (20) indicates that the probability of settlement is decreasing
in prejudgment interest rate. This is because prejudgment interest increases both the expected trial
stake and the defendant's uncertainty about trial outcomes. (21) suggests that when legal costs are
high, length of time to trial are long, and expected trial stakes and uncertainty about the severity
of damage are low, the duration elasticity of the hazard function is decreasing with the prejudgment
interest rate. (22) suggests that the hazard rate of settlement decreases with prejudgment interest
rate more rapidly the higher the defendant's uncertainty about the severity of damage.
The results lead to the following hypotheses:
Hypothesis 6. The duration of bargaining will increase when prejudgment interest rate increases.
Hypothesis 7. The e®ect of prejudgment interest on the duration of bargaining will decrease when
the defendant's uncertainty about the severity of damage decreases.
Furthermore, I derive hypothesis on the expected settlement that I will test empirically. Let p(t;¢)
denote the probability of settlement in period t; let Ã denote the expected settlement amount. Due











T(± ¡ 1)±T¼»(1 + R)T
±T ¡ 1
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By di®erentiation, we have
ÃR > 0 and ÃT > 0: (24)
Remark. (24) suggests that the expected settlement is increasing with the level of prejudgment
interest rate (as captured by the size of R) and the length of time to trial (as captured by the length
of T). This is because prejudgment interest increases the expected trial stake and thus improves the
plainti®'s bargaining position vis-µ a-vis the defendant. The higher the prejudgment interest rate and
the longer the length of time to trial, the larger the trial stake.
This result leads to the following hypotheses:
Hypothesis 8. The expected settlement will increase when prejudgment interest rate increases.
Hypothesis 9. The expected settlement will increase when the length of time to trial increases.
2.4. Data description
The data are from the Texas Department of Insurance (TDI) Commercial Liability Insurance Closed
Claim Report. Texas requires detailed reports for all claims for which the total damage payments
by all insurers are at least $ 10,000. A rich variety of case-speci¯c information is recorded for the
majority of claims, including the date of the accident, the dates for initiation, settlement and closure
of the lawsuit (for most of the cases); the defendant's prior estimate of the level of damages. These are
the key variables of interest in this chapter. I analyze data from all available years. which currently
include the years 1988 - 2005.59
Five lines of commercial liability insurance are represented in TDI data: (i) monoline general
liability, (ii) commercial auto liability, (iii) commercial multiperil liability, (iv) medical-professional-
liability and (v) other professional liability. Commercial insurance provides liability coverage for
businesses, as opposed to personal insurance that are purchased by individuals.60 Monoline general
liability insurance provides coverage for liability arising out of accidents resulting from the operation
or products of a business as well as contractual liability. Commercial auto liability insurance pro-
vides coverage for commercial automobiles. Commercial multiperil liability insurance covers risks to
business due to perils that are named in the insurance policy, such as ¯re, earthquake or thunder.
Medical professional liability is insurance purchased by hospitals or medical professionals to address
the liability from their patients. Other professional liability is insurance purchased by management
of corporations as well as other non-medical professionals such as lawyers to address liability from
shareholders and from clients.61 As motivated in the introduction, investigating the di®erence in
litigation process among these insurance lines is of interest in this chapter of the thesis. Further,
the insurance lines serve as control variables for case scale and defendant's uncertainty about trial
outcome.62
¤ Rules for inclusion in the sample. TDI data include 186,077 paid claims across these
59All dollar values throughout the chapter are adjusted to 2005$ using standard measure of general price trends
published by the Bureau of Labor Statistics, the Consumer Price Index for All Urban Consumers.
60For de¯nitions of these lines of insurance, see the Insurance Information Institute (2005).
61The description of insurance types is taken from Hersh and Viscusi (2007).
62This point will be further discussed in the latter part of this section.Access to Justice: An Economic Approach 34
¯ve insurance types over the years 1988-2005. While the data is very rich, it still has limitations
that make necessary several restrictions on the set of cases included in my sample. Firstly, because
my primary focus is on the duration of pretrial negotiation, the data were sampled to obtain only
those observations for which a suit was ¯led. Due to this restriction, 75,619 claims are dropped.63
Obviously, the resulting sample is not representative of all cases brought for damage award, nor
should it be. Omission of the cases settled without suit ¯led does not introduce selectivity bias,
since the focus of my analysis is con¯ned to legal dispute resolution process and such cases are not
in the population of interest. Secondly, I drop 10,694 cases initiated before but terminated after
the initiation of prejudgment interest reform. This restriction allows me to unambiguously identify
the e®ect of prejudgment interest on litigation duration.64 Thirdly, an additional 30,458 claims are
dropped because information on the type of injury is not recorded. Fourthly, a further 2,163 claims
are dropped because information on the e®ect of joint and several liability is not recorded.65 Missing
or potentially misrecorded data on insurance type, insured's liability and litigation durations further
reduce the number of sampled observations.66 Because of these restrictions, the resulting sample of
67,130 cases contains 65,747 that terminated in a settlement before trial and 1,383 that terminated
after a trial had begun. I refer to the sample of 67,130 cases as my bargaining sample.
¤ Litigation duration and stages of case disposition. The variables and model parameters
are de¯ned in Table 2.1 (see appendix), and the corresponding descriptive statistics are presented in
tables 2.2 and 2.3.
Panel A of Table 2.2 provides an overview for the litigation sample of average litigation durations,
by each of the ¯ve insurance policy types and by stages of disposition. Calculations (not explicitly
reported in the table) based on the litigation sample show that the overwhelming share of cases in
the sample, 98%, consists of suits resolved prior to trial, either by an alternative dispute resolution
(31%) or through formal judicial process (67%). Additional 2% settled after a trial had begun but
before a court verdict was reached.
Let DURATION be the time elapsed between the date that a suit is ¯led and the date that the
claim is closed. DURATION for cases settled before trial are considerably shorter than for cases settled
during trial. For settlements before trial, auto liability has the shortest DURATION of 20 months; other
professional liability is 20% greater, with DURATION around 24 months; The longest DURATION for
settlement before trial is for general liability, with average DURATION of around 30 months. Settlement
during trial generates the longest delay in settlement with an average DURATION of 32 months.
The DURATION for these three categories of case disposition averages 25 months across all lines.
Auto liability claims have the shortest DURATION , averaging 20 months. The longest litigation dura-
tions are for general liability lawsuits, with average DURATION of 30 months. Table 2.2 Panel B reports
the median values that correspond to the entries in Panel A. Because of the skewed distributions of
63The descriptive statistics of these cases are reported in the appendix. See Table 2.3 Panel C.
64I am grateful to Eric van Damme and Timothy Swanson for raising the issue of unambiguous identi¯cation of the
e®ect of prejudgment interest reform.
65The potential e®ect of joint and several liability on the duration of litigation will be discussed in the latter part of
the paper.
66One case is dropped because information on insurance type is missing. Four additional cases are dropped because
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Table 2.3: Descriptive Statisticsa
Panel A. Legal System, Bargaining Environment and Delegation of Bargaining
Before Trial During Trial All Cases
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Legal system
PREJUDGMENT INTEREST RATE (%) 9.88 0.75 9.98 0.30 9.89 0.75
CONGESTION (months) 18 10 19 11 18 10
JOINT & SEVERAL LIABILITY (1=yes) 0.13 0.33 0.17 0.38 0.13 0.34
NONECONOMIC DAMAGES (1=yes) 0.38 0.49 0.45 0.50 0.38 0.49
Bargaining Environment
INITIAL INDEMNITY RESERVE ($) 75,404 217,650 107,938 322,760 76,074 220,367
INITIAL EXPENSE RESERVE ($) 9,000 23,776 12,154 25,433 9,065 23,815
INSURED'S FAULT (%) 81.00 31.60 76.71 33.62 80.91 31.65
MULTIDEF (1=yes) 0.416 0.493 0.495 0.500 0.417 0.493
Delegation Strategy
PLAINTIFF LAWYER (1=yes) 0.998 0.041 0.999 0.027 0.998 0.041
OUTSIDE DEFENSE COUNSEL (1=yes) 0.838 0.369 0.901 0.299 0.839 0.367
Observations 65,747 1,383 67,130
a. all dollar values are in 2005 $. The source for these values is author's calculations based on the Texas Department of
Insurance Commercial Liability Insurance Closed Claim database for the years 1988-2005.
the litigation durations, the median values are below the means.
¤ Legal system, bargaining environment, delegation and case characteristics. Four sets of
explanatory variables are employed in the analysis to account for possible variations in the mean and
dispersion of unobservable trial outcomes and those in the costs of continuing litigation. A ¯rst set
of variables captures aspects of the institutional environment where bargaining takes place. By far,
the most important is PREJUDGMENT INTEREST RATE | the variable that controls for the magnitude
of prejudgment interest rate imposed on damage payment. In Texas, from which the present sample
was drawn, the rate ¯xed at 10 percent a year from 1988 to July 2003. In August 2003, Texas enacted
prejudgment interest reform. Consequently, the rate was set to be the prime rate (`annual interest
rate' is a synonym) of the Federal Reserve System with ceiling of 15 percent a year and °oor of 5
percent a year.67 PREJUDGMENT INTEREST RATE equals 10% for cases terminated before 1st August
2003, and equals 5% for damage negotiations initiated after 1st August 2003.
Further, CONGESTION measures the speed of court proceedings. It is the average number of months
required for a case to reach trial from the date that suit was ¯led in a given district. The variable
thus controls for district-speci¯c determinants of duration. Fournier and Zuehlke's (1996) show that
cases ¯led in jurisdictions with relatively long court congestions tend in most instances to have greater
probability of settlement.
To distinguish the e®ect of prejudgment interest reform from other aspects of legal system, three
additional legal system variables will be included. JOINT & SEVERAL LIABILITY, indicates those cases
where joint and several liability a®ects settlement or trial verdict. Korhauser and Revesz (1994) found
that joint and several liability can a®ect both the probability of litigation and the size of the award.68
67See Texas O±ce of Consumer Credit Commission (2007).
68Korhauser and Revesz (1994) established that, absent of insolvency considerations, cases associated with joint andAccess to Justice: An Economic Approach 38
Due to the often complex e®ects of this liability scheme, I do not construct a continuous measure of its
e®ect but focus instead on a dummy variable categorizing whether joint and several liability impacts
damage award. 13% of the cases in my sample is impacted by joint and several liability. Litigated
cases are less likely to be a®ected by joint and several liability than cases settled before trial.
The last legal system variable, NONECONOMIC DAMAGES, is a dummy variable indicating whether
a plainti® receives compensation for noneconomic losses { for example, intangible losses such as
pain and su®ering.69 Unlike for economic damages, tort law has no objective criteria for measuring
noneconomic damages. Due to their subjective nature, it is often hard to predict the magnitudes
of such damages. Therefore, this variable also serves as a measure of the defendant's uncertainty.70
Noneconomic damages were warranted in 38% of the cases in my sample. Cases settled prior to trial
are less likely to involve noneconomic damages payment than cases settled after trial had begun.
A second set of variables re°ect changes in the bargaining environment. INITIAL INDEMNITY RE-
SERVE and INITIAL EXPENSE RESERVE, control for the scale of the defendant's prior estimate on the
severity of damage and the level legal expenses, respectively. These reserve amounts are determined
based on the insurer's experience with the injury type and the nature and severity of damage: a
higher initial indemnity reserve (resp. initial expense reserve) corresponds to a higher expected value
of damage (resp. higher expected level of legal expenditures and greater litigation length). Initial
reserve levels are established by insurers for the time that a damage claim was reported, which will
generally be before a suit is ¯led. That is, they are set before any actual damage payments are made
and actual defense expenditures are incurred. When insurers set up their initial reserve amounts for
a case, they should reserve an amount that corresponds to the actual expected damages and legal
costs for that case type. The estimate of the expected damages and expected costs will change as
additional information arrives. Although in retrospect all claims in the sample should have strictly
positive reserve amounts, at the time when the initial reserves were established the available informa-
tion on the claim may not suggest a positive expected damage or expenses. Indeed, data on all claims
reported to the TDI from 1988 to 2005 show that in 3% of the cases, insurers have actually made
zero damage payment and in 33% of the cases, insurers have actually incurred zero legal expenses.
The initial reserve amounts have relatively weak predictive power for actual damage payments,
legal expenses and length of litigation time, which is what one would expect given their predetermined
nature. A regression of actual defense expenditure on INITIAL EXPENSE RESERVE yields a coe±cient
of 1.1 (p-value = 0.000), demonstrating that on average, actual expenses track expected expenses
closely. However, the R-squared in this equation is only 0.05, showing that there is a great deal of
several liability have lower likelihood of settlement when the probabilities that the defendants will be found liable are
su±ciently uncorrelated across cases. Furthermore, Korhauser and Revesz (1994) found that when the probabilities are
perfectly correlated, the plainti® will extract more surplus from settlement in a joint and several liability case. The
theoretical models discussed in this chapter do not consider how joint and several liability might a®ect the settlement
process. My purpose here is to determine if there are any empirical di®erences in the duration of joint and several
liability cases relative to others.
69Economic damages were awarded in all paid claims. Therefore, the incidence of economic damage award is not
included as an explanatory variable.
70Viscusi (1988a), Sharkey (2005), Avraham (2006b), Rubin and Shepherd (2007) and Cummins and Weiss (1993)
make similar remarks on the unpredictability of noneconomic damages. Jury instructions often explicitly acknowledge
the subjective and imprecise nature of noneconomic damages. See, e.g., Judicial Council of California Civil Jury
Instructions No. 2905 A (2004).Access to Justice: An Economic Approach 39
variation across cases in actual expenses for any given INITIAL EXPENSE RESERVE level.71 A regression
of elapsed time between litigation duration on INITIAL EXPENSE RESERVE shows a similar signi¯cant,
but weak, relation, with a coe±cient 0.003 (p-value = 0.000), and an R-squared of 0.007. A regression
of damage payment on INITIAL INDEMNITY RESERVES shows a similar weak relation, with a coe±cient
of 0.78 (p-value = 0.000) and an R-squared of 0.18.
INSURED'S FAULT refers to the insured's percentage of fault after reallocating for plainti®'s negli-
gence. On average, the insured's share of fault is 81%. Together with INITIAL INDEMNITY RESERVE,
they provide a case-speci¯c measure of expected damages. Fenn and Rickman (2001), in their study
of motor vehicle accident cases, found that a case in which the insurer believes its insured is fully at
fault was, ceteris paribus, associated with shorter delays. A drawback to my measure might arise if
the insured's fault is endogenously determined in litigation process where the insurer uses delay to
signal the insured's fault to a plainti® who is less informed about the distribution of fault.
MULTIDEF indicates cases that involve multiple defendants and is included to control for potential
di®erences in the settlement decisions of multiple defendants.72 Approximately 42% of the cases
in my sample involves multiple defendants. There is a signi¯cant di®erence in multiple defendants
involvement between litigated and settled cases. Fournier and Zuehlke's (1996) empirical evidence
suggests that settlement takes longer to obtain when there are multiple litigants.
A third set of variables, `delegation strategy', controls for the litigants' delegation strategies that
may be associated with the both settlement likelihood and the included variables of interest. Hersch
and Viscusi (2007) show that for larger stake cases and more complex cases insurers rely more heavily
on outside counsel. Helland and Klick (2006) ¯nd that lawyers systematically delay settlement to
accrue additional fees when compensated by hourly fees or through a lodestar calculation.
Finally, I include two categorical variables, INSURANCE and INJURY, to control for the e®ects of
omitted case speci¯c characteristics that may be correlated with both settlement likelihood and the
included variables of interest. Kessler's (1996) empirical evidence suggests that claims arising out of
more serious injuries take longer to settle and that increased case complexity increases delay.73 Table
2.3, Panel B reports the mean and standard deviation of court verdict by di®erent insurance lines
and injury types. I report court verdicts for all tried cases (that is, cases received court verdicts)
from the population, not alone the tried cases in the sample, to provide a comprehensive measure
of the defendant's uncertainty about the stakes involving di®erent insurance and injury types. Auto
liability is the most commonly speci¯ed insurance category. It also has very low trial stakes per claim
and very low variation in court verdict amount across claims.
Professional liabilities have the opposite characteristics; these are infrequently occurring claims
with very high trial stakes per case and very large variation in court verdict amount across cases.
Back injury is the most commonly speci¯ed injury category. It also has very low damage payments
per claim with very low variation in payments across claims. Fatal injuries and very severe injuries
types such as amputation, burns-heat, systemic poison-toxic, brain damage and spin cord injuries,
71Restricting this regression to the 67% of the observations reporting nonzero initial expense reserves yield an R-
squared of 0.09.
72The theoretic analysis discussed above do not consider the impact of the participation of multiple parties on settle-
ment process. My purpose here is determine if there exist empirical di®erences in the duration of these cases relative to
others.
73See Kessler (1996), page 445.Access to Justice: An Economic Approach 40
Table 2.3. (continued)
Panel B: Court Verdict by Insurance & Injury Types
Mean Std. devn. Observations
Insurance Line
Monoline general liability ($) 918,219 3,160,960 681
Commercial auto liability 471,636 1,643,413 1,253
Commercial multiperil 1,119,324 3,867,493 438
Medical professional liability 3,566,801 28,053,925 488
Other professional liability 2,544,966 10,117,273 31
All lines 1,219,656 11,860,978 2,891
Injury Type
Death ($) 4,074,435 3.28e+07 347
Amputation 1,700,604 2,685,387 42
Burns (heat) 841,353 1,467,806 47
Burns (chemical) 771,471 1,216,696 14
Systemic poisoning (toxic) 816,404 1,304,336 7
Systemic poisoning (other) 182,123 284,585 11
Eye injury (blindness) 1,192,381 1,808,639 35
Respiratory condition 2,841,058 6,215,495 13
Nervous condition 703,397 1,365,239 55
Hearing loss or impairment 2,380,039 4,064,951 20
Circulatory condition 600,334 876,920 28
Multiple injuries 793,219 3,272,379 711
Back injury 485,507 1,543,377 857
Skin disorder 1,266,976 3,364,021 9
Brain damage 5,412,468 9,911,498 109
Scarring 1,073,026 2,447,380 92
Spinal cord injuries 4,323,863 9,545,227 46
Other 1,460,703 5,597,202 590
All types 1,219,656 11,860,978 2,891
a. all dollar values are in 2005 $. The source for these values is author's calculations
based on the Texas Department of Insurance Commercial Liability Insurance Closed
Claim database for the years 1988-2005.
have the opposite characteristics; these are infrequently occurring injuries with very high damage
payments per case and very large variation in payments across cases. The insurance line and injury
types thus may serve as measures of the defendant's uncertainty about trial stake and helps to capture
case scale e®ects.74 A drawback to these measures might arise if the defendants can estimate trial
stakes using information other than insurance line and injury types.75
2.5. The Empirical Models
2.5.1. Models of Litigation Duration
To analyze the in°uence of legal regime and that of bargaining environment on the duration of
settlements, hazard models were estimated. My focus here is the e®ect of each exogenous characteristic
of the lawsuit on the probability of settlement, conditional on settlement not having already reached,
74The sample moments of trial award distributions are not used as variables in the analysis since the number of claims
proceed to trial was small, and there is a sample selection bias a®ecting such claims. See Viscusi (1988a) for similar
critiques on using sample moments of trial award distributions as proxies for expected trial outcome and variance in
trial outcomes.
75I thank Kathryn Spier for pointing out this issue.Access to Justice: An Economic Approach 41
and holding other case characteristics constant. The intervening endogenous settlement payment and
actual litigation costs are not explicitly modeled.
In what follows, I estimate two alternative empirical speci¯cations and investigate the robustness
of the results. The second speci¯cation is a generalization of the ¯rst. It should be stressed that the
empirical models I am using are reduced form models and not structural models.
¥ Cox's (1972) semiparametric proportional hazard model is the most popular approach
towards characterizing the hazard function h(t;¢). The model is consistent with the empirical lit-
erature of dynamic pretrial bargaining76 and °exible enough to account for potential inappropriate
distribution assumptions that may be involved in parametric methods.77 The hazard function for
case i is
hi(t;xi) = h0(t) £ exp(x0
i¯)
where t is the elapsed time since the start of bargaining, xi is a vector of observed explanatory
variables. The parameter vector ¯ is the vector of coe±cients, measuring the in°uence of observed
characteristics. The term exp(x0
i¯) shifts the baseline hazard function h0(t), and a positive coe±cient
indicates that the observed case characteristics increase the settlement hazard and reduce the litigation
duration. The model is semiparametric in that the baseline hazard h0(t) is a nonparametric function
of time, with the in°uence of other observable case characteristics speci¯ed assuming a particular
functional form. Furthermore, the model is a proportional hazard one since the ratio of the hazard
function for any group with certain observed characteristics to that of the baseline hazard is equal to a
constant, dependent only on the observed characteristics; i.e, h(t)=h0(t), the relative hazard function,
is not time varying.
¥ Cox model with time varying e®ects of the covariates. To this point, our discussion of Cox
model is fairly standard. Most applications make the baseline hazard rate a function of explanatory
variables and estimate a single duration elasticity. However, it is important to consider the validity
of the proportionality assumption. The results of section 2.3 (see inequalities (11), (12) and (13))
suggest that changes in the bargaining environment and the legal system may not lead to strictly
proportional shifts in the hazard function.
Consequently, I generalize, in a similar fashion as Fournier and Zuehlke (1998) and Fenn and
Rickman (2001) do, the usual proportional hazard speci¯cation by allowing the duration elasticity of
each observation to vary with the vector of explanatory variables. The model being estimated now
takes the form of
hi(t;xi) = h0(t)exp(x0
i¯(t)): (25)
where hi(t;xi) is the hazard rate at time t for case i with covariates xi. Following Stablein et al.
(1981), I assume that ¯(t) is a vector of linear functions of time. This is equivalent to adding
an interaction term of x and time to the model, which was proposed by Cox (1972) to check the
assumption of proportional hazards for the covariates.
76See, e.g., Fenn and Rickman (2001) and Kessler (1999).
77The advantages of using Cox (1972) model to analyze time to event data have been widely recognized. See, e.g.,
Kalb°eisch and Prentice (1980), Meyer (1990), Kessler (1999) and Perperoglou (2005).Access to Justice: An Economic Approach 42
The value of adopting this speci¯cation follows directly from my comparative statics (11) and
(18). This speci¯cation allows both the intercept and slope of the log-hazard function of cases to vary
with changes in the legal system and bargaining environment.
Suppose that there are n observations and k distinct settlement times. Further suppose that I
rank the settlement times such that t1 < t2 < ::: < tk where tj denotes the settlement time for the
jth case. Furthermore, let Rj denote the set of cases that have not settled until time tj. Then the

































For the proportional hazard model where a single duration elasticity is estimated, ¯(tj) = ¯ for all
j 2 f1;2;:::;kg .
2.5.2. Models of Settlement Payment
To analyze the in°uence of change in prejudgment interest rate on the level of settlement payment,
a linear regression model was estimated. As before, it should be stressed that the empirical model I
am using is a reduced form model and not a structural model. Let the estimated value of settlement
payment be given by
Ãi = x0
i~ ¯ + ²i; (28)
for each case i. xi is a vector of observed explanatory variables. The parameter vector ~ ¯ is the vector of
coe±cients, measuring the in°uence of observed characteristics. A positive coe±cient indicates that
the observed case characteristics increase the settlement payment. The parameters for settlement
payments are estimated by ordinary least squares (OLS) regression.
2.6. Empirical Evidence
2.6.1. Duration of Litigation
Graphical analysis. I begin by graphing the non-parametric Kaplan-Meier hazard functions over
the ¯rst 60 months of litigation for di®erent factors that could in°uence the duration of settlement.78
The empirical hazard is the fraction of unsettled claims at the start of a month which settle during
the month.79 These functions plot rates of settlement against the litigation durations.
78I am grateful to Eric van Damme and Jan van Ours for suggesting me to graph these functions and to devote
attention to analyzing them.
79Formally, de¯ning the risk set in month m, Rm, as the number of claims not settled by the start of month m, and
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Figure 2.3: E®ects of Prejudgment Interest Reform
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Figure 2.6: Non-Economic Damages
Figures 2.3, 2.4, 2.5 and 2.6 depict the settlement hazards strati¯ed by di®erent institutional
factors. Claims settled after the downward adjustment of prejudgment interest rate have higher
settlement hazards and therefore take shorter to settle (Figure 2.3). However, one should not imme-
diately conclude that the increase in settlement hazards results solely from the prejudgment interest
rate reform. The prejudgment interest reform was enacted since August 2003. Several other reforms
were enacted in the same period in Texas. Further analysis will be conducted in section 2.6.2 to
isolate the e®ect of prejudgment interest reform.
Delay in trial courts increases delay in settlement (Figure 2.4); the doctrine of joint and several
liability has a negative impact on the settlement hazards (Figure 2.5); when non-economic damages
are warranted, the probability of a settlement decreases and the litigation duration increases (Figure
2.6). These graphical analyses suggest a clear link between delay and the institutional factors.
Figure 2.7 depicts the settlement hazards strati¯ed by the insurer's initial estimate of the extent
of damage. During the ¯rst 20 months from the suits were ¯led, there is no apparent di®erence in
settlement hazards between claims with high initial indemnity reserves and those with low reserves.
As litigation prolongs, the di®erence becomes more pronounced: cases expected to have higher damage
levels by the insurer have higher settlement hazards and therefore take shorter to settle. This graphical
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Figure 2.9: Settlement Hazard by Insurance Lines
over time. A caveat to this graphic analysis is that it might not provide an adequate impression of
the in°uence of damages on settlement hazards: The theory presented in section 2.3 suggests that
settlement hazards tend to increase with the severity of damages and decrease with legal costs.80 But
high damages are usually associated with high legal costs.81 Since the analysis in Figures 2.7 does not
single out the e®ect of damages on settlement hazards from that of legal costs, the e®ect of damages
is likely to be underestimated.
Figure 2.8 provides an interesting snapshot of the settlement hazards strati¯ed by the insurer's
initial estimate of the level of defense expenditure. Cases with large initial expense reserves have lower
settlement hazards during the ¯rst 30 months from the suit was ¯led. This pattern is reversed, how-
ever, as litigation prolongs. This graphical analysis suggests that there is no evidence of a systematic
relation between litigation duration and defense expenditures. However, the graph may misrepresents
the in°uence of legal costs on settlement hazards: legal costs usually increase with the severity of
80Fenn and Rickman (2001) and Fournier and Zuehlke (1996) make the same prediction that settlement hazards
increase with the severity of damage and decrease with the level of legal costs.
81A regression of INITIAL INDEMNITY RESERVES on INITIAL EXPENSE RESERVES for all claims reported to the
TDI from 1988 to 2005 yields a coe±cient of 2.8 (p-value = 0.000) and an R-squared of 0.10. Restricting this regression
to the 95% of the observations reporting nonzero initial expense reserves yield an R-squared of 0.16.Access to Justice: An Economic Approach 45
damages. Moreover, the hazard rate of settlement tends to increase with the severity of damages but
decrease with the level of legal costs. Since Figure 2.8 does not separate the e®ect of legal costs on
settlement hazards from the e®ect of damages, the e®ect of legal costs is likely to be underestimated.
Figure 2.9 shows the sample hazards for insurance of di®erent types. There is a clear marked
variation across types. In particular, the settlement hazards are much higher for auto liability claims
than for monoline general liability and for medical professional liability claims. Table 2.2, together
with this ¯gure clearly indicate that the pattern of settlement delays di®er considerable across di®er-
ent insurance lines.
¥ Regression analysis. Table 2.4 reports the Cox regression estimates of the time-dependence
coe±cients and the baseline coe±cients.82 Both speci¯cations reported make the baseline (t = 1)
hazard rate a function of the case characteristics discussed in section 2.4. The speci¯cations di®er
in their treatment of the duration elasticity. The speci¯cation reported in the ¯rst column is rather
simple, allowing the initial hazard rate a function of explanatory variables but estimating a single
duration elasticity.
The speci¯cation in the second column generalizes the ¯rst model by making the duration elasticity
a function of the legal system variables and bargaining environment variables. This speci¯cation allows
me to determine whether there is empirical support for the propositions obtained from my comparative
static analysis of Spier's model. Particularly, do the settlement hazards of claims increase or decrease
with prejudgment interest rate and delays in trial court? In addition, the second speci¯cation makes
the incremental e®ect of prejudgment interest on the duration elasticity a linear function of INITIAL
INDEMNITY RESERVE and INITIAL EXPENSE RESERVE. Essentially, interaction terms for each of these
two variables with PREJUDGMENT INTEREST RATE are added to the list of explanatory variables that
determine the duration elasticity. The bene¯t of the inclusion of interaction terms is the re¯nement
in explaining the impact of prejudgment interest.
For the simpler speci¯cation, reported in columns 1 of Table 2.4, the signi¯cantly negative sign of
the coe±cient of PREJUDGMENT INTEREST RATE suggests that cases with higher prejudgment interest
rates take longer to settle. In other words a reform that is designed to reduce delay through the
imposition of prejudgment interest have the actual e®ect of increasing delay, in line with my theoretical
prediction.
A one percentage point increase in prejudgment interest rate would reduce the settlement hazard
by 67 percent.83 An important caveat to this interpretation is raised by the lack of control for
the e®ects of changes in social, economic and legal systems.84 Recall that PREJUDGMENT INTEREST
RATE equals 10 for cases terminated before 1st August 2003 and 5 for damage negotiations initiated
after 1st August 2003. My model cannot determine whether the empirical di®erences attributed to
prejudgment interests re°ect the impact of such interests on litigation behavior, or these di®erences
re°ect developments in technology, social environment or other features of the legal system in the
82The continuous variables are in terms of natural logs so that the coe±cients in the equation equals the duration
elasticities of the hazard rate with respect to the independent variables. In addition, I add one to all values before
taking natural logs because some claims report zero values.
831 ¡ expf¡1:696g ¼ 81:7%
84I am grateful to two anonymous defense committee members for raising this issue concerning potential model
misspeci¯cation.Access to Justice: An Economic Approach 46















Log(INITIAL INDEMNITY RESERVE) ¡0:142¤
(0:018)







Log(INITIAL INDEMNITY RESERVE) 0:045¤¤
(0:007)








JOINT & SEVERAL LIABILITY ¡0:073¤ ¡0:762y
(0:014) (0:080)
NONECONOMIC DAMAGES ¡0:086¤¤ ¡0:376y
(0:008) (0:041)
Bargaining Environment
Log(INITIAL INDEMNITY RESERVE) 0:016¤¤ 0:127¤¤
(0:002) (0:009)
Log(INITIAL EXPENSE RESERVE) ¡0:013¤¤ ¡0:085¤¤
(0:001) (0:004)





PLAINTIFF LAWYER ¡0:278y ¡0:287y
(0:095) (0:095)
OUTSIDE DEFENSE COUNSEL ¡0:268¤ ¡0:265¤
(0:011) (0:011)








Monoline general liability ¡0:209¤ ¡0:214¤
(0:037) (0:037)
Commercial auto liability 0:201¤ 0:181¤
(0:037) (0:037)
Commercial multiperil ¡0:038¤ ¡0:041¤
(0:038) (0:038)







Burns (heat) ¡0:093¤ ¡0:094¤
(0:028) (0:028)
Burns (chemical) ¡0:114y ¡0:104y
(0:051) (0:051)
Systemic poisoning (toxic) ¡0:454¤ ¡0:590¤
(0:036) (0:038)
Systemic poisoning (other) 0:035y 0:056y
(0:071) (0:071)
Eye injury (blindness) ¡0:019¤ ¡0:023¤
(0:034) (0:034)
Respiratory condition ¡0:418¤ ¡0:510¤
(0:032) (0:033)
Nervous condition ¡0:089¤ ¡0:081¤
(0:031) (0:031)
Hearing loss or impairment ¡0:054y ¡0:057y
(0:051) (0:051)
Circulatory condition 0:017¤ 0:031¤
(0:044) (0:044)
Multiple injuries 0:064¤ 0:066¤
(0:011) (0:011)
Back injury 0:030¤ 0:030¤
(0:012) (0:012)
Skin disorder 0:144¤ 0:139y
(0:055) (0:055)








Log likelihood -677,292.87 -676,514.41
a. Standard errors are shown in parentheses.
y signi¯cant at 10 percent level; * signi¯cant at 5 percent level; ** signi¯cant at 1 percent level. Omitted
insurance policy type is other professional liability.
Source: Author's calculations based on the Texas Department of Insurance Commercial Liability Insurance
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same period. This problem will be further addressed in section 2.6.2. The coe±cient of my measure
of court congestion, CONGESTION, is signi¯cantly negative. This indicates that delays in trial courts
increase delays in settlement out of court. Furthermore, the coe±cient of JOINT & SEVERAL LIABILITY
and that of NONECONOMIC DAMAGES are signi¯cantly negative. This suggests that cases take longer to
settle when joint and several liability impacts settlement or potential verdict and when non-economic
damage is an element of compensation.
However, some of the baseline coe±cient in the ¯rst model are not consistent with my theoretical
predictions. The coe±cient of my measure of stakes, INITIAL INDEMNITY RESERVE is signi¯cantly
positive. The coe±cient of my measure of litigation time-length and legal costs, INITIAL EXPENSE
RESERVE, is signi¯cantly negative. The coe±cient of my measure of the tortfeasor's liability, INSURED'S
FAULT is signi¯cantly positive. Therefore, it appears that a claim on which the insurer expects that
the damages and liabilities are higher, ceteris paribus, be associated with shorter delays; a case that
the insurer expects to cost more, ceteris paribus, be associated with longer delays. These results
deserve close attention: they con°ict with the prediction obtained from the theory and questions the
appropriateness of Cox's (1972) proportional hazard model in ¯tting the sample data.
Furthermore, the signi¯cantly negative coe±cient of MULTIDEF provides an intuitively appealing
result: settlement agreement is more di±cult to reach when there are multiple parties negotiating.85
As a ¯nal note on this simple model, the signi¯cantly negative coe±cients of PLAINTIFF LAWYER
and OUTSIDE DEFENSE COUNSEL and suggest a clear link between settlement delay and the litigants'
delegation strategies: settlement is more di±cult to obtain for cases in which the defendant retains
an outside defense counsel. However, I am not able to establish causality between lawyer involvement
in the litigation game and increased delay.
One shortfall of the ¯rst speci¯cation in Table 2.4 is that attribute variation (i.e., variation in
the explanatory variables), to the extent it has any impact, is constrained to generate parallel shifts
in the log-hazard function. The baseline coe±cients reported above determine intercept shifts in the
linear relationship between the log-hazard function and the log of current duration. The generalized
model reported in column 2 allows variation in legal system, bargaining environment and parties'
delegation strategy to change both the intercept and slope of this linear relationship. The coe±cients
reported under the heading Time-Dependence Parameters gauge the e®ect of changes in institutional
and bargaining environments on the slope, or duration elasticity, of this linear relationship.
As in the ¯rst model, the baseline coe±cient of PREJUDGMENT INTEREST RATE is negative, but
statistically insigni¯cant and much smaller in absolute value. The time-dependence coe±cient of
PREJUDGMENT INTEREST RATE is a linear function of INITIAL INDEMNITY RESERVE and INITIAL EXPENSE
RESERVE. The constant term of this linear function is negative but statistically insigni¯cantly. The
increment to the duration elasticity following a percentage increase in prejudgment interest rate is
estimated to be -0.305 at the means of INITIAL INDEMNITY RESERVE and INITIAL EXPENSE RESERVE.86
This result might best be interpreted as follows: on average, high prejudgment interest discourages
settlement. But the adverse e®ect is not signi¯cant. The incremental e®ect of PREJUDGMENT INTEREST
85Kornhauser and Revesz (1994) show that cases associated with multiple defendants who share joint and several
liability have lower likelihood of settlement when the plainti®s' probabilities of trial success are su±ciently uncorrelated
across cases.
86-0.683+0.045*ln(76;074)-0.014*ln(9;065) ¼ ¡0:305. The time-dependence coe±cient of PREJUDGMENT INTER-
EST RATE , estimated at the means of INITIAL INDEMNITY RESERVE and INITIAL EXPENSE RESERVE for back
injury, skin disorder, death, amputation, are -0.09, -0.033, -0.008, and -0.019, respectively.Access to Justice: An Economic Approach 49
RATE on duration elasticity is found to be increasing in stakes and decreasing in litigation costs.
However, as mentioned earlier there is a caveat to the accuracy of my analysis raised by the lack of
control for the e®ects of changes in social, economic and legal environments. 87.
Both the baseline coe±cient and the time-dependence coe±cient of CONGESTION, my measures of
trial delays, are negative and statistically signi¯cant. Thus, an increase in trial delays results in a log-
hazard pro¯le with signi¯cantly lower intercept and a smaller slope. Hence, cases ¯led in jurisdictions
with longer trial delays always tend to have longer settlement delays. This result contradicts the
prediction of the theoretic model (see inequalities (11)) that increased delays in trial courts lead to
decreased delays in out-of-court settlement (i.e., hT > 0).
The estimates of JOINT & SEVERAL LIABILITY provide an interesting result. As in the ¯rst model,
the baseline coe±cient of JOINT & SEVERAL LIABILITY, is negative and statistically signi¯cant, but
much larger in absolute value. In contrast to its baseline e®ect, the time-dependence coe±cient of
JOINT & SEVERAL LIABILITY is signi¯cantly positive. Thus, cases where joint and several liability has
an impact on settlement has a log-hazard pro¯le with a lower intercept and a greater slope. Since
the time-dependence coe±cient is small relative to the baseline coe±cient, however, the e®ect of joint
and several liability shifts the hazard pro¯le downward for majority of cases settled before trial.88
There is a similar pattern associated with my measure of uncertainty in law, NONECONOMIC DAM-
AGES, where the baseline and time-dependence e®ects work in opposition. Its baseline coe±cient is
far more negative than that of the simple model, and its estimated time-dependence coe±cient is
positive but much smaller in absolute value than its base-line e®ect. Thus, allowing non-economic
loss as an element of damage compensation results in a log-hazard function with a lower intercept
and a greater slope. Since the time-dependence coe±cient is small relative to the baseline coe±cient,
however, the unexpected time-dependence e®ect of NONECONOMIC DAMAGES does not overcome the
baseline e®ect until duration exceeds approximately 55 months,89 encompassing approximately 93%
of the cases in the bargaining sample. This indicates that uncertainty in law generates longer delays
in settlement for most of the cases.
Turning to the insurer's prior estimates on stakes, the baseline coe±cient of INITIAL INDEMNITY
RESERVE is signi¯cantly positive and greater in absolute value than the corresponding estimate from
the simpler model. The time-dependence coe±cient of INITIAL INDEMNITY RESERVE is a linear function
of PREJUDGMENT INTEREST RATE: it is estimated to be -0.035 at the mean of PREJUDGMENT INTEREST
RATE. Thus, an increase in INITIAL INDEMNITY RESERVE results in a log-hazard pro¯le with a signi¯-
cantly larger intercept and a signi¯cantly smaller slope. The net e®ects, judged within the observed
range of duration, are not consistent with the theory. Estimated at the mean of PREJUDGMENT INTER-
EST RATE, a unit increase in INITIAL INDEMNITY RESERVE, results in a lower probability of settlement
after approximately 38.8 months, encompassing only 17:3% of the cases in the bargaining sample.
This ¯nding is not consistent with Spier's (1992) theoretic prediction and with Fenn and Rickman's
(2001) and Kessler's (1996) evidence from motor-insurance claims and Fenn and Rickman's (1999)
87I am grateful to two anonymous defense committee members for raising this issue concerning potential model
misspeci¯cation.
88The time-dependence e®ect of JOINT & SEVERAL LIABILITY does not overcome the baseline e®ect until duration exceeds
approximately 38 (expf0:762=0:209g ¼ 38) months, encompassing approximately 82% of the cases in the bargaining
sample.
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study of medical negligence and employee cases. They found that delays increase when the estimated
damages are high. However, this result has foundation in the work of Priest and Klein (1984).90
Turning to the measures of litigation costs, INITIAL EXPENSE RESERVE, provides an intuitive result
that is consistent with the theory. Its baseline coe±cient is signi¯cantly negative in the generalized
model. The time-dependence coe±cient of INITIAL EXPENSE RESERVE, is a linear function of PREJUDG-
MENT INTEREST RATE: it is estimated to be 0.024 at the mean of PREJUDGMENT INTEREST RATE. Thus,
an increase in INITIAL EXPENSE RESERVE results in a log-hazard pro¯le with a signi¯cantly smaller
intercept and a signi¯cantly greater slope. The net e®ects, judged within the observed range of dura-
tion, are not supported by the theory. A unit increase in INITIAL EXPENSE RESERVE, results in a higher
probability of settlement until more than 36 months after a suit is ¯led, encompassing approximately
80% of the cases in the bargaining sample. This ¯nding is not consistent with Spier's (1992) theoretic
prediction.
In relation to the insured's fault (i.e., the plainti®'s likelihood of prevailing in court), the pre-
diction of the theoretic model is not supported by the empirical result: for 76% of the out-of-court
settlements,91 higher fault is signi¯cantly associated with higher settlement hazards and therefore
shorter delays. Although this evidence con°icts with the prediction obtained from the theory and
questions the validity of Spier's model in this regard, it has foundation in the work of Priest and
Klein (1984).92
Turning to the parties' delegation strategies, the coe±cients of PLAINTIFF LAWYER and OUTSIDE
DEFENSE COUNSEL are both signi¯cantly negative. This suggests that cases involving plainti® lawyer
and outside defense counsel are signi¯cantly and strongly associated with longer delays.
The coe±cients also indicate that claims associated with less complex and more routine insurance
lines take shorter to settle. In the augmented model, for example, the hazard rate of settlement of
commercial auto liability claims is approximately 1.5 times (expf0:181gexpf¡0:214g ¼ 1:5) as great
as that for monoline general liability, 1.5 times (expf0:181g=expf¡0:041g ¼ 1:3) as great as that for
commercial multiperil, 1.3 times as great as that for medical professional liability claims and 1.2 times
as great as that for other professional liability.
The injury variables re°ect both case complexity and the scale of the claim. The estimated e®ects
of injury types on settlement hazards are economically plausible. In comparison with the omitted
category of multiple injuries, cases take longer to settle if they are associated with fatal injuries and
very serious injury types: amputations, burns, systemic poisoning-toxic, brain damage and spinal
cord injuries. In contrast, less complex and minor injuries such as skin disorder, back injury and
circulatory conditions have shorter settlement delays.
90Priest and Klein (1984) assumes that settlement occurs when the parties can identify settlement terms that make
them both better o®, in their view, than going to trial. A crucial determinant of settlement, therefore, is the defendant's
assessment of the severity of damage. When the defendant estimates that the severity of damage is high, she is more
likely to agree with the plainti®'s settlement terms.
91The time-dependence e®ect, following a unit increase in INSURED'S FAULT, does not overcome the baseline e®ect until
duration exceeds approximately 31 (expf0:108=0:031g ¼ 33) months, encompassing approximately 76% of the cases
settled prior to trial.
92Priest and Klein (1984) assumes that settlement occurs when the parties can identify settlement terms that make
them both better o®, in their view, than going to trial. A crucial determinant of settlement, therefore, is the defendant's
assessment of its own liability. When the defendant's (or the insured's) fault is high, ceteris paribus, the defendant is
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2.6.2. Caveats and Robustness Checks
The results in the previous section suggest that prejudgment interest has unjusti¯ably large negative
in°uence on the duration of settlement. In this section, I discuss the steps I take to control for
the e®ects of omitted legal factors that may be correlated with both settlement probability and the
included variables of interest.
The prejudgment interest reform was enacted since August 2003. Several other reforms were
enacted in the same period in Texas. The most prominent of these are noneconomic damage caps
reform, early o®er reform for medical professional liability claims, and joint and several liability reform
(see Avraham (2006a)). The e®ect of noneconomic damage caps, when they are binding, is to reduce
trial awards.93 As discussed in Section 2.3, reduction in trial awards could lead to an increase in
settlement hazards. The early o®er statute provides the insurer in a medical professional liability
claim with an option of making a prompt settlement o®er to the plainti® that covers earning losses
and medical expenses. If the o®er is rejected, then the plainti® may pursue extensive litigation.
However, the standard of proof will be raised at trial.94 Hersch et al. (2007) estimate that settlement
will be expedited by the introduction of early o®er statute. The joint and several liability reform
provides that defendant pays only assessed percentage of fault unless the defendant is 50 percent or
more responsible, and that defendants can designate other responsible parties whose fault contributed
to causing plainti®'s harm. As discussed in Section 2.4, joint and several liability can a®ect both the
probability of litigation and the size of the award, thereby a®ecting the settlement hazards.
An important limitation to my results reported in Table 2.4 is that I do not distinguish between
changes in the settlement hazards that are caused by the prejudgment interest reform from those that
are caused by the other reforms enacted in the same period. To see if this might be driving my key
¯ndings,95 I rerun the model in the second column of Table 2.4 but omit the observations where joint
and several liability is applicable or noneconomic damage is an element of damage compensation.
In addition to that, I omit medical professional liability claims for which the early o®er statute and
noneconomic damage caps are applicable. Because of these restrictions, the resulting subsample
contains 29,583 cases. I will refer to this subsample as the restricted sample.
After controlling for the potential e®ects of noneconomic damage caps reform, early o®er statute
and joint and several liability reform, the baseline coe±cient of PREJUDGMENT INTEREST RATE becomes
larger in absolute value but remains statistically insigni¯cant. Meanwhile, the time-dependence co-
e±cient of PREJUDGMENT INTEREST RATE becomes smaller. The decrement to the duration elasticity
following a percentage increase in PREJUDGMENT INTEREST RATE is estimated to be -0.135 at the means
of INITIAL INDEMNITY RESERVE and INITIAL EXPENSE RESERVE for the bargaining sample. This is much
93Using the Texas Department of Insurance Commercial Liability Insurance Closed Claim database for the years
1988-2004, Hyman (2008) et al. estimate that for pro-plainti® jury verdicts, the caps a®ect 47% of verdicts, and reduces
average verdict amount by 26%. In cases settled without trial, the caps a®ect 18% of cases; and reduces average
settlement payment by 18%.
94Under this system, a defendant has the option, not the obligation, to o®er the injured victim, within 180 days
after a claim is ¯led, periodic payment of the claimant's net economic losses as they accrue. Economic losses under an
early-o®ers statute must cover medical expenses, including rehabilitation, plus lost wages, to the extent that all such
costs are not already covered by insurance or other collateral sources, plus attorney's fees.
95I gratefully acknowledge the suggestions from two anonymous defense committee members, Ronen Avraham, Paul
Fenn and participants of American Law and Economics Association 18th Annual Meeting (May 2008) for me to conduct
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smaller in absolute value than the value of -0.305 derived from column 2 of Table 2.4. The incremen-
tal e®ect of PREJUDGMENT INTEREST RATE on the duration elasticity is also found to be increasing in
stakes and decreasing in litigation costs. Thus, my empirical evidence suggests, the initial decrease in
the baseline hazard rate experienced by cases with high prejudgment interest rate is reinforced more
quickly for cases with lower stakes and higher litigation costs.
Moreover, claims involve noneconomic damage, joint and several liability and medical malpractice
are usually more complex and associated with higher uncertainty.96 The smaller time-dependence
coe±cient of PREJUDGMENT INTEREST RATE for in restricted sample suggests that the adverse e®ect
of PREJUDGMENT INTEREST RATE on duration elasticity increases with uncertainty. This is consistent
with the prediction (inequality (22)) of the theoretic model (hR» > 0).
2.6.3. Alternative Delay Indicators
In this subsection I brie°y describe exercises I conducted to see if the results above are robust to
my empirical modeling assumptions. The previous subsections reveal a negative but statistically
insigni¯cant impact of prejudgment interest and court delays on litigation durations measured as the
time elapsed between the date of ¯ling of a case and the date of case termination. In this subsection,
I investigate the robustness of this ¯nding to the use of alternative measures of litigation delays: [1]
the time elapsed between injury and case termination, and [2] the time elapsed between the insurer
receiving a damage claim and case termination.
I rerun the model in the second column of Table 2.4. To control for the e®ects of omitted
institutional characteristics that may be correlated with both settlement likelihood and prejudgment
interest rates, the regressions are run on the restricted sample. Estimates of the time-dependence
coe±cients and the baseline coe±cients are presented in columns 2 and 3 of Table 2.5.
For litigation durations measured as time between injury and case closure, reported in column 2
of Table 2.5, the baseline hazard of PREJUDGMENT INTEREST RATE is negative, and large in absolute
value, but statistically insigni¯cant. As with previous speci¯cations, this model ¯nds a insigni¯cantly
lower baseline hazard rate for cases with higher a prejudgment interest rates. Unlike in the previ-
ous speci¯cations, however, the duration elasticity is estimated to be positive (1.54) at the means
of INITIAL INDEMNITY RESERVE and INITIAL EXPENSE RESERVE of the restricted sample. Since the
time-dependence coe±cient is small relative to the baseline coe±cient, however, a unit increase in
PREJUDGMENT INTEREST RATE results in a hazard pro¯le with a lower probability of settlement for
approximately 77.9 months, encompassing approximately 99 % of cases in the restricted sample.
Therefore, the overall e®ect of PREJUDGMENT INTEREST RATE is consistent with my results.
The measure of court backlog, CONGESTION, provides an interesting result. Its baseline coe±cient
was signi¯cantly negative in the previous models, but is signi¯cantly positive when litigation duration
is measure by time elapsed from injury. Its time-dependence coe±cient becomes signi¯cantly negative.
Thus, an increase in CONGESTION results in a log-hazard pro¯le with a signi¯cantly greater intercept
and a signi¯cantly smaller slope. The time-dependence e®ect of an increase in CONGESTION overcomes
96See Section 2.4 for discussion on uncertainty associated with noneconomic damage claims and medical malpractice
claims. Among the litigated cases for the years 1988-2005, my calculation using the TDI data indicates that the
standard deviations for trial awards with joint and several liability (resp. with single liability claims) is $ 3.59e+07
(resp.$ 3,109,769). This serves as evidence that higher uncertainty is associated with claims with joint and several
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Table 2.5. Robustness Checks: Alternative Specifications for Pretrial Settlementa
Time between Time between
Tort reforms Injury & Closure Claim & Closure
(N = 29;583) (N = 29;583) (N = 29;583)
Log Log Log
Variable (DURATION) (DURATION-1) (DURATION-2)
Time-Dependence Parameters
Log(PREJUDGMENT INTEREST RATE) ¡0:198 1:358 ¡0:599
(0:137) (0:133) (0:166)
Log(CONGESTION) 0:000¤ ¡0:038¤ ¡0:030¤
(0:013) (0:018) (0:017)
Bargaining Environment
Log(INITIAL INDEMNITY RESERVE) ¡0:035¤ ¡0:044¤ ¡0:173¤
(0:023) (0:020) (0:025)
Log(INITIAL EXPENSE RESERVE) 0:057¤ 0:003¤ 0:027¤
(0:012) (0:010) (0:012)
Log(INSURED'S FAULT) ¡0:074¤ ¡0:029¤ 0:102¤
(0:015) (0:020) (0:018)
MULTIDEF 0:000¤¤ 0:187¤ ¡0:101¤
(0:000) (0:033) (0:029)
Interaction
Log(INITIAL INDEMNITY RESERVE) 0:017¤¤ 0:013¤¤ 0:047¤¤
(0:009) (0:008) (0:009)




Log(PREJUDGMENT INTEREST RATE) ¡1:411 ¡6:712 ¡2:553
(0:247) (0:338) (0:391)
Log(CONGESTION) ¡0:042¤ 0:111y 0:069y
(0:039) (0:065) (0:059)
Bargaining Environment
Log(INITIAL INDEMNITY RESERVE) ¡0:012¤ 0:070¤ 0:238¤
(0:013) (0:018) (0:021)
Log(INITIAL EXPENSE RESERVE) ¡0:080¤¤ ¡0:056¤¤ 0:004¤¤
(0:006) (0:010) (0:009)
Log(INSURED'S FAULT) 0:273¤ 0:160y ¡0:360y
(0:047) (0:076) (0:060)
MULTIDEF ¡0:207 ¡0:783y 0:337y
(0:135) (0:119) (0:099)
Delegation Strategy
PLAINTIFF LAWYER ¡0:362¤ ¡0:054y ¡0:053
(0:016) (0:135) (0:135)
OUTSIDE DEFENSE COUNSEL ¡0:170¤ ¡0:236¤ ¡0:244¤
(0:017) (0:016) (0:016)
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Table 2.5. Robustness Checks: Alternative Specificationsa
Time between Time between
Tort reforms Injury & Closure Claim & Closure
(N = 29;583) (N = 29;583) (N = 29;583)
Log Log Log
Variable (DURATION) (DURATION-1) (DURATION-2)
Case characteristics
Insurance
Monoline general liability ¡0:170¤ ¡0:148¤ ¡0:134¤
(0:017) (0:017) (0:017)
Commercial auto liability 0:251¤ 0:340¤ ¡0:014¤
(0:016) (0:017) (0:016)
Other professional liability 0:016¤ ¡0:075¤ 0:078¤
(0:047) (0:047) (0:047)
Injury
Death ¡0:175¤ 0:015¤ ¡0:016¤
(0:024) (0:024) (0:024)
Amputation ¡0:150y ¡0:059y 0:013y
(0:053) (0:053) (0:053)
Burns (heat) ¡0:137¤ ¡0:002y ¡0:013¤
(0:042) (0:043) (0:042)
Burns (chemical) ¡0:199y ¡0:132y ¡0:120y
(0:076) (0:076) (0:076)
Systemic poisoning (toxic) ¡0:291¤ ¡0:656y ¡0:133y
(0:063) (0:064) (0:063)
Systemic poisoning (other) ¡0:042 0:031y ¡0:082
(0:120) (0:120) (0:120)
Eye injury (blindness) ¡0:034y ¡0:062y ¡0:017y
(0:059) (0:059) (0:059)
Respiratory condition ¡0:577y ¡1:049y ¡0:386¤
(0:052) (0:057) (0:052)
Nervous condition ¡0:138¤ ¡0:153¤ ¡0:050¤¤
(0:046) (0:046) (0:046)
Hearing loss or impairment ¡0:092y ¡0:078y ¡0:144y
(0:085) (0:085) (0:085)
Circulatory condition 0:006y 0:111y 0:045y
(0:076) (0:076) (0:076)
Multiple injuries 0:038¤ 0:096¤ 0:043¤
(0:016) (0:016) (0:016)
Back injury 0:003¤ ¡0:013¤ ¡0:060¤¤
(0:016) (0:016) (0:016)
Skin disorder ¡0:087y ¡0:142y 0:014y
(0:093) (0:093) (0:093)
Brain damage ¡0:167¤ ¡0:135¤ ¡0:113¤¤
(0:035) (0:035) (0:035)
Scarring 0:115¤ 0:200¤ 0:121¤¤
(0:033) (0:033) (0:033)
Spinal cord injuries ¡0:194¤ ¡0:113¤ ¡0:059¤¤
(0:048) (0:048) (0:048)
Other 0:032¤ 0:037¤ 0:053¤
(0:019) (0:019) (0:019)
Log likelihood -274,367.35 -272,746.2 -275,447.1
a. Standard errors are shown in parentheses.
y signi¯cant at 10 percent level; * signi¯cant at 5 percent level; ** signi¯cant at 1 percent level.
Source: Author's calculations based on the Texas Department of Insurance Commercial Liability Insurance Closed Claim
database for the years 1988-2005. All three regressions exclude medical professional liability claims, joint and several liability
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the baseline e®ect fairly slowly. A unit increase in CONGESTION results in a hazard pro¯le with a
lower probability of settlement after approximately 18 months, encompassing 46.1% of the cases in
the restricted sample. This result suggests that the e®ect of trial delay on settlement delay is not
constant over time.
A ¯nal robustness check reported in column 3 of Table 2.5, treats litigation duration as elapsed
time between the date that a case is reported to insurer and date of case closure.
The estimated e®ect of PREJUDGMENT INTEREST RATE is robust to this alternative measure. The
baseline hazard remains negative and statistically insigni¯cant. The time-dependency coe±cient is
estimated to be -0.183 at the means of INITIAL INDEMNITY RESERVE and INITIAL EXPENSE RESERVE of
the restricted sample. This is comparable to the value of -0.135 derived from column 1 of Table 2.5.
Turning to my measure of trial delays, the baseline coe±cient of CONGESTION is signi¯cantly
positive but smaller than that in the previous model. The time-dependence coe±cient is signi¯cantly
negative and smaller in absolute value than that in the previous speci¯cation. The time-dependence
e®ect of a unit increase in CONGESTION overcomes the baseline e®ect after approximately 10 months,
encompassing but 17% of the cases in the restricted sample. This result suggests that the e®ect of
trial delay on settlement delay is not constant over time.
2.6.4. Effect of Prejudgment Interest on Settlement Payment
In this section I brie°y describe exercises I conducted to examine the e®ect of change in prejudgment
interest rate on the level of settlement payment.
¥ Regression analysis. Table 2.6 in the appendix reports the OLS regression estimates of the
coe±cients.97 My key interests are the e®ects of prejudgment interest and court backlogs on plainti®'s
payo®. As before, to isolate the e®ect of prejudgment interest reform from the e®ects of other legal
reforms I omit the observations where joint and several liability is applicable or noneconomic damage
is an element of damage compensation. In addition to that, I exclude medical professional liability
claims for which the early o®er statute is applicable.
A one percentage point increase in prejudgment interest rate would reduce the settlement payment
by 26 percent.98 This suggests that cases with higher prejudgment interest rates receive smaller
settlement payment, holding claim and other institutional characteristics constant. In other words
a reform that is designed to reduce delay through the imposition of prejudgment interest has the
unexpected e®ect of worsening the plainti®'s bargaining position vis-µ a-vis the defendant in pretrial
negotiation. This result is inconsistent with my theoretical prediction.
The unrealistically large negative e®ect raises a caveat to my analysis. Recall that PREJUDGMENT
INTEREST RATE equals 10 for claims closed before 1st August 2003 and 5 for damage negotiations
initiated after 1st August 2003. My model cannot determine whether the empirical di®erences at-
tributed to prejudgment interests re°ect the impact of such interests on litigation behavior, or these
di®erences re°ect developments in technology and social environment in the same period. Changes
in the legal system that is not controlled for in my model (e.g., damage caps) may also display a
negative e®ect on the magnitude of damage payments.
97The continuous variables are in terms of natural logs so that the coe±cients in the equation equals the duration
elasticities of the hazard rate with respect to the independent variables. In addition, I add one to all values before
taking natural logs because some claims report zero values.
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The coe±cient of CONGESTION, my measures of trial delays, are positive and statistically signi¯-
cant. Hence, cases ¯led in jurisdictions with longer trial delays always tend to receive larger settlement
payment. This result is consistent with the prediction of the theoretic model (see inequalities (24))
that increased delays in trial courts lead to increased settlement payment(i.e., ÃT > 0).
2.7. Conclusion
The social costs of delay in the resolution of legal disputes have motivated an extensive literature
investigating its causes. However, much less work has investigated a related and more policy-relevant
question: how do legal systems a®ect delay in settlement? To address this question, I have presented
a model developed by Spier (1992) and adapted by Fenn and Rickman (1999) where pretrial nego-
tiation takes place over a ¯nite period of time prior to a ¯xed trial date. In the absence of direct
information on the trial outcome, the defendant presents the plainti® with an increasing sequence of
o®ers. Facing such a schedule, low type plainti®s will settle early for lower damage payments, while
high type plainti®s will be prepared to delay agreement until settlement o®ers raise. The model pre-
dicts that duration of settlement is in°uenced by variables re°ecting the legal system. These include
the level of the prejudgment interest rate and the time required for a case to reach trial. Using the
Texas Department of Insurance Commercial Liability Insurance Closed Claim database on 67,130
¯led cases for the years 1988-2005, I estimate the in°uence of these institutional factors on the timing
of settlement and present two major ¯ndings.
My empirical work suggests changes in prejudgment interest rate have no statistically signi¯cant
e®ect on the duration of litigation. This observation, if it is indeed correct, is inconsistent with a
theoretic model where only the plainti® has private information. An important limitation to this
result is that I am not able to identify all the shocks in the social, economic and legal environments
that changed the duration of litigation around the time of prejudgment interest reform. My parameter
estimates for the e®ect of prejudgment interest therefore contain a potential misspeci¯cation bias. The
same lack of control for changes in social, economic and institutional environments has plagued my
analysis on the e®ect of prejudgment interest on damage payments. Further, I show that longer delays
in trial courts are associated with longer delays in out-of-court settlement. This ¯nding suggests that
policies that streamline the court system by reducing court congestion will expedite both public and
private resolution of disputes.
On balance, the evidence in favor the screening interpretation of settlement delay is weak. There
were a number of phenomena that did not seem to be readily explained by Spier's (1992) model of
pretrial bargaining. Chief among these is the puzzle of why longer delays in out-of-court settlement
are associated with longer delays in trial courts. Might the opportunity that delays in court provide
to proceed with discovery or inference of new information explain this unpredicted e®ect?99 In ad-
dition, the litigation duration apparently moves in opposite directions over the insured's fault after
reallocating for the plainti®'s negligence. Higher prejudgment interest rate that enlarge trial stakes
are associated with lower settlement payment. These are intriguing results, which present challenging
problems for analysis. Further theoretical and empirical research will obviously be required to fully
describe the determinants of litigation delays in these data. Finally, there were considerable unex-
plained variations in litigation durations as well as variations across case characteristics, suggesting
99A similar remark about alternative causes of delay in litigation was made by Kennan and Wilson (1990).Access to Justice: An Economic Approach 57
that there are numerous factors not quanti¯ed in my analysis that are important determinants of
litigation delays.
This is consistent with the view that it is extremely di±cult to model the complexities of the
bargaining process with its emphasis on strategic behavior under uncertainty and asymmetric infor-
mation. Nevertheless, the screening model does provide a simple but theoretically consistent way of
analyzing delay determinants, and it does receive some empirical support. My interpretation is that
is a promising way of bringing some understanding to the empirical regularities in this complex area.Access to Justice: An Economic Approach 58
2.8. Appendix
Table 2.1. Variable Definitions
Variable De¯nitions
DURATION The number of months from the date suit ¯led to the date claim closed.
DURATION-1 The number of months from the date of injury to the date claim closed.
DURATION-2 The number of months from the date reported to insurer to the date
claim closed.
STAGE Legal stage where settlement was reached. The stages are
- Alternative dispute resolution;
- Settlement before trial;
- Settlement during trial, before court verdict;
- Court verdict;
- Settlement reached after verdict;
- Settlement after appeal ¯led;
- Case dismissed or summary judgment.
SETTLEMENT PAYMENT Total settlement amount including economic damages, noneconomic
damages, prejudgment interest, and exemplary damages.
Legal System
PREJUDGEMENT INTEREST RATE The prejudgment interest rate of Texas. The rate is 10% a year for
claims settled before August 2003 and 5% a year for claims reported
after August 2003.
JOINT & SEVERAL LIABILITY Indicator with value 1 if the doctrine of joint and several liability has
an impact on settlement or court verdict, 0 otherwise.
NONECONOMIC DAMAGES Indicator with value 1 if non-economic loss is an element of damage
compensation, 0 otherwise.
CONGESTION Population mean of the number of months required to continue litigation
until the date of trial for cases in the same judicial district.
Bargaining Environment
INITIAL INDEMNITY RESERVE The amount of the insurer's initial indemnity reserve.
VARIANCE Sample variance of the log-dollar amount awarded to prevailing plainti®s
in completed trials for cases of the same injury type and judicial circuit.
INITIAL EXPENSE RESERVE The amount of the insurer's initial expense reserve.
INSURED'S FAULT Insured's percentage of fault after reallocating for claimant's negligence.
MULTIDEF Indicator with value 1 if multiple defendants were involved, 0 otherwise.
Delegation Strategy
PLAINTIFF LAWYER Indicator with value 1 if the plainti® hires a lawyer; 0 otherwise.
OUTSIDE DEFENSE COUNSEL Indicator with value 1 if the defendant hires an outside counsel; 0 oth-
erwise.
Case Characteristics
INSURANCE Categorical variable indicating the line of insurance associated with the
claim, including monoline general insurance, commercial auto liability,
commercial multiperil liability, medical professional liability. The omit-
ted category is other professional liability.
INJURY Categorical variable indicating the type(s) of injury associated with the
claim, including death, amputation, burns, etc. The omitted category
is multiple injury.Access to Justice: An Economic Approach 59
Table 2.3: Descriptive Statisticsa
Panel C. Settlement duration, Settlement Payment, Legal System, and Bargaining Environment
of Dropped Cases
Mean Std. Dev. Observations
Dependent variables
SETTLEMENT DURATION(months) 35 26 118,947
SETTLEMENT PAYMENT ($) 66,029 351,762 118,947
Legal system
PREJUDGMENT INTEREST RATE (%) 9.72 1.15 118,947
CONGESTION (months) 15.60 11.57 118,947
JOINT & SEVERAL LIABILITY (1=yes) 0.03 0.16 103,828
NONECONOMIC DAMAGES (1=yes) 0.17 0.38 118,947
Bargaining Environment
INITIAL INDEMNITY RESERVE ($) 24,611 91,676 118,947
INITIAL EXPENSE RESERVE ($) 2,283 10,615 118,947
INSURED'S FAULT (%) 27.83 44.18 118,943
MULTIDEF (1=yes) 0.12 0.33 118,947
a. all dollar values are in 2005 $. The source for these values is author's calculations based on the
Texas Department of Insurance Commercial Liability Insurance Closed Claim database for the years
1988-2005. SETTLEMENT DURATION refers to the elapsed time between the date that the case
was reported to insurer and the date of settlement.Access to Justice: An Economic Approach 60
Table 2.6. OLS Regression Estimates of The Effect
of Prejudgment Interest on Settlement Paymenta Table 2.6. (Continued)
Log(SETTLEMENT PAYMENT) Log(SETTLEMENT PAYMENT)
(N=29,583 ) (N =29,583 )
Legal System Injury
Log(PREJUDGMENT INTEREST RATE) ¡0:557y Death 0:970¤
(0:055) (0:023)




Log(INITIAL INDEMNITY RESERVE) 0:103¤¤ Burns (chemical) 0:271y
(0:003) (0:072)
Log(INITIAL EXPENSE RESERVE) 0:006¤¤ Systemic poisoning (toxic) 0:302y
(0:001) (0:060)
Log(INSURED'S FAULT) ¡0:066¤¤ Systemic poisoning (other) ¡0:123
(0:010) (0:113)
Log(DURATION) 0:110¤¤ Eye injury (blindness) 0:372y
(0:009) (0:056)




PLAINTIFF LAWYER 0:271 Hearing loss or impairment 0:153y
(0:128) (0:080)




Insurance Back injury 0:042¤
Monoline general liability 0:000¤ (0:015)
(0:044) Skin disorder ¡0:030y
Commercial auto liability 0:032¤ (0:088)
(0:044) Brain damage 1:051¤
Commercial multiperil ¡0:072¤ (0:033)
(0:044) Scarring 0:261¤
(0:031)







a. Standard errors are shown in parentheses.
y signi¯cant at 10 percent level; * signi¯cant at 5 percent level; ** signi¯cant at 1 percent level.
Source: Author's calculations based on the Texas Department of Insurance Commercial Liability Insurance Closed Claim
database for the years 1988-2005. The regressions excludes medical professional liability claims, joint and several liability
claims and claims involve noneconomic damages claims. Omitted insurance policy type is other professional liability.Access to Justice: An Economic Approach 61
Chapter 3
In Litigation: How Far Do The \Haves" Come Out Ahead?
3.1. Introduction
In economic analysis of private litigation spending,100 researchers often make two simplifying
assumptions: First, access to court intervention is equally costly for both parties; Second, the parties
decide how much e®ort to invest in the lawsuit only once and simultaneously. In this chapter my
main objectives are to (i) study the e®ect of asymmetric litigation costs on litigants' investment
incentives and the subsequent equilibrium of the `litigation game' and to (ii) study litigations where
parties have the °exibility to add to their previous e®orts after observing their opponents' most
recent e®ort in an intermediate stage. This is worthwhile, because my model generates signi¯cantly
di®erent e±ciency and distributional implications than symmetric, static models. Moreover, when
we are directly evaluating the performance of legal institutions and making policy recommendations
for litigation-system reform, it is useful to proceed within a framework that is fully consistent with
various asymmetry and timing considerations.
Litigants often vary substantially in their litigation costs and parties with cost advantages tend
to come out ahead in litigation and adjudication.101 This idea is an old one, but it has received
renewed attention in the last three decades. Galanter's seminal work (1974) made a compelling case
for the proposition that the advantaged players, who are called the \haves", tend to come out ahead
in litigation. Galanter argues that the \haves" tend to win more often because they are likely to enjoy
superior material resources and have access to lawyers capable of making superior arguments on their
behalf. Superior resources enable the \haves" to purchase the best available legal assistance and expert
witnesses, that may improves the chances of victory at trial. As a consequence, the \haves" win more
often in litigation than \have nots". Second, Galanter contends, \repeated players," who tend to be
\haves", will come out ahead because they are usually more adept at conforming their claims to the
requirements of the law; hence less experienced individuals (\one-shotters") with grievances will be
deterred from initiating lawsuits against repeat players or contesting legal claims submitted by them.
It is this aspect of Galanter's theory that I will focus on, that is, the consequences of asymmetry in
the parties' adeptness at handling lawsuits.
The question of `how just is the justice system in the presence of asymmetry?' is the most
important question I seek to answer in this chapter. Drawing from Galanter's work, I study the
100The term \private litigation spending" is ¯rst used by Spier (2007). It refers to the literature that studies how
litigants decide how much time and e®ort to invest in the lawsuit.
101For empirical evidence see, e.g. Wheeler et al. (1987), Eisenberg and Farber (1996) and Songer et al. (1999).
Wheeler et al. (1987) provide evidence from 5,904 U.S. supreme court cases from 1870 to 1970 that con¯rms the
hypothesis that ¯nancially and organizationally stronger parties tend to prevail in litigation against weak parties, for
di®erent types of cases, time period and types of legal representation. Using data on over 200,000 U.S. federal civil
litigations, Eisenberg and Farber (1996) show that the distribution of litigation costs for individuals has more variation
than the distribution of litigation costs for corporations. Lawsuits where the plainti® is an individual and the defendant
a corporation are found to have lower plainti® win rates than those suits where the plainti® is a corporation and the
defendant an individual or a corporation. Songer et al. (1999) provide evidence from U.S. courts of Appeals from 1925
to 1988 in support of the hypothesis that appellate litigants with signi¯cant organizational strength are much more
likely to win than less organized litigants who are lack of litigation expertise and economies of scale.Access to Justice: An Economic Approach 62
e®ect of asymmetry on the payo®s of advantaged players, the \haves", and disadvantaged players,
who are call the \have nots". I will be generating a game theoretical model of litigation and give
a quantitative impression on the e®ect of asymmetry. While no single paradigm can fully capture
the intricacies of litigation process, for the purpose of this chapter three di®erent litigation protocols
come ready for use: (1) static legal process, (2) sequential legal process with exogenous sequencing
and (3) sequential legal process with endogenous sequencing. The static protocol is most often seen
in the litigation literature. Although this is a good approximation in a variety of legal contests,102
usually during a litigation, the development and presentation of evidence occurs sequentially in a
sequence of periods. Therefore, my contention has been that a litigation protocol with multiple
rounds, in which the plainti® having the ¯rst move and both sides react to each other's choices, is
closer to the usual setting of litigation process. In addition, I contend that very often in legal disputes
either party may put forward (or defend against) a claim and precommit his/her e®ort. Examples of
such litigation games include custody, divorce and business contract disputes. Hamilton and Slutsky
(1990), Baik and Shogren (1992) and Leininger (1993) endogenize the sequence of moves in two-stage,
two-player contests. Building on these previous studies, I develop a model that endogenizes the timing
of initiating a lawsuit and to study the equilibrium sequence of legal e®orts. Furthermore, and for
the ¯rst time in the literature, I establish a measure of distortion to access to justice for comparative
static exercises: I compare the degree of distortion of justice within a given litigation protocol across
di®erent magnitudes of asymmetry; I also compare trial outcomes across di®erent protocols with the
same degree of asymmetry.
To summarize my results, I ¯nd that when the parties are unevenly matched, the plainti® wins
more often and earns higher payo® in a sequential legal process than in a static play. Further analysis
suggests that in a sequential process, a moderate degree of asymmetry with a weak player leading may
work to improve access to justice. The theory also implies that in disputes such as divorce, patent
and contract, where either side can make or defend claims, the \have nots" will initiate the litigation
to challenge the \haves". The \haves" go along with this and scale back expenditure. Endogenous
sequencing always minimizes litigation cost and in some cases may improve access to justice. Its
outcome Pareto-dominates static play outcome.
The reminder of the chapter is organized as follows: section 3.2 represents the related literature.
Section 3.3 sets up the model and introduces the normative criteria. Section 3.4.1 analyzes static
litigation game. Section 3.4.2 analyzes sequential litigation game with exogenous timing. Section
3.4.3 endogenizes the choice of timing. Section 3.5 concludes.
3.2. Relation to the Literature
My analysis is based on and related to three strands of literature. First, my analysis is based on the
literature on rent-seeking contests. Second, my analysis is related to papers that similarly use the
contest framework to analyze litigant spending. Third, I relate to analysis that use auction-theoretic
framework to address the issue of litigation spending.
The structure of the legal contests considered in this chapter is similar to those of other types
of contests, including lobbying, patent races, tournaments in labor markets, and a variety of sports.
102In these legal contests, there is either no opportunity of exchanging information granted by procedural requirement
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There is a large literature studying contests, originating from Tullock's seminal work (1980). Tullock
studies contests with identical players choosing their e®ort levels only once and simultaneously. The
study is primarily concerned with the relationship between the value of a contestable rent and the
value of resources expended in the competition for it. Tullock (1980) ¯nds that the aggregate social
cost of rent seeking is increasing in the number of players and the marginal return to the players'
investment. The early literature on legal spending has predominantly adopted Tullock's (1980) model,
owing to its stylized feature and great simplicity.103
However, in the political-economic reality rent seeking often has a dynamic nature. Recognizing
the dynamic characteristics of many contests where one player moves before the other, Dixit (1987),
Baik and Shogren (1992) and Leininger (1993) extend Tullock's (1980) static contests to sequential
ones. These latter studies have demonstrated that in a dynamic setting the social cost of rent-seeking
is signi¯cantly di®erent from that in a static setting. Dixit (1987) analyzes a two-player, two-stage
sequential contest. The contest outcome functions are assumed to be of Tullock's (1980) type. In
this game, the strategies employed by the players hinge on the anticipated reaction of the opponent
{ each player would like his rival to \back o®" and exert less e®ort in the contest. To this end, the
¯rst-moving player might derive a strategic bene¯t from aggressive spending, for example, when the
second-moving player's best response function is decreasing in the ¯rst-moving player's e®ort level (i.e.,
downward sloping). Conversely, the ¯rst-moving player would bene¯t from a commitment to lower
spending levels if the second-moving player's best-response function slopes upward. Either scenario
can arise in the general framework. Using the analytical framework of Dixit (1987), Hirshleifer and
Osborne (2001) compare the e®ort levels of the one-shot, simultaneous move legal contest with those
of two-stage sequential contests. They ¯nd that given the (exogenous) opportunity to exert e®ort
¯rst, the player with higher stakes at trial overcommits to his e®ort with respect to his one-shot
simultaneous Nash equilibrium level; the player with lower stakes at trial under-commits. These
interesting results however rely critically on the assumption that litigants can exert e®ort only once.
This is a good approximation in lawsuits with either a large ¯xed cost of investing in litigation or a
one-time opportunity of presenting one's case in court. However, in many other legal contests litigants
have the °exibility to add to their previous e®orts after observing their opponent's most recent e®ort
in an intermediate stage. This chapter extends Hirshleifer and Osborne (2001) and captures three
main elements present in a litigation game. Firstly, the litigants observe their opponent's recent e®ort
in an intermediate period; Secondly, the probability of courtroom success depends on the cumulative
e®ort levels; Finally, litigants exert e®ort sequentially rather than simultaneously.
Furthermore, in models of litigation with endogenous legal expenses, timing sequences are usually
speci¯ed exogenously.104 However, very often in a legal dispute, either party may initiate as the
plainti®. Examples abound. In a custody case, when both the mother and the father want the
custody of their children, both sides may put forward (or defend against) a claim. When a divorce
agreement cannot be reached between spouses, both the husband and the wife can initiate the lawsuit.
When a contractual dispute has taken place between a big company purchaser and a small business
supplier, both sides may act as a claimant. I analyze the timing decisions of the litigants by using
103See, e.g. Kobayoshi and Lott (1996) and Farmer and Pecorino (1999).
104See, e.g. Hirshleifer and Osborne (2001), Braeutigam et al. (1984), Katz (1988), Hause (1989), Kobayashi and Lott
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the analytical framework of Baik and Shogren (1992) and Leininger (1993). Baik and Shogren (1992)
and Leininger (1993) study a two-player, two-stage contest in which a player's strategy consists of
two components: (1) the timing of her move (i.e., exerting e®ort early or late) and (2) the level of
her rent-seeking e®ort. In the ¯rst stage of the game the players simultaneously determine whether
to exert e®ort early or late. If the players make di®erent timing decisions, the rent-seeking game is
played sequentially. If however both players make the same timing decision, the contest is played
with simultaneous moves. It is found that players want to conduct the competition sequentially (and
not simultaneously) which yields higher payo®s due to lower expenditures.
Finally, it is worthwhile to mention a closely related approach to economic analysis of litigation.
Baye et al. (2005) use an auction-theoretic framework to examine symmetric litigation environments
where the legal ownership of a disputed asset is unknown to the court. The court observes only the
quality of the case presented by each party, and awards the asset to the party presenting the best case.
The probability of plainti® victory depends on both parties' expenditure choices, The more each party
spends the worse the prospect of litigation for the other. Baye et al. (2005) ¯nd that equilibrium
legal expenditures are increasing in the proportion of the winner's attorney fees that must be paid
by the loser, while the expected payo®s of the litigants are a decreasing function of this proportion.
Litigation systems with lower equilibrium legal expenditures provide a greater incentive for parties
to sue than systems that entail higher equilibrium legal expenditures. However, the auction-theoretic
framework has an undesirable feature: when the plainti®'s litigation expenditure is marginally higher
(resp. lower) than that of the defendant, he will succeed (resp. lose) at trial with certainty. Building
on Hirshleifer and Osborne (2001), Braeutigam et al. (1984), Katz (1988), Hause (1989), Kobayashi
and Lott (1996), and Farmer and Pecorino (1999), I modify this assumption so that a litigant always
has a strictly positive probability to win at trial whenever her expenditure on the lawsuit is positive.
3.3 Model of Litigation
Consider two litigants, party 1 and party 2, who are involved in a civil dispute over the damage
award of value V, which has to be divided between the two parties. V is common knowledge. An
example of this situation is a car accident in which two cars collide. The court has to decide how
much fault of each car-driver contributed to the accident. Assume that the \legally right decision"
will be the one that the court would accurately reach after extensive investigation of the causes of
the accident and the amount of damages. With knowledge on the genuine cause of the accident and
the amount of damage due, a legal decision would be available. I assume that the parties in dispute
are risk neutral.
Let µ1 (with 0 · µ1 · 1) (resp. µ2 (with 0 · µ2 · 1 and µ1 +µ2 = 1) ) denote party 1's (resp. 2's)
(exogenous) legal right to the disputed asset. µ1 = 0 indicates that party 1 is not legally entitled to
the asset; µ1 = µ2 = 0:5 indicates that 1 and 2 are each entitled to 50 percent of the asset. I assume
that µ1 and µ2 are common knowledge among the litigants but not known by the court. Therefore
the court's decision is subject to the in°uence of legal e®orts. I de¯ne a litigation system as just if
the system allocates a net payo® of µ1V (resp. µ2V ) to 1 (resp. 2) in equilibrium. The 2-vector
µ = (µ1;µ2)
is called the right legal resolution. For the purpose of the current study, it su±ces to simplify the
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i.e., µ1 = µ2 = 1
2. This normalization allows me to focus my attention on the sole e®ect of asymmetry
on parties' legal decisions and the subsequent litigation outcomes. However, it








where e1 (resp. e2) denote the aggregate legal e®ort expended by party 1 (resp. 2) on presenting a
convincing case. Here a (a 2 (0;1)) denotes the degree of asymmetry in 1 and 2's adeptness or cost
e±ciency in conforming their claims to the requirements of the law. For example, a = 1 implies the
parties are equally adept with handling the case; a = 2 means that party 1 is twice as adept as 2.
Using Galanter's (1974) terminology and without loss of generality, when the parties are unevenly
matched, I call the more adept party the \have" and the less adept party the \have not". This
parameter, which controls the magnitude of asymmetry, will play a central role in my analysis.
Furthermore, note that there is a positive but diminishing marginal e®ect of each party's e®ort
on his own win rate,
w1 > 0; w11 < 0; w2 < 0; w22 > 0;
where subscripts denote partial derivatives and the arguments (e1;e2) are omitted for brevity. These
conditions also ensure that an increase in each party's e®ort level hurts the other, and therefore makes
it strategically desirable for each to precommit his/her e®ort level in such a way as to induce a lower
e®ort from the other in response. Whether this implies a commitment at a higher or a lower level
of ones' own e®ort depends on whether the other's best response function is downward sloping or
upward sloping.105
For simplicity, I assume the American rule is applicable, i.e., each party pays his own legal bills



















respectively. I assume the court is equally likely to recognize either party if neither has presented
quality evidence. This speci¯cation in equation (19) provides a simple and tractable way of illustrating
the di®erent e±ciency and distributional implications of the asymmetric, sequential model and the
symmetric, static model. More general models will not change my conclusion qualitatively.





which is the total legal investment made by both parties discounted by the value of the stake in
dispute, i.e., the proportional resources dissipated in legal competition is r.
105The general signi¯cance of the slopes of reaction functions has been extensively discussed by Fudenberg and Tirole
(1984), Bulow et al. (1985) and Eaton and Grossman (1986).
106Skaperdas (1996) and Clark and Riis (1998) give axiomatic foundations for contest success functions having this
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Let the 2-vector u = ( 1
V u1; 1
V u2) be the (normalized) trial outcome. The measure of distortion to
access to justice ± in this chapter is simply given by the Euclidean distance between the trial outcome
u and the right legal resolution µ:
± := k u ¡ µ k :
Once we are equipped with the measure of distortion to access to justice, we can put it to use
in comparative static exercises. In the following section, I will examine the comparative statics of
equilibrium distortion to access to justice with respect to the changes in magnitude of asymmetry
for the static litigation protocol, the sequential protocol with exogenously determined sequencing and
the sequential protocol with endogenous sequencing, respectively. I will also examine the comparative
statics of equilibrium distortion with respect to the changes in the timing of litigation process.
3.4. Analysis
3.4.1. The Basic Game: Static Litigation
Typically, the static, simultaneous-decision protocol is adopted in the private litigation spending liter-
ature. This is a good approximation in variety of a litigation with either a large ¯xed costs of exerting
e®orts or a one-time opportunity of action granted by procedural requirement. However, usually dur-
ing the litigation, the development and presentation of evidence occurs sequentially. Therefore, my
contention has been that the sequential decision protocol, in which the plainti® having the ¯rst move
and both sides react to each other's choices, is closer to the usual sequence of litigation process. As
a benchmark, though, this section ¯rst studies simultaneous choices in a one-shot game.
The sequence of the game is, in period 1 party 1 chooses his legal e®ort level. In period 2, without






(a + 1)2V: (31)
where the superscript c stands for simultaneous, or \Cournot", decisions.








(a + 1)2; (32)
which indicates that, a fraction of 2a
(a+1)2 of the total stakes is dissipated in the litigation process.
Figure 3.1 depicts the variations of equilibrium rate of rent dissipation as the degree of asymmetry
changes. The magnitude of resource dissipation drops as the degree of asymmetry enlarges (
drc(a)
da > 0,
for a < 1 and
drc(a)
da < 0 for a > 1). The intuition is straightforward: facing too strong an opponent,
the \have not" is pessimistic about her chance of winning and subsequently invests less than when
she would if her strength was in close range with the \have". The \have" exploits the \have not"'s
pessimism by investing less as well. The total legal e®ort level falls.
Note that the \have" and the \have not" are equally \aggressive" in pursuing trial victory - ir-
respective of the asymmetry - they invest the same amount of legal e®orts to win the case. This
symmetric expenditure in rent-seeking games with \bias" has been discussed by Tullock (1980).Access to Justice: An Economic Approach 67
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Figure 3.1. Rent Dissipation (Static Litigation)
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Figure 3.2. Win Rates (Static Litigation)
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Figure 3.3. Trial Payo®s (Static Litigation)
Win rate and Trial payo® These legal expenses determine the weight of evidence, the win rate











(1 + a)2V and uc
2(a) =
1
(1 + a)2V: (34)
Obviously, asymmetry in°uences litigants' payo®s in equilibrium. When litigants are symmetric




4 ). When asymmetry is present,
the \have" achieves a more favorable trial outcome (wc > 1 ¡ wc and uc
1 > uc
2 for a > 1).




2(1 + a)2 : (35)
Figure 3.4 depicts the e®ect of asymmetry on distortion to access to justice in a simultaneous-move
equilibrium. An important feature of this ¯gure is that the degree of distortion signi¯cantly drops
as asymmetry vanishes. Note however in equilibrium the distortion can never be fully eliminated.
This is because the parties necessarily incur costs to receive their entitlements. Finally, I would
like to remark that the degree of distortion is sensitive to the method of measurement. Alternative
measurement methods may provide di®erent results.Access to Justice: An Economic Approach 68
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Figure 3.4. Distortion to Access to Justice (Static Litigation)
3.4.2. Sequential Litigation Game with Exogenous Sequencing
In reality, one could observe that litigants expend e®ort in several periods to win a lawsuit. They
have the °exibility to add to their previous e®orts after observing their rival's most recent e®ort in
an intermediate stage. In this section, I study the strategic interactions and the associated outcomes
of such sequential litigation process. The key questions in this section are:
(i) Will it be pro¯table for parties to commit?
(ii) In which way does asymmetry in°uence parties' commitment decisions?
(iii) How does asymmetry alter the parties' equilibrium payo®s when commitment has taken place?
I. Two Stage Game
I begin by studying a simple case where the litigation takes place in only two rounds. Then I will
extend the analysis to the more complicated situation where the litigation takes place in four rounds.
Without loss of generality, let party 1 be the plainti® and 2 the defendant. The plainti® commits
¯rst to a level of litigation e®ort e1 { after which it is observed and the defendant responds with e2.
I require equilibrium of this model to be subgame perfect.
With backward induction, let's ¯rst consider the decision of the defendant, who has the opportu-
nity to decide on her legal e®ort after observing the quality of the plainti®'s case. The defendant's











that is, the defendant only invests to prepare a counter claim if the plainti®'s e®ort level falls below
V
a .
Taking into account of the defendant's reaction pattern e2(e1), the plainti® would decide on his
observable legal e®orts after accessing the likely response of the defendant given e1. The plainti®






























when \have not" leads
.
Figure 3.5. Best resp onse functions







2 ¡ e1 if e1 · V
a
V ¡ e1 otherwise,
(38)
In analyzing the impact of asymmetry on the litigants' investment incentives, it will be helpful to
discuss separately two ranges for the parameter a: where a 2 (0;2] and where a 2 [2;1).







4V if a 2 (0;2]
V
a if a 2 [2;1):
(39)







4 V if a 2 (0;2]
0 if a 2 [2;1);
(40)
where the superscript P and D indicates \plainti®" and \defendant", respectively.
Note that, when the parties are unevenly matched and the plainti® is the \have" (resp. \have
not"), he overcommits (resp. under-commits) to his e®ort as compared to his one-shot simultaneous
Nash equilibrium level (eP
1 > ec
1 when a > 1 and eP
1 < ec
1 when a < 1). Figure 3.5 develops
the corresponding intuition using best response functions. The dynamic strategies employed by the
litigants hinge on the anticipated reactions of the rival { each player would like his opponent to
\back o®" and invest less in the contest (see Dixit (1987); Katz (1988)).107 To this end, the plainti®
will derive strategic bene¯t from aggressive spending when the defendant's best response function is
decreasing in the plainti®'s investment (i.e., is downward-sloping). This situation arises when the
plainti® is a \have" and the defendant a \have not" (a > 1). Conversely, the plainti® would bene¯t
from a commitment to lower spending levels if the defendant's best response curve slopes upward.
This situation arises when the plainti® is a \have not" and the defendant a \have" (a < 1).
107See Bulow et al. (1985) for a general discussion of strategic commitment in contests.Access to Justice: An Economic Approach 70
















Figure 3.6. Rent Dissipation (Exogenous Sequencing (with plainti® moving ¯rst) vs. Static Process )












4 if a 2 (0;2];
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a if a 2 [2;1);
(41)




a) of the stake is wasted in litigation when the plainti® is no more than (resp. at least) twice as adept
as the defendant.
Figure 3.6 depicts the relation between the equilibrium rate of dissipation and asymmetry. In
general, the total resources dissipated is negatively correlated with asymmetry. This result is intuitive:
deterred by her rival's advantage, the \have not" refrains from investing actively. The \have" exploits
his rival's passiveness by subsequently exerting less e®ort.
The most intensive litigation will exhaust more than half of the value in dispute (maxrs(a) = 0:56).
This takes place when a \have" plainti® makes an aggressive move to deter its opponent. Refer to
¯gure 3.5, the marginal payo® of the \have not" defendant is decreasing with respect to the plainti®'s
e®ort level. Therefore, a \have" plainti® can curb the defendant's incentive by overcommit to a higher
level of e®ort and thereby gaining bigger victory in litigation. However, when the di®erence on both
sides is not signi¯cantly large, the \have not" defendant would not be adequately deterred and would
react aggressively. The result is a very intensive legal combat.
Figures 3.6 also illustrates the distinct in°uences of asymmetry on the intensity of legal investment
as the dynamics of legal process di®er. When 1 < a < 2:41, the aggregate legal e®ort levels with
exogenous sequencing is higher than that in simultaneous decisions (rc(a) < rs(a)). When 0 < a < 1
or a 2 [2;1):, sequential decision gives rise to less intensive a litigation (rs(a) < rc(a)).
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3¡a if a 2 (0;2];
0 if a 2 [2;1):
(42)
Proposition 3.1 In a sequential legal process with exogenous sequencing,
(i) a plainti® wins more often than a defendant.Access to Justice: An Economic Approach 71













Figure 3.7. Win Rates (Exogenous Sequencing (with plainti® moving ¯rst) vs. Static Process)
(ii) The plainti®'s trial payo® (weakly) exceeds his payo® in the static play. That is, uP
1 (a) ¸ uc
1(a)
for all a.
(iii) A defendant's trial payo® exceeds her payo® in the static play if an only if she is a \have". That
is, uD
2 (a) ¸ uc
2(a) for a ¸ 1 and uD
2 (a) · uc
2(a) for a · 1.
(iv) The exogenous sequencing outcome Pareto-dominates the static play outcome if and only if the
defendant is a \have" (a < 1).
Proof. (i) can be directly derived by comparing equations (33) and (42). Figure 3.7 depicts the
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4 V if a 2 (0;2];
0 if a 2 [2;1):
(43)
Comparing equations (34) and (43), we have that (ii) holds. That is, the plainti® is better o® in a
sequential legal process with exogenous sequencing than in a static process. The intuition is easily
conveyed. Consider the plainti®'s trial payo® in the two protocols. Refer to ¯gure 3.5, we see that the
Nash equilibrium N of the static protocol is the intersection of the two best response functions. In
a sequential protocol, the plainti® chooses his most preferred point on the defendant's best response
function. Therefore, the Nash equilibrium of the static play is feasible for the plainti®. When the
static play Nash equilibrium di®ers from that when the plainti® has the ¯rst move, which is the case
when parties are unevenly matched, the plainti® does strictly better as a ¯rst mover.108 Figures 3.8
shows the result graphically.
Furthermore, (iii) can be derived by comparing equations (34) and (43). (iv) is directly implied
by (ii) and (iii) of proposition 3.1. k






4[8 + 5a(a ¡ 4) + a(a ¡ 4)2]
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2 if a 2 [2;1):
(44)
108A player in a game becomes a \¯rst mover" when he can commit to an e®ort level, that is, choose a e®ort level
irrevocably and reveal it to the opponent.Access to Justice: An Economic Approach 72
















Figure 3.8. Plainti® Payo® (Exogenous Timing)















Figure 3.9. Defendant Payo® (Exogenous Timing)













Figure 3.10. Distortion to Access to Justice (Exogenous Sequencing vs. Static Process)
Figures 3.10 depicts the in°uence of asymmetry on access to justice when timing is exogenous. The
distortion reaches its minimum when the plainti® is (approx.) 80 percent as adept as the defendant
rather than when both sides are evenly matched. The dynamics of legal process may accentuate or
diminish the e®ect of asymmetry in terms of access to justice. In general, the degrees of distortion
di®er under the two protocols. Interestingly, the ¯gure shows that in a sequential litigation protocol,
a moderate degree of asymmetry with a weak player leading may work to mitigate the distortion of
justice (±s(a) < ±c(a) when 0:43 < a < 1).
II. Sequential Litigation Game with Multiple Stages
For the next results we need some more notations. Let et
i ¸ 0 denote player i's e®ort level in period
t, t = 1;2;3;4. Player 1 (resp. player 2) exerts e®ort in odd (resp. even) periods. The aggregate
e®ort level of 1 (resp. 2) is denoted by e1 (resp. e2) so that e1 ´ e1
1 + e3
1 and e2 ´ e2
2 + e4
2: A
strategy speci¯es the e®ort level that a player chooses whenever it is his turn to exert e®ort, given his
e®ort level and his opponent's e®ort level chosen in all previous periods. Furthermore, let Et
1 (resp.
Et
2) denote the sequence of e®ort of player 1 (resp. player 2) prior to and including period t, with
E1
2 = f0g. A pure behavior strategy for player i at period t is a map et
i: Et¡1
1 £Et¡1
2 ! [0;1), i = 1;2
and t = 1;2;3;4. A pure strategy for player 1 in the game as a whole is denoted e1 = (e1
1;e3
1) and for
player 2, e2 = (e2
2;e4
2).
I require the equilibrium of this game to be subgame perfect. The e®ort level of 1 (resp. 2) at
period t in subgame perfect equilibrium is denoted by ~ et
1 (resp. ~ et
2). The aggregate e®ort level of 1
(resp. 2) in subgame perfect Nash equilibrium is denoted by ~ e1 (resp. ~ e2).Access to Justice: An Economic Approach 73
Before giving the main results on multiple stage sequential legal contest, I will ¯rst provide some
essential properties on the payo® functions. Some further notations are needed. Let Ri(ej) be player
i's one-shot best response function. That is,
Ri(ej) = argmax
ei¸0
ui(ei;ej) for i;j = 1;2;i 6= j:
Lemma 3.1. Given ej, ui(¢;ej) is strictly concave in ei.












(ae1 + e2)2 < 0:
This property guarantees that Ri(¢) is a well-behaved function: it is single valued and continuously
di®erentiable. The strictly concavity of ui(¢) ensures that ¯xing the level of ej, ui strictly increases
as ei approaches Ri(ej). k
Lemma 3.2 (ec
1;ec
2) is an unique Nash equilibrium in the one-shot simultaneous move game.





(ae1 + e2)3 ¡
aV









@e1@e2 > 0 if and only if ae1 > e2; @2u2
@e1@e2 > 0 if and only if ae1 < e2. That is,
dR1(e2)
de2 > 0 for all
(e1;e2) 2 f(e1;e2) j ae1 > e2g;
dR1(e2)
de2 = 0 for (e1;e2) for all (e1;e2) 2 f(e1;e2) j ae1 = e2g;
dR1(e2)
de2 < 0
for all (e1;e2) 2 f(e1;e2) j ae1 < e2g;
dR2(e1)
de1 > 0 for all (e1;e2) 2 f(e1;e2) j ae1 < e2g;
dR2(e1)
de1 = 0 for
(e1;e2) for all (e1;e2) 2 f(e1;e2) j ae1 = e2g;
dR2(e1)
de1 < 0 for all (e1;e2) 2 f(e1;e2) j ae1 > e2g. Hence,
R1(e2) and R2(e1) cross locus at (ec
1;ec
2), where ae1 = e2. We have, (ec
1;ec
2) exists and is unique.k
Further, let (eP
i ;eD








Lemma 3.3. Given ej = Rj(ei), ui(¢;Rj(¢)) is strictly concave in ei.
Proof. Di®erentiate equation (30), we get du1
de1 = aV e1
(ae1+e2)2 ¡ 1 and du2
de2 = V e2
(ae1+e2)2 ¡ 1. Solving
for aV e1
(ae1+e2)2 ¡ 1 = 0 and V e2
(ae1+e2)2 ¡ 1 = 0 we have that R1(e2) =
p
aV e2¡e2







V e1 + (a2 ¡ 1)e1
¡ e1 and u2(R1(e2);e2) =
aV e2 p
aV e2 + (a ¡ 1)e2
¡ e2: (45)









































Therefore, given ej = Rj(ei), ui(¢;Rj(¢)) is strictly concave in ei.Access to Justice: An Economic Approach 74
Lemma 3.3 implies that, (eP
i ;eD




Lemma 3.4. In the two-stage sequential litigation game,

















Proof. This is straightforward from comparing equations (31), (39) and (40).
The above lemma summarizes the main ¯ndings in Dixit (1987). When parties are unevenly matched,
given the (exogenous) opportunity to move ¯rst, the favorite over exerts, and the have not, eases up.
The intuition is explained in Figure 3.1. From (34) we know that an increase in a player's e®ort level
hurts his rival, and therefore given the opportunity to precommit each player has incentive to induce a
lower e®ort from the other in response. Whether this implies a commitment at a higher or lower level
of one's own e®ort depends on the slope of other's best response function. In the neighborhood of the
Nash equilibrium N, the `have not"s best response function (BR2) is downward sloping and that of
the favorite (BR1) is upward sloping. So to curb the `have not"s incentive, the favorite precommits
to a higher e1, moving the outcome from N to S1. To prevent the favorite from exerting higher e®ort,
however, the `have not' commits to a lower e2, and move the outcome from N to S2.
Proposition 3.2. For legal contests of four rounds, in subgame perfect equilibrium, the aggregate
e®ort levels of party 1 and party 2 are
~ e1 = eP
1 and ~ e2 = eD
2 :








1 ; ~ e3
1 = 0 and ~ e2
2 + ~ e4
2 = eD
2 ;
if and only if w(ec
1;ec
2) > 1=2;







1 + ~ e3
1 = eP
1 and ~ e2




if and only if wc · 1=2.
Proof. It is to show that in subgame perfect equilibrium, the aggregate e®ort levels of player 1
and 2 are
~ e1 = eP
1 and ~ e2 = eD
2 :Access to Justice: An Economic Approach 75














respectively, if and only if p1 (ec
1;ec
2) > 1=2; there exists a continuum of subgame perfect equilibrium
paths, namely, 1 and 2 invests (~ e1
1;~ e3












respectively, if and only if p1 (ec
1;ec
2) · 1=2.
Using backward induction, we start with the last period.
t = 4
Given the ¯rst three periods choices e1
1;e2
2, and e3










Equation (46) describes player 2's continuation reaction function in the last period. Hence, the





















The uniqueness of these strategies is implied by lemmas 3.1, 3.2 and 3.3.
The logic of the proof is as follows: Given the 2nd period e®ort and the aggregate e®ort of player
1, if player 2 ¯nds herself above her best response function, then she will ¯nd that she has exerted
\too much" e®ort and refrain from expending further e®ort. Otherwise, it is best for player 2 to add
to her 2nd period amount up to her best response function. Note that since e®ort is irreversible, the




2, and conjecturing player 2's last period e®ort level e4
2, player 1 solves maxe1¸e1
1 u1(e1;e2):
The solution is then
e1 = maxfe1
1;R1(e2)g: (48)Access to Justice: An Economic Approach 76
Equation (48) describes 1's continuation reaction function, which provides us with the subgame-






> > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > <




































The uniqueness of these strategies is implied by lemmas 3.1 and 3.3.
The logic of the proof is as follows: Given the ¯rst two period e®orts and conjecturing the rival's
last period e®ort, it is best for player 1 to exert no further e®ort in case of an excessive ¯rst period
choice, since e®ort is irreversible. These are the situations when [1] both parties are above their
best response functions or when [2] 1 has exceeded his Stackelberg amount. There are three cases
in which 1 should exert additional e®ort: [1] if player 2 is above her one-shot simultaneous move
Nash equilibrium amount and 1 still below his best response function, it is best for player 1 to add
to his ¯rst period amount up to his best response function due to lemmas 3.1 and 3.2 ; [2] suppose
2 is above her Stackelberg amount but still below her one-shot Nash equilibrium level. Based upon
lemmas 3.1 and 3.3, we know it is best for 1 to increase to 2's best response function as to prevent 2
from exerting further e®ort; [3] if both are below their Stackelberg amounts, then it is optimal for 1
to add to his ¯rst period amount up to his Stackelberg level; Figure 3.11 depicts the corresponding











































Now consider the second period. Clearly party 2 has no incentive to choose an e®ort level higherAccess to Justice: An Economic Approach 77
than her best-response function, given party 1's ¯rst period e®ort and conjecturing 1's following





> > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > <









1 and wc > 1=2
y; s.t. 0 · y · R2(e1
1) if e1
1 ¸ eP
1 and wc > 1=2
y; s.t. 0 · y · R2(e1
1) if e1
1 ¸ eP
1 and wc · 1=2:
y; s.t. 0 · y · eD
2 if e1
1 · eP
1 and wc · 1=2:
(50)
Based upon lemma 3.3, the logic of the proof is explained as follows. Given party 1's ¯rst period
e®ort and conjecturing 1's following period e®ort, if the `have not' player 2 ¯nds that the `have' 1
is below his one-shot static-play Nash equilibrium amount, then 2 will immediately exert e®orts up
to her one-shot static-play Nash equilibrium amount; if 2 ¯nds that 1 is above his one-shot Nash
equilibrium amount but below his Stackelberg amount, then it is best for 2 to immediately increase
her e®orts up to her best response function. From equation (49), we know that any di®erent e®ort
level by 2 will provide 1 with a strict incentive to exert additional e®ort in the following period and
thereby hurting 2; if favorite party 1 is above his Stackelberg amount, then 2 will anticipate that 1
will exert no further e®ort due to equation (49). Hence, 2 may allocate her e®ort between the periods
due to equation (47). Similar reasoning can be applied to cases in which 1 is underdog. Figure 3.12





































e®ort allocated between periods
-
immediate increase of e®ort
t = 1
Similarly, in the ¯rst period, party 1 has no incentive to choose an e®ort level higher than his best
response function. Then the remaining question is will party 1 invest an amount other than his
two-period Stackelberg level? It will be helpful to discuss separately two ranges for the value of wc:Access to Justice: An Economic Approach 78
where wc > 1=2 and where wc · 1=2.
I. wc > 1=2
If party 1 chooses e1
1 · eP
1 in period t = 1, then we know from equation (50) that in period t = 2,
party 2 will choose e2
2 such that e2
2 = R2(e1
1). Further, from (49) we know that in period 3, party 1
will exert no more e®ort, i.e., e3
1 = 0. In the last period, 2 will choose e4
2 = 0. As a result, in subgame
perfect equilibrium, the aggregate e®ort levels of party 1 and 2 are
~ e1 = e1
1 and ~ e2 = R2(e1
1):
Lemma 3.3 implies that party 1's payo® is maximized when he sets e1
1 = eP
1 . Any amount of e1
1 < eP
1
will lead party 2 to invest e2
2 > eD
2 in period 2 (and e4
2 = 0 in period 4), resulting in a lower payo®
for 1. Now suppose party 1 chooses e1
1 > eP
1 in period t = 1. Then 1 can always improve his payo®
by reducing e1
1 to eP
1 due to lemma 3.3.
So in subgame perfect equilibrium, 1 and 2 invests (~ e1
1;~ e3












II. wc · 1=2
If party 1 chooses e1
1 · eP
1 in period t = 1, then from equation (50) we know in period t = 2,
party 2 will choose e2
2 such that 0 · e2
2 · R2(e1
1). From equation (49), we know that in period 3,
party 1 will choose an amount e3
1 equals to eP
1 ¡e1








1 ) = eD
2 . Now suppose that party 1 chooses e1
1 > eP
1 in period t = 1. But
1 can always improve his payo® by reducing e1
1 to eP
1 due to lemma 3.3.
As a result, in subgame perfect equilibrium, the aggregate e®ort levels of party 1 and 2 are
~ e1 = eP
1 and ~ e2 = eD
2 :
This outcome can be realized via a continuum of subgame-perfect-equilibrium paths, namely, 1 and
2 invests (~ e1
1;~ e3













This result says that doubling the number of periods of interaction has no real impact on the aggregate
e®ort level. Since the aggregate e®ort has not changed, the corresponding equilibrium rate of rent
dissipation, the respective payo®s and the subsequent distortion to access to justice are the same
in a four-period game as in a two-period one. The equilibrium level of rent dissipation, payo®s andAccess to Justice: An Economic Approach 79
subsequent distortion to access to justice is therefore the same in a four-period game as in a two-period
one.
In the Stackelberg outcome, the favorite leader takes all action in the ¯rst period as a leader,
thereby curbing the underdog follower's incentive. This is because a lower e®ort by a favorite leader
in the ¯rst period would trigger a more aggressive response by the follower, which is unfavorable.
In contrast, an underdog leader allocates her e®ort throughout all the periods as for her there is no
need to overcommit. A follower, being either a favorite or a underdog, may distribute investment
throughout all the periods.
3.4.3. Sequential Litigation Game with Endogenous sequencing
Now assume that, the legal procedure does not prescribe which party exerts e®ort ¯rst and which
party responds, that is, either party may initiate as the plainti® in a litigation. This is often the case
in legal disputes such as custody, divorce and contract:
(i) In custody litigation, who will put forward (or defend against) a claim if one partner has superior
ability to manipulate and intimidate the children regarding their statements to the custody evaluator?
(ii) If a divorce agreement cannot be reached between a spouse, who will initiate the lawsuit when
gender bias in family courts works to the female's (or male's) advantage?
(iii) Legal costs are typically higher for foreign ¯rms in business contract disputes. They incur higher
costs in communications and in translating business documents into a form that will be understood
by a domestic court. Will the domestic ¯rm act as a claimant given its typical advantage?
These questions will be answered in this section.
3.4.3.1. Equilibrium Sequence of Litigation with Announcement
Now consider the extended litigation game with announcement stage (hereafter \extended litigation
game"). I will construct and solve analytically a speci¯c parametric model based on the more general
and nonparametric models of Hamilton and Slutsky (1990), Baik and Shogren (1992) and Leininger
(1993).109 Litigants 1 and 2 ¯rst decide and announce the rounds in which they will choose their
e®ort levels. This is done simultaneously. The litigants then choose their e®ort levels, knowing when
the opponent does so, in the rounds to which they were committed in the announcement stage. If
both parties choose to exert e®orts in the same rounds, a simultaneous play subgame occurs; if the
litigants choose to exert e®orts at di®erent rounds, then the party choosing to exert e®orts in odd
(resp. even) rounds becomes the plainti® (resp. defendant), giving rise to a sequential play subgame.
Formally, de¯ne ¡ = fN ;S;ug to be the extended litigation. The set of players is N = f1;2g.
Let I1 and I2 be compact, convex intervals of I R1 which are litigants 1's and 2's possible e®ort levels
in the basic game, i.e., in the game without the announcement stage. As in the basic game, the
payo®s to the two litigants depend only on the e®orts exerted in the basic game (see equation (30)).
T ´ fFirst, Secondg is the set of possible times at which to choose the level of e®ort. Let m be the
period in which litigant 1 has chosen to exert e®ort and n be the period litigant 2 has chosen to exert
e®ort. The set of strategies for litigant 1 is S1 = fFirst, Secondg£©1, where ©1 is the set of functions
that map f(First, First), (First, Second), (Second, First)£I2, (Second, Second)g into I1. Litigant 2's
109Hamilton and Slutsky (1990), Baik and Shogren (1992) and Leininger (1993) endogenize the sequence of moves in
two-stage, two-player contests.Access to Justice: An Economic Approach 80
strategy set is S2 = fFirst, Secondg £ ©2, where ©2 is the set of functions that map f(First, First),
(First, Second)£I1, (Second, First), (Second, Second)g into I2. De¯ne s1 = (m;Á1) 2 S1, where




> > > > > > > <
> > > > > > > :
uc
1 if (m;n) 2 f(First, First), (Second, Second)g
uP
1 if (m;n) = (First, Second)
uD





> > > > > > > <
> > > > > > > :
uc
2 if (m;n) 2 f(First, First), (Second, Second)g
uD
2 if (m;n) = (First, Second)
uP
2 if (m;n) = (Second, First);
where the superscript \E" stands for extended litigation.
We can now formally analyze the equilibria in the extended litigation.
Proposition 3.3. In extended two-stage litigation with announcement stage,
(i) The litigation intensity in endogenous sequencing decision falls below that under simultaneous de-
cision. That is, rE(a) · rc(a) for all a.
(ii) The \have" (resp. \have not") wins less (resp. more) often in a sequential protocol than in a
static play. That is, wE(a) > wc(a) when 0 · a < 1 and wE(a) < wc(a) when a > 1.
(iii) The endogenous sequencing outcome Pareto-dominates the static play outcome. That is, uE
i ¸ uc
i
for all a for i = 1;2.
(iv) The distortion to access to justice is smaller in the endogenous sequencing process than that in
the static process for moderate degrees of asymmetry.
Proof. To prove the proposition, we ¯rst need to establish the timing of choices. The timing of
choices can be determined by the comparison of payo®s with the three di®erent orders of play. The
normal form of the extended litigation is
Litigant2


















2. It is a dominant strategy110 for the \have not" party 1 to take the role of a plainti® and invest
early and that the \have" party 2 is better o® observing then reacting to 1's action than competing
for the ¯rst-mover-advantage. The unique subgame perfect equilibrium is (First, Second); Similarly
when a ¸ 1, the unique subgame perfect equilibrium is (Second, First).
110A strategy is called dominant if it always earns a higher payo® for the one uses it.Access to Justice: An Economic Approach 81












Figure 3.13. Rent dissipation (Endogenous Sequencing vs. Static Process)






4 if 0 · a · 1;
3a¡1
4a2 if a ¸ 1:
(51)
Figures 3.13 illustrates the e®ect of asymmetry on litigation cost.
(ii) The win rate and trial payo® of the players in the extended two-stage litigation with announcement






3¡a if 0 · a · 1;
2a¡1
3a¡1 if a ¸ 1:





3¡a if 0 · a · 1;
a
3a¡1 if a ¸ 1;
(52)
respectively. The third result of the proposition can be derived by comparing equations (33) and (52).
When the sequence of moves is endogenously determined, the dynamics of legal process diminishes
the e®ect of asymmetry in terms of win rates. Figure 3.14 illustrates the di®erence between the two
protocols.













Figure 3.14. Win Rates (Endogenous Sequencing vs. Static Process)







4V if 0 · a · 1;
(2a¡1)2







4 V if 0 · a · 1;
1
4aV if a ¸ 1:
(53)
This last result of proposition 3.3 can be directly derived by comparing equations (34) and (53). kAccess to Justice: An Economic Approach 82

















Figure 3.15. 1's Trial Payo® (Endogenous Timing)














Figure 3.16. 2's Trial Payo® (Endogenous Timing)






4[8 + 5a(a ¡ 4) + a(a ¡ 4)2]
1
2 if 0 · a · 1;
1




2 if a ¸ 1:
Figures 3.17 depicts the in°uence of asymmetry on access to justice when timing is endogenous.
The distortion reaches its minimum when one litigant is (approx.) 80 percent as adept as the other.
The ¯gure also illustrates the di®erent impacts that asymmetry would exert on justice as the timing
changes. Note that, ±E(a) < ±c(a) for some a. The enhanced access to justice stems from the parties'
°exibility in coordinating their legal actions to soften competition: the \have not" would always has
the ¯rst move and commit to a low e®ort level; the \have" goes along and scales back expenditure.
Both sides can therefore save a signi¯cant amount of e®ort and avoid ¯erce litigation.












Figure 3.17. Distortion to Access to Justice (Endogenous Sequencing vs. Static Process)
3.5. Conclusion
In a game theoretical model, the ¯ndings of this study rea±rm Galanter's thesis that the \haves
come out ahead." The parties with lower costs in litigation consistently fared better than their weaker
opponents and the disparity in success rates was greatest when the disparity in strength was greatest.
The total legal costs are always low toward the extremes of disparity in strength (where a is close to
0 or 1) and highest for intermediate values of disparity in strength. Distortions to access to justice
are always high toward the extremes of asymmetry and lowest for intermediate values of asymmetry.Access to Justice: An Economic Approach 83
Several notable additions of this analysis to the fairly extensive literature that has been built on
Galanter's insights are the discovery that
[1] in a sequential litigation protocol where the roles of the plainti® and the defendant are ex-
ogenously determined, the tendency of the \haves" to achieve greater trial victory and win more
frequently than their less advantaged opponents through aggressive litigation investment is remark-
ably higher when he \haves" are plainti®s than when they defendants;
[2] while the dynamics of legal process always bene¯ts the plainti®, it hurts the defendant when
she is disadvantaged and the sequencing of move and countermove is exogenous;
[3] in lawsuits such as custody, patent and contract, where the roles of the plainti® and the
defendant are left to be determined by the parties themselves, the \have not" will initiate the lawsuit
to challenge the \have" as to soften litigation intensity. The \have" goes along with this and scales
back expenditure.
[4] in both static legal process and sequential process with endogenous sequencing, the extent of
rent dissipation is decreasing in the disparity in adeptness; however, in sequential legal process with
exogenous sequencing, this is not necessarily the case.
[5] the outcome of endogenous sequencing litigation protocol Pareto dominates the outcome of the
static play;
[6] The °exibility of multiple actions neither bene¯ts nor harms the litigants.Access to Justice: An Economic Approach 84
Chapter 4
Economic Determinants of Noneconomic Damages
in Medical Malpractice Claims
4.1. Introduction
Victims of tortious injury su®er from accidents in more than ¯nancial ways. Adequate access to
justice requires that the victims be compensated timely and fully for their losses. I have discussed the
issue of timely compensation in Chapter 2. This chapter deals with the issue of full compensation:
besides economic losses such as medical expenses and lost earnings, also noneconomic losses such
as pain, su®ering and loss of enjoyment of life should be compensated. A problem associated with
such compensatory damages is that they are di±cult to quantify. For this reason, there has long
been claims that awards for noneconomic harm are random and unpredictable. It is the purpose of
this chapter to investigate, in medical malpractice claims, that (i) whether noneconomic damages are
arbitrary, and (ii) what determines the incidence and magnitude of noneconomic damages awards.
This is worthwhile, because the popular beliefs that noneconomic damages awards are capricious and
unpredictable have made these awards an contentious issue in all of the various medical malpractice
reform attempts in recent years in the United States.111;112 My analysis provides the most recent evi-
dence that these beliefs are unfounded. I begin with a general conceptual discussion on the economics
of non-economic damages.
The aim of compensatory damages is to make the victim whole and restore the victim to the
position she was in before the injury, at least to the extent that monetary damages can do so.113
Compensatory damages consist of awards for both economic damages and noneconomic damages.
Whereas economic damages are designed to reimburse an accident victim's lost earnings and medical
costs, noneconomic damages are intended to compensate the victim for her physical pain or mental
anguish. The speci¯c compensable elements of noneconomic damages vary by jurisdiction. But gen-
erally damages are awarded for bodily harm (e.g., dis¯gurement, disability), emotional distress (e.g.,
fear, anxiety, depression, and embarrassment), and loss of enjoyment of life (e.g., limitations on one's
lifestyle and resulting feelings).114 Therefore, noneconomic damages encompass highly intertwined
elements, many of which have psychological or social aspects.
The following simple theoretic framework may help to conceptualize the idea of compensation
for noneconomic losses.115 Let U denote the lifetime utility of a victim and let w denote the level
111In 2003, The former U.S. President Bush has urged Congress at least six times to impose substantial nationwide
restrictions on medical malpractice cases, including a cap on noneconomic damages of over $250,000. In his recent health
care reform, U.S. President Obama has rejected caps on noneconomic damages in medical malpractice cases. President
Obama told the American Medical Association (and the American public) that medical malpractice caps are \unfair to
people who have been wrongfully harmed." See also Kinney (1995). Kinney (1995) summarizes federal e®orts to reform
noneconomic damages in the 90s.
112Proponents for restricting and eliminating non-economic damages also argue that jury awards and settlements are
too high. This chapter, however, focuses on the predictability of noneconomic damages. Whether these awards levels
are appropriate is not of interest in this chapter.
113See Restatement (Second) of Torts, 1979, x 901.
114See Restatement (Second) of Torts, 1979, x 905.
115I am grateful to Eric van Damme for suggesting me to adopt this framework.Access to Justice: An Economic Approach 85
of the victim's lifetime income. Furthermore, let x denote the level of physical and mental distress
su®ered by the victim. Assume, for simplicity, that the victim's lifetime utility depends only on her
lifetime income and physical and mental distress so that U = U(w;x). Assume that the victim's
utility increases with her lifetime income and decreases with her physical and mental distress, or
Uw > 0 and Ux < 0. Further assume that without the injury, the victim's lifetime income is w0
and her physical and mental distress is 0. The victim's utility before the injury is then U(w0;0).
After the injury, the victim's lifetime income drops to w1 and her distress level becomes x1. Hence,
her lifetime utility becomes U(w1;x1). The level of the victim's noneconomic loss is given by ¡x1.
Furthermore, let ce denote the level of economic damages awards and cn the level of noneconomic
damages awards. To restore the victim to the position she was in before the injury, we must have
that U(w1 + ce + cn;x1) = U(w0;0):
However, in practice the conceptual framework above is di±cult to implement for determining ex-
actly how much the victims should be compensated. The components of noneconomic damage awards
are de¯ned in only general ways.116 Jury instructions for noneconomic loss do not provide precise
quantitative guidance. Because of this lack of guidance, there have long been claims that noneco-
nomic damage awards are random.117 Since randomness implies variation in awards for individuals
who su®er identical injury, when damages are random the tort system is not horizontally fair.118
Furthermore, when compensations are random, the tort system may not be fair if a fair system is
one that restores a victim of to the position she was in before the injury. When compensations are
provided randomly more severely injured victims may receive less compensation than less severely
injured ones.119
Empirical ¯ndings o®er little support to the claims that awards for noneconomic harm are un-
predictable.120 In an insightful paper, Viscusi (1988a) studied over 10,000 closed product liability
claims and found that noneconomic damage awards vary systematically with the economic losses,
the character of injuries, and liability doctrine involved in claims. Bovbjerg et al. (1989) studied
the predictability of noneconomic damages in personal injury lawsuits from Florida and Kansas City.
They categorized the injury types by degrees of severity which were measured on a nine-point scale.
They found that the juries award the least damages for insigni¯cant and temporary injuries and
the largest for catastrophic permanent injuries. However, they also found considerable unexplained
variability across and within categories of injury severity, raising the possibility that juries do not
award damages uniformly from case to case. In the same genre, the latter research by Balder et al.
(1995), Bobbers et al. (1989) and (1991), Goodman et al. (1989), Hans & Ermann (1989), Peterson
(1984), Sloan & Hsieh (1990), Vidmar & Rice (1993) has been able to account for between half and
two-thirds of the variation in awards in sampled cases by using from just one to a small handful of
explanatory variables.
This chapter shares an obvious common thread with this earlier body of work. It departs in that,
¯rst, I have the usual opportunity to analyze data on out-of-court settlement. In contrast, Bovbjerg
116This remark has been given by Wissler et al. (1997).
117See, e.g., discussions in Daniels (1989), Daniels & Martin (1995), Litan (1993), MacCoun (1993), Saks (1992),
Vidmar (1994), (1995), Weiler (1991).
118Horizonal fairness implies that individuals su®er the same degree of injury recover the same amount of damage
compensation. See Section 1.1, page 6.
119For de¯nition of fairness, see Section 1.1.
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et al. (1989) and others have restricted their analysis to tried cases. The vast majority of cases
are settled out-of-court in the shadow of litigation. But little is known about the pattern of awards
for noneconomic harm in out-of-court settlement. Moreover, there is usually a sample selection bias
associated with using tried cases: the group of court-adjudicated cases is a highly selected sample of
all cases brought for damage award.121 The present study contributes to this literature by expanding
the current knowledge on noneconomic damages and by overcoming the problems of selection bias
that plague earlier studies. Using a novel dataset from the Texas Department of Insurance (TDI)
Commercial Liability Insurance Closed Claim Report, I provide a comprehensive prospective on the
incidence and magnitude of noneconomic damage awards in medical malpractice cases and analyze
the relationship of these awards to other characteristics of the case. I present four robust ¯ndings on
this topic:
(a) Consistent with the ¯ndings of Viscusi (1988a) and Rodgers (1993), I ¯nd that noneconomic
damage awards are not completely random outcomes. They vary, in predictable ways, with
changes in the economic characteristics of the case: the victim's ¯nancial loss is the single best
predictor of noneconomic damages, accounting for 64 percent and 25 percent of the variance
in the incidence and magnitude of the awards, respectively;
(b) Moreover, the incidence of noneconomic damage awards are higher for unemployed or self-
employed victims than for employed ones; Furthermore, when compared to victims receiving
collateral insurance payment, victims without collateral insurance are more likely to be com-
pensated. These results suggest that when awarding noneconomic damages the tort system has
objectives other than merely making whole the victims for their physical and mental anguish.
(c) By going to trial a victim increases the amount of compensation for noneconomic harm by
nearly 73.5% when compared to a victim who settles out of court. This result indicates that
the various aspects of the litigation process, such as litigation costs and plainti®'s risk aversion,
lower the plainti®s' bargaining position vis-µ a-vis the defendant. Subsequently the defendant
lowers the settlement o®er amount below the expected court award.
(d) The incidence and magnitude of awards are not systematically related to the type of injury.
Permanent and catastrophic injuries do not necessarily receive more awards for noneconomic
damages than temporary, insigni¯cant injuries. The lack of systematical relationship could be
a result, in part, of variability the type of evidence that could be presented at trial, in the
bargaining skill of the parties, the gender and income of the victim, or other factors that are
not taken into account by the current model.122
Taken together, my results cast doubt on the validity of the claim that noneconomic damage
awards are random and unpredictable and serve as evidence against damage caps. The chapter is
organized as follows. In Section 4.2, I brie°y describe the provision of noneconomic damages in the
US legal system and the recent noneconomic damage reforms. Section 4.3 provides an overview of
the noneconomic damage awards by injury type. The role of noneconomic damages is not uniform,
even for a particular injury class. Section 4.4 describes estimation methods. Section 4.5 presents
the empirical results. Section 4.6 presents summary measures of the e±ciency of the tort system for
121See Priest and Klein (1984) for discussion on sample selection bias associated with litigated cases. See Viscusi
(1988b) for similar critiques on using expected court verdict as proxy for expected levels of damage.
122See Section 1.1 for the de¯nition of `fairness'.Access to Justice: An Economic Approach 87
medical malpractice claims in the Texas Department of Insurance Commercial Liability Insurance
Closed Claim database. The legal costs share of total damage payments average about 0.59 for
all claims involve noneconomic damage payments. This ratio is somewhat higher for cases without
noneconomic damage payments. Furthermore, I ¯nd that the tort system is more e±cient in awarding
noneconomic damages for fatal injury and very serious injury types than for temporary, insigni¯cant
injuries. Section 4.6 provides a discussion on fairness issues in noneconomic loss compensation based
on the empirical results. Section 4.7 concludes.
4.2. Legal Background
Provision of Noneconomic Damages
In the US, noneconomic damages are provided extensively through the tort law system, but
only moderately by insurance markets.123 In the American tort system, noneconomic damages are
estimated by the juries, in°uenced by the e®ort of the lawyers and eventually modi¯ed and approved
by the court.
Juries are often urged to \reasonably compensate" the victims for noneconomic losses.124 However,
what compensation is reasonable and the objectives that are to be promoted by this compensation
have not been well de¯ned. Standard jury instructions sometimes explicitly state that there are no
objective guidelines by which the jury can follow to measure the money equivalent of noneconomic
losses.125 Furthermore, as Vidmar and Rice (1993) and others have observed, since juries are ad hoc
groups of lay persons familiar only with the case at hand, they are not aware of the level of awards
in similar cases with which to compare and adjust their damage assessment.
As a result, lawyers have tried to o®er a number of heuristic devices to help juries quantify
noneconomic losses. However, courts have often rejected these attempts. Some jurisdictions in the
US forbid the jurors to use the \per diem" method, where the jury awards the victim a small amount
per unit of time (such as a day or an hour) and then multiplies it by the victim's life expectancy.126 The
reasons of prohibition are that assuming the noneconomic loss su®ered by the victims is additive over
each time interval is at best an approximation to the true value; In addition, it begs the fundamental
issue of what each unit of noneconomic loss is worth.127 Courts have similarly rejected the \Golden
Rule" which asks jurors to determine the amount of compensation they need to receive (ex post) if
they had to experience the victims' pain and su®ering. The reason of rejection is that the courts think
the \Golden rule" approach is too clearly based on nonobjective factors: it is impermissible in virtually
every jurisdiction to ask jurors to imagine themselves in the circumstances of the victim and to use
123There are di®erent explanations for the absence of an insurance market for noneconomic loss. For instance, Suurmond
and Van Velthoven (2005) shows that there is a lack of demand for insurance for noneconomic damages: even if
noneconomic losses would be fully compensated - a risk averse individual would never purchase insurance against the
risk of incurring noneconomic losses. Croley and Hanson (1995) argue that there is a lack of supply of insurance.
They show that market failures, such as moral hazard, would prohibit insurance companies from selling insurance for
noneconomic damages.
124For instance, the Restatement (Second) of Torts (1979, x 912) particularly notes: \The discretion of the judge or
jury determines the amount of recovery, the only standard being such an amount as a reasonable person would estimate
as fair compensation."
125See Douthwaite, (1988), page 274.
126See Pearson et al. (2005) and McCa®ery et al.(1995).
127For discussion of this point, see Viscusi (1988a). Totaro (2006) makes a similar remark.Access to Justice: An Economic Approach 88
that visualization in determining the level of noneconomic damages.128 Yet some jurisdictions in the
US allow jurors to use the \per diem" approach. Similarly,\day-in-the-life" videos are admissible in
courts if they are carefully prepared.129 Once the jury determines the amount of damage, the court
may reduce the amount via a remittitur process,130 or because there are statutory caps under which
the court must adjust the jury award.131
Noneconomic Damages Reform
The claims that noneconomic damages are random have made these damage components the subject
of much legislation and continuing suggestions for further modi¯cations of the legal system in order to
limit or prohibit noneconomic damage awards. For instance, in 1986 the U.S. Department of Justice
Tort Policy Working Group reported that noneconomic damages were subjective awards and are
unpredictable and that the magnitude of these awards was so substantial that a cap was needed.132
In 2003, former US President Bush proposed a nationwide $250;000 cap on all noneconomic damages
awarded in medical malpractice lawsuits. Following the proposal seven states passed legislation or
amended their constitutions to create caps on noneconomic damages. Texas, for instance, established
a tree-tiered system for awarding noneconomic damages in medical malpractice cases in 2003 (see
House Bill 4, Texas Legislature (2003)). A $ 250,000 cap applies to all doctors involved in a case,
with a $ 250,000 cap against any single institution and a $ 500,000 cap on all health-care institutions
combined.133 By 2007, 26 states in the US have imposed caps on non-economic damages.134 During
this period, noneconomic damage caps were struck down by supreme courts in ¯ve states. In some
states, such as Illinois and Ohio, caps were struck down by state supreme courts and later reenacted
in amended form. Sometimes this cycle repeated itself.135
The above discussions lead to the following hypothesis about the predictability of noneconomic
damage awards:
Hypothesis Noneconomic damage awards are entirely random events.
In this case the constant term will be statistically signi¯cant in each equation, while the substantive
coe±cients will not be as a consequence.136
128See Boucher (2008), page 169.
129See Varner and James (1999).
130A remittitur process is a legal process which allows a judge to reduce a jury award if the judge believes that the
amount is not supported by the facts and that it is excessive.
131For an extensive review of the provision of noneconomic damages, see Avraham (2006b).
132See U.S. Department of Justice Tort Policy Working Group, Report (February 1986).
133Reforms in the other states are as follows. Florida imposed caps on noneconomic damages for medical negligence
at $ 500,000 for physicians and $ 750,000 for hospitals; West Virginia capped noneconomic damages at $ 250,000 per
occurrence; $ 500,000 per occurrence for wrongful death, permanent and substantial deformity, loss of limb or bodily
function; Colorado extended its pre-existing $ 250,000 cap on noneconomic damages for medical negligence cases to cases
of physical impairment and dis¯gurement. Ohio capped noneconomic damages at $ 250,000 or three times economic
damages to a maximum of $ 350,000 per victim or $ 500,000 per occurrence. Oklahoma capped noneconomic damages
at $ 300,000 in cases involving pregnancy.
134See Bustos and Avraham (2008), page 2.
135See Avraham (2006a) for a comprehensive survey on noneconomic damages reforms in the US. See also Bovbjerg
(1989); National Conference of State Legislatures (1988); Sanders & Joyce (1990) for legislations on noneconomic
damages.
136The constant term in the regression equation is not determined by the values of the explanatory variables. Therefore,
a statistically signi¯cant constant term with statistically insigni¯cant coe±cients indicate that the dependent variableAccess to Justice: An Economic Approach 89
Table 4.2: Descriptive Statistics: Overall distribution of noneconomic damage awardsa
Claims with Positive
All Claims Noneconomic Damages
Fraction of Fraction of Fraction of
cases with Mean Payment for Mean Payment for
Noneconomic Noneconomic Noneconomic Noneconomic Noneconomic
Type of Injury Damages Damages Damages Damages Damages
Death .33 120,143 .76 363, 720 .77
Amputation .32 113,239 .69 348,809 .69
Burns (heat) .42 82,798 .31 434,831 .72
Burns (chemical) .38 65,173 .24 317,051 .63
Systemic poisoning (toxic) .56 105,535 .43 272,026 .77
Systemic poisoning (other) .51 106,462 .35 210,327 .69
Eye injury (blindness) .36 110,639 .25 304,743 .68
Respiratory condition .36 83,095 .24 229,072 .66
Nervous condition .44 102,694 .27 235,690 .62
Hearing loss or impairment .34 192,867 .24 1,012,727 .72
Circulatory condition .37 93,488 .23 253,754 .62
Multiple injuries .31 42,275 .20 133,783 .62
Back injury .29 51,215 .16 176,079 .55
Skin disorder .37 78,392 .24 251,187 .64
Brain damage .34 329,283 .19 1,512,229 .56
Scarring .44 71,856 .29 163,102 .66
Spinal cord injuries .30 211,062 .16 693,724 .53
Other .35 68,614 .23 462,335 .67
Observations 17,960 6,187
a. all dollar values are in 2005 $. The source for these values is author's calculations based on the Texas Department of
Insurance Commercial Liability Insurance Closed Claim database for the years 1988-2005.
4.3. Descriptive Statistics
The data are from the Texas Department of Insurance (TDI) Commercial Liability Insurance Closed
Claim Report. Texas requires detailed reports for all claims for which the total damage payments by
all insurers are at least $10;000. A rich variety of case-speci¯c information is recorded for majority of
claims, including the total amount of damage payment, the level of noneconomic damage payment,
the type of injury and the plainti®s percentage of fault. I analyze data from all available years, which
currently include the years 1988 - 2005.137
¤ Rules for inclusion in the sample. TDI data include 20,116 paid medical malpractice claims
across 18 injury types over the years 1988-2005. While the data is very rich, it still has limitations
that make necessary a restriction on the set of cases included in my sample. I drop 2,156 claims are
dropped because information on the type of injury is not recorded. Because of this restriction, the
resulting sample of 17,960 cases contains 17,086 cases that terminated in a settlement out-of-court
and 874 that terminated during or after trial. I refer to the sample of 17,960 cases as my full sample.
Subsequently, I expand the analysis in the ¯rst part of Section 4.5 to include only claims for which
the insurer reports positive victim age and assess the role of victim's age in noneconomic damage
of the regression equation is not signi¯cantly in°uenced by changes in any of the explanatory variables.
137All dollar values throughout the chapter are adjusted to 2005$ using standard measure of general price trends
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payments. Because of this restriction, 4,430 cases are dropped from the full sample.
¤ Distribution of Noneconomic Damages. The variables and model parameters are de¯ned
in Table 4.1 (see appendix), and the corresponding descriptive statistics are presented in tables 4.2
and 4.3. Table 4.2 reports the distribution of noneconomic damages. The results are striking in
terms of the importance of noneconomic losses in comparison with the economic losses. The e®ect
of noneconomic losses is particularly prevalent for systemic poisoning (toxic) and systemic poison-
ing (other) victims, as more than half of these accident victims received noneconomic damage losses
compensation.
The mean value of noneconomic damage award, which includes claims for which there was a
positive award but not necessarily a noneconomic damage component, ranges from a low for $51;215
for back injury to a high values of and $329;282 for brain damages.
There is considerably less variation in the share of the award comprised by noneconomic losses.
The third column of statistics in Table 4.2 indicates that noneconomic losses comprises from 16
percent to 43 percent of all awards in which medical malpractice liability payment has been received.
These rather impressive statistics regarding the in°uence of noneconomic damages may understate
the importance of these concerns in which they arise. The statistics in the ¯nal columns of Table 4.2
address the noneconomic damage contribution excluding cases where noneconomic damage awards
are zero, and the role of noneconomic damage increases by 40 percent in most cases. The mean values
of noneconomic damage awards now exceed $1;000;000 in two cases { hearing loss of impairment
and for brain damages. In 2005 dollars these noneconomic damage amounts exceed $451;946 as an
average for the injury category. The recommendation by the former President Bush that noneconomic
damages be capped at $250;000 would clearly be a binding constraint on average for these injuries.
The levels of compensation for brain damages and spinal cord injuries should be regarded as very
extreme outliers rather than the norm. In 13 out the 18 injury categories in which there is positive
noneconomic damage compensation, the level of such compensation is below $25;000.
¤ Explanatory Variables. Three sets of explanatory variables are employed in the analysis
to account for possible variations in the factors that might a®ect the incidence and magnitude of
awards for noneconomic harm. A ¯rst set of variables captures the economic characteristics of the
case. FINANCIAL LOSS is the amount (in 2005 dollars) of the ¯nancial losses that have been awarded in
either settlement or at trial for the victim's medical expenses and lost earnings. This variable re°ects
the severity of injury, as one would expect that more severe injuries are associated with higher medical
expenses and lost working hours. FINANCIAL LOSS has relatively high explanatory power in predicting
the noneconomic damage awards. A regression of AMOUNT OF NONECONOMIC DAMAGES on FINANCIAL
LOSS yields a coe±cient of 0.59 (t-value = 74.98), demonstrating that on average, noneconomic losses
track ¯nancial losses closely. Furthermore, the pseudo R-squared in this equation is 0.24, showing
that there is a large proportion of variation across cases in the level of noneconomic damages for any
given ¯nancial loss amount. Several studies have shown positive correlation between noneconomic
losses and economic losses, which include loss of income and property damages.138
The next variable, EMPLOYED, indicates whether the victim is employed outside of the home.
Employment status is often an important determinant of the incidence and level of noneconomic
138See, e.g., Viscusi (1988a), Rodgers (1993), Croley and Hanson (1995) and Avraham (2005).Access to Justice: An Economic Approach 91
Table 4.3: Descriptive Statistics
Mean Std. Dev.
Economic Variables
FINANCIAL LOSS ($) 61,131 362,738
EMPLOYED (1=yes) 0.41 0.49
COLLATERAL PAYMENT (1=yes) 0.38 0.48
EMPLOYED (1=yes) 0.41 0.49
INITIAL EXPENSE RESERVE ($) 16,786 24,919
AGE (years) 39 24
N %
Stage
Settlement out of court 17,086 95.13




Burns (heat) 170 0.95
Burns (chemical) 74 0.41
Systemic poisoning (toxic) 50 0.28
Systemic poisoning (other) 81 0.45
Eye injury (blindness) 471 2.62
Respiratory condition 204 1.14
Nervous condition 140 0.78
Hearing loss or impairment 103 0.57
Circulatory condition 247 1.38
Multiple injuries 500 2.78
Back injury 416 2.32
Skin disorder 203 1.13
Brain damage 1,722 9.59
Scarring 429 2.39
Spinal cord injuries 424 2.36
Other 7,638 42.53
Observations 17,960
a. all dollar values are in 2005 $. The source for these values is author's cal-
culations based on the Texas Department of Insurance Commercial Liability
Insurance Closed Claim database for the years 1988-2005. The number of
observation for AGE is 13,530.
damages in juror's decision making. As employment income forms the basis for calculating most
economic damage awards, noneconomic loss becomes an important element of compensation for people
who do not work outside the home, like retired seniors, children, and homemakers. The victims are
employed in 41% of the cases in my sample.
The third economic variable, COLLATERAL PAYMENT, indicates whether the victim receives col-
lateral insurance payments. The variable is included to control for the potential negative e®ect of
receiving collateral insurance payments on the probability and level of noneconomic damage awards.
Viscusi (1988a) shows that jurors are less likely to award noneconomic damages when the victims
already receive collateral insurance payments; and when they do, the level of awards is lower. Victims
receive collateral insurance payment in 38% of the cases in my sample.
Furthermore, I include a dummy variable, STAGE, to control for the e®ects of omitted case char-
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included variables of interest. As motivated in the introduction, the group of cases that is ¯led and
litigated in court is a usually highly selected sample of cases.
To control for the potential e®ects of litigation expenditure on damage payments, I use information
on the initial reserve amounts established by the insurer given the characteristics of the claim. These
reserve amounts are established based on the insurer's experience with the injury type and the nature
and severity of damage: a higher initial expense reserve corresponds to a higher expected value of
legal expenditures. Initial reserve levels are established by insurers for the time that a damage claim
was reported, which will generally be before a suit is ¯led. That is, they are established prior to any
actual damage payments are made and actual defense expenditures are incurred. When insurers set
up their initial reserve amounts for a case, they should reserve an amount that corresponds to the
actual expected damages and legal expenses for that case type. The estimate of the expected damages
and expected costs will change as additional information arrives.
Finally, the type of injury is characterized through a series of 18 injury categories, such as brain
damage, back injuries, and so forth, and a catch-all `other' injury category. Injury type may provide
another measure of severity since certain types of injuries lead to greater levels of physical and
emotional distress than others. Systemic poisoning, for example, is more life threatening than skin
disorder. A burn from heat may be more painful than back injury.
4.4. Empirical Models
Two aspects of noneconomic damage awards { the likelihood and the amount of noneconomic
damage payment { merit further empirical investigation. In particular, I will isolate compensation
for particular types of injuries from e®ects such as the di®erences in the size of the ¯nancial losses
(e.g. earning loss, medical expenses, etc.) associated with di®erent injury categories. Using the same
empirical strategy as that in Viscusi (1988a), I estimate two equations for the case sample. The ¯rst
is for the level of noneconomic damages, and the second is for the incidence of noneconomic damages.
The equations include the same explanatory variables.
Let the estimated value of noneconomic losses be given by
[Noneconomic Damages]i = x0
i¯ + ²i; (54)
for each observation i. xi is a vector of observed explanatory variables. The parameter vector ¯ is
the vector of coe±cients, measuring the in°uence of observed characteristics.
The likelihood of receiving noneconomic damage payment is given by
Prob[Noneconomic Damages]i = Probf[Noneconomic Damages]i ¡ ²i > 0g (55)
where the observed noneconomic damages variable equals 1 if the estimated noneconomic damages
are positive and 0 otherwise.
Two statistical issues immediately arise. The ¯rst statistical issue involves estimation of the
equation for the amount of noneconomic damage awards. Using OLS to analyze the nonzero damage
payment responses would yield biased estimates. The problem is that the dependent variable is
censored from below, with no observations for it if noneconomic damage payments are not positive.
In this case, the relationship de¯ned by equation (54) can be consistently estimated using the Tobit
estimator.139
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The second statistical issue is that the dependent variable estimated in (55) has a binary nature.
Estimating (55) using ordinary least squares (OLS) methods could lead to biased estimates of the
coe±cients. Assuming that the error term follows a normal distribution, the probit estimator yield
unbiased estimates of the probability response and will be used here.
4.5. Empirical Evidence
Columns 1 and 2 of Table 4.4 report the regression estimates of the incidence and magnitude of
noneconomic damage awards. Our key interest is on the predictability of these awards. Column 1 of
Table 4.4 reports the logit regression results for the incidence of noneconomic damage awards; Column
2 of Table 4.4 reports the tobit regression estimates for the log of noneconomic damage levels. The
level of economic damages, the two indemnity reserve variables are also in terms of natural logs so
that the coe±cients in equation (54) equal the pertinent elasticities. Columns 3 and 4 of Table 4.4
add the victim's age to the regressions reported in the ¯rst two columns of Table 4.4. Adding the age
variables to the regressions will capture some e®ects of EMPLOYED { the victim's employment status
in the ¯rst two columns of the table. I begin by focusing on the results in columns 1 and 2 of Table
4.4.
Columns 1 and 2 of Table 4.4 show that there are four variables that a®ect or are associated with,
in a signi¯cant way, the incidence of awards for noneconomic harm; and there are three variables
that a®ect or are associated with, in a signi¯cant way, the level of awards. The explanatory variables
account for nearly two-third of the variability in the incidence of awards and over one quarter of
the variability in the level of awards, respectively. One can therefore reject the hypothesis that
noneconomic damage awards in medical malpractice cases are entirely random outcomes. These
results cast doubt on the validity of the claim that awards for noneconomic harm are random and
unpredictable.
The estimates in Table 4.4 also show that the speci¯c factors that a®ect noneconomic damage
compensation. Consider ¯rst the economic variables. Cases with higher ¯nancial losses are more
likely to receive noneconomic damage payments, and when they do the amount of such payments are
higher. This is plausible { more serious injuries are probably associated with higher levels of medical
expenses and lost working hours and, presumably, greater pain, su®ering and loss of enjoyment of
life. Because the dependent variable, were expressed as natural logarithms, the coe±cient in the ¯rst
model (reported in column 2 of Table 4.4) for FINANCIAL LOSS represents the elasticities of the level of
noneconomic damage awards with respect to changes in ¯nancial losses. Thus, noneconomic damage
awards increase with ¯nancial losses, as expected, but the elasticity of that is more than unity. It is
not clear why cases with higher levels of ¯nancial losses are compensated proportionately more than
cases with smaller ¯nancial losses.
The incidence of noneconomic damage awards are signi¯cantly higher for unemployed or self-
employed victims than for employed ones. This is consistent with the view that noneconomic com-
pensation is more important to those who do not work outside the home, such as the elderly, children,
and homemakers. That's because victims who do not work outside their homes cannot collect a lost
wages portion of economic damages. The \worth" of a homemaker's work inside the home is not
easily measured by a dollar amount, and would only be compensated through noneconomic damages.
However, I ¯nd no evidence of a statistically signi¯cant variation in the magnitudes of compensations
between employed and unemployed individuals.Access to Justice: An Economic Approach 94
Table 4.4. Estimates of Noneconomic damage equationsa
INCIDENCE OF Log(1+ AMOUNT OF INCIDENCE OF Log(1+ AMOUNT OF
NONECONOMIC NONECONOMIC NONECONOMIC NONECONOMIC
DAMAGES DAMAGES) DAMAGES DAMAGES)
Variable (N = 17;960) (N = 17;960) (N = 13;530) (N = 13;530)
Log(FINANCIAL LOSS +1) 0:567¤¤ 1:536¤ 0:578¤¤ 1:499¤
(0:008) (0:013) (0:009) (0:014)
EMPLOYED ¡0:502y ¡1:168 ¡0:498y ¡1:097
(0:068) (0:121) (0:083) (0:132)
COLLATERAL PAYMENTS ¡0:126y ¡0:255 0:063y 0:054
(0:066) (0:119) (0:078) (0:125)
STAGE (1= trial) 0:088 0:551¤ 0:107 0:549y
(0:149) (0:048) (0:177) (0:062)
Log(INITIAL EXPENSE RESERVE +1) 0:020¤ 0:015¤ 0:001¤ 0:018¤
(0:010) (0:017) (0:012) (0:017)
Log(AGE+1) - - ¡0:064¤ ¡0:128y
- - (0:033) (0:054)
Death 0:133 0:551 0:221 0:518
(0:138) (0:250) (0:174) (0:287)
Amputation ¡0:430 ¡0:875 ¡0:565 ¡1:076
(0:251) (0:436) (0:319) (0:488)
Burns (heat) 0:195 0:763 ¡0:047 0:318
(0:315) (0:584) (0:418) (0:680)
Burns (chemical) ¡0:530 ¡0:857 ¡0:401 ¡0:613
(0:520) (0:912) (0:598) (0:971)
Systemic poisoning (toxic) 0:932 2:277 0:711 1:703
(0:519) (0:955) (0:697) (1:053)
Systemic poisoning (other) ¡0:093 0:506 ¡0:650 ¡0:210
(0:480) (0:775) (0:557) (0:820)
Eye injury (blindness) ¡0:007 0:113 0:039 0:107
(0:225) (0:401) (0:269) (0:430)
Respiratory condition 0:158 0:250 0:289 0:384
(0:288) (0:537) (0:339) (0:574)
Nervous condition 0:284 0:319 0:608 0:790
(0:356) (0:631) (0:388) (0:644)
Hearing loss or impairment 0:304 0:675 0:585 1:387
(0:401) (0:766) (0:421) (0:767)
Circulatory condition ¡0:010 ¡0:080 0:135 0:028
(0:279) (0:495) (0:322) (0:537)
Multiple injuries ¡0:487 ¡0:857 ¡0:620 ¡1:088
(0:226) (0:406) (0:264) (0:432)
Back injury ¡0:516 ¡1:067 ¡0:690 ¡1:327
(0:263) (0:455) (0:309) (0:488)
Skin disorder 0:352 0:668 0:290 0:599
(0:268) (0:537) (0:347) (0:639)
Brain damage ¡0:883 ¡1:897 ¡0:625 ¡1:452
(0:173) (0:286) (0:213) (0:329)
Scarring 0:057 0:180 0:199 0:381
(0:214) (0:373) (0:249) (0:391)
Spinal cord injuries ¡1:209 ¡2:143 ¡1:172 ¡2:038
(0:295) (0:458) (0:351) (0:491)
Other ¡0:003 0:007 ¡0:018 ¡0:111
(0:134) (0:242) (0:168) (0:277)
CONSTANT ¡2:447 ¡5:062 ¡2:696 ¡4:906
(0:165) (0:307) (0:224) (0:375)
Pseudo R-Squared 0.6504 0.2606 0.6756 0.2757
a. Standard errors are shown in parentheses.
y signi¯cant at 10% level; * signi¯cant at 5% level; ** signi¯cant at 1% level.
Source: Author's calculations based on the Texas Department of Insurance Commercial Liability Insurance Closed Claim database for the
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Furthermore, there is a signi¯cantly negative e®ect of receiving collateral insurance payments
on the probability of noneconomic damage awards. This result suggests that the victim's ¯nancial
situations have considerable in°uence on the jury's decision to award noneconomic damages. However,
the magnitude of such payments is not signi¯cantly associated with the level of economic losses.
The incidence and magnitude of damage payments for cases settled out-of-court but in the shadow
of litigation clearly re°ect the juror's concern. There is no statistically signi¯cant di®erence in the
likelihood of noneconomic damages between cases settled before trial and cases settled during or after
trial. However, by going to trial the victims increase the amount of compensation for noneconomic
harm by nearly 73.5% (expf0:551g ¡ 1 ¼ 73:5%) when compared to victims who settle out of court.
This result indicates that the various aspects of the litigation process, such as litigation costs and
plainti®'s risk aversion, lower the plainti®s' reservation price and the defendant's settlement o®er
amount below the expected court award. The signi¯cantly positive coe±cient of INITIAL EXPENSE
RESERVE provides an intuitively appealing result: the defendant spends more costs on cases with high
damages.
However, noneconomic damages seem to vary less systematically with injury types. For instance,
the incidence and amount of awards for serious and catastrophic injuries such as brain damage and
spinal cord injuries are not signi¯cantly higher than those of less serious injury categories such as
back injury and skin disorder. The lack of systematical relationship could be a result, in part, of
variability in the bargaining skill of the parties, the type of evidence that could be presented at trial,
the age, gender and income of the victim, or other factors that are not taken into account by the
current model.
The inclusion of AGE in columns 3 and 4 of Table 4.4 re°ects the duration of noneconomic damages.
It turns out that the coe±cients of AGE are negative and statistically signi¯cant. This is plausible:
physical and mental anguishes that are permanent will usually be endured for a longer period the
younger the victim is. Therefore, younger victims are likely to receive are more likely to receive
noneconomic damage payments, and when they do the amount of such payments are higher. As a
¯nal note on this empirical analysis, the TDI database does not contain information on victim's gender
and income. Therefore, I am not able to assess the e®ects of these important individual characteristics
on the incidence and magnitude of noneconomic damages. The omission of these variables could well
bias estimated coe±cients on some of the variables included in the models.140 But it can be argued
that income and gender are relevant variables in explaining the variations in noneconomic losses only
in that people who do not work outside the home, like women and children, tend to receive more
noneconomic damage awards as a compensation for less economic damage payments. The inclusion
of EMPLOYED remedies the potential model misspeci¯cation bias associated with omission of victim
gender and income.
4.6. Measures of The Efficiency of Noneconomic Loss Compensation
For the sample of 17,960 medical malpractice claims in the TDI database, there is information on
whether the plainti® retained an attorney as well as on the defendant's legal costs. With reasonable
assumptions it is possible to calculate the role of legal costs relative to the net payment amount
received by claimants for medical malpractice cases. Analysis of all claims, not simply those in which
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a suit was ¯led, might lead to a lower estimate of the magnitude of transactions costs. For purposes
of these calculations, I assume that for plainti®s who retained an attorney the plainti®'s legal costs
are one-third of the total damage award she receives, which is consistent with available empirical
evidence.141 For plainti®s who did not retain an attorney I assume that the plainti®'s legal costs are
zero. These cost estimates might understate the actual costs as they do not include and out-of-pocket
expenses and the value of plainti®'s time.
Let ¼ denote the level of damage award. Let cp (resp. cd) denote the legal costs incurred by the






Table 4.4 reports the e±ciency measures by di®erent types of injury for medical malpractice claims
with noneconomic damage payments. E±ciency measures for claims without noneconomic damage
payments are included for comparison. The legal costs per net damage payment amount for all cases
with noneconomic damage payments average 0.59 and range from 0.51 to 0.68. That is, on average,
the tort system generates transactions costs more than half of the value of the net payment received
by the plainti®. The injury types with the lowest degree of e±ciency are back injury and nervous
condition, for which the values of legal costs average 0.68 relative to the total damage payment to
plainti®s. These values are much higher than those for more serious injuries or fatal injury such as
spinal cord injuries (0.51), brain damage (0.51) and death (0.57). Amputation is the only serious or
permanent injury type with a costs to damages ratio greater than 0.6. Furthermore, the total legal
costs for each dollar received by plainti®s average 0.66 for claims where noneconomic damage is not
an element of compensation.
4.7. Fairness in Noneconomic Loss Compensations
The results in Section 4.5 shows a lack of systematical relationship between the injuries types
and the incidence and level of noneconomic losses. In this section, I provide a simple example to
illustrate that given the de¯nition of `unfairness' as the (normalized) di®erence between a victim's
legally entitled compensation and the actual compensation received,143 such a lack of systematic
variation might indicate that a tort system is unfair if (i) according to the law the system is to restore
an individual to the same level of utility before an injury, and (ii) noneconomic losses are higher for
more serious injury categories, and (iii) the victims are fully compensated for their ¯nancial losses.
To start, assume for simplicity that a victim's lifetime utility U depends only on her lifetime
income w and the level of her physical and mental distress x so that U = U(w;x). Further assume
that the victim's utility increases with her lifetime income and decreases with her physical and mental
distress, or Uw > 0 and Ux < 0. Suppose that in absence of any injury, the victim's lifetime income is
w0 and her physical and mental distress is 0. The victim's utility before any injury is then U(w0;0).
141Hensler et al.'s (1987) study of tort litigation costs in Cook County and San Francisco notes that contingency fees
were typically one-third of the award. See Hensler et al. (1987), pp. 25-26. Hersch and Viscusi (2007) make the same
assumption about the plainti®'s legal costs when measuring the e±ciency of tort liability litigation.
142This share calculation is similar to the formulation used by Hensler et al. (1987), Carroll et al.(2005), and Hersch
and Viscusi (2007).
143See Section 1.1 for a formal de¯nition of unfairness.Access to Justice: An Economic Approach 97




Death 0.57 0.62 5,652
Amputation 0.65 0.65 383
Burns (heat) 0.65 0.64 157
Burns (chemical) 0.58 0.50 71
Systemic poisoning (toxic) 0.61 0.98 45
Systemic poisoning (other) 0.61 0.71 77
Eye injury (blindness) 0.55 0.59 441
Respiratory condition 0.59 0.74 194
Nervous condition 0.68 0.95 131
Hearing loss or impairment 0.55 0.59 103
Circulatory condition 0.67 0.68 235
Multiple injuries 0.63 0.59 479
Back injury 0.68 0.69 388
Skin disorder 0.52 0.75 184
Brain damage 0.51 0.57 1,623
Scarring 0.62 0.72 396
Spinal cord injuries 0.51 0.56 392
Other 0.61 0.69 7,152
All Types 0.59 0.66 16,785
Source: Author's calculations based on medical professional liability claims in the Texas
Department of Insurance Commercial Liability Insurance Closed Claim database for the
years 1988-2005. For claims in which the plainti® retained an attorney, e±ciency measure
equal (defendant's legal costs + (1/3) total damage payments)/total damage payments.
For claims in which no plainti® lawyer was used, e±ciency measure equals defendant's
legal costs / total damage payments. 1,175 cases are dropped from the full sample due
to lack of information on the defendants payments to in-house counsel.
Now suppose after a skin disorder (resp. brain damage), the victim's lifetime income drops to ws
(resp. wb) and her distress level becomes xs (resp. xb). Hence, her lifetime utility becomes U(ws;xs)
(resp. U(wb;xb)) after the skin order (resp. brain damage). The level of the victim's ¯nancial losses
(resp. noneconomic losses) are given by wj (resp. ¡xj), where j = s;b. Suppose that xb > xs. That
is, brain damage results in more noneconomic losses than skin disorder does.
Write the level of economic damage awards (resp. noneconomic damage awards) received by the




n). Suppose that according to the law, the victim is entitled to a
level of compensation ~ cj that would restore her to the same level of utility before the injury, i.e.,
U(wj + ~ cj;xj) = U(w0;0): Further assume that the victim always receives full compensation for her
¯nancial losses so that c
j
e = w0 ¡ wj for j = s;b.




n = ~ cj , i.e., if the victim receives what she is legally entitle to. Now
it is to show that the tort system is unfair if cs
n = cb
n given that xb · xs, cs
e = w0¡ws and cb
e = w0¡wb.
Suppose in negation that cs
n = cb
n, xb > xs, cs
e = w0¡ws and cb
e = w0¡wb and that the tort system is




n;xb) = U(w0;0). Substituting
we have that U(w0 + cs
n;xs) = U(w0 + cb
n;xb). By assumption cs
n = cb
n, so we have U(w0 + cs
n;xs) =
U(w0 + cs
n;xb). But Ux < 0. Therefore, xs < xb implies that U(w0 + cs
n;xs) > U(w0 + cs
n;xb). We
have reached a contradiction.
Therefore, if cs
e = cb
e and xb > xs then the tort system is fair only if cb
n > cs
n.Access to Justice: An Economic Approach 98
4.8. Conclusion
My results provide but a very limited test of the rationality of the process by which noneconomic
damages are determined. The tort law provides no clear guidelines for the calculation of noneconomic
damages. Many of the noneconomic damage cap reforms have been based on a belief that these awards
are entirely random. Using Texas Department of Insurance Commercial Liability Insurance Closed
Claim data for the 1988-2005 period, I provide evidence that the tort system awarding noneconomic
damages is far from random. Abstracting from the potential omitted variable bias, my evidence
shows a reasonably stable and predictable relationship between the characteristics of the claim and
the actual outcome in the great majority of cases that are settled informally out of court. The critiques
on noneconomic damage awards are not supported by the evidence.
In particular, my main ¯nding has been that noneconomic damage awards vary quite systemati-
cally with the economic characteristics of the case. These economic characteristics include the amount
of ¯nancial losses, whether the victim is employed, whether the victim collects collateral insurance
payments and level of the insurer's initial expense reserve. These information are usually available
at the initial stage of a damage claim and can be used by the parties and the jury to aid the cal-
culation of noneconomic losses. Moreover, I have shown that the amount of noneconomic damages
is signi¯cantly higher in tried cases than in cases settled out-of-court. This result suggests that the
group of tried cases is a selected sample of all cases brought for damage compensation. However, this
systematic variation does not imply that no reform e®orts are needed. For instance, I have shown
that the tort system in Texas might not be fair as victims with fatal, permanent and catastrophic
injuries (e.g., death, brain damage and spinal cord injuries) do not receive signi¯cantly higher amount
of compensation than victims with temporary, minor injuries (e.g., skin disorder).
Furthermore, I have shown that on average, the total legal costs for each dollar received by
plainti®s are 0.59 for claims where noneconomic damage is an element of compensation. For cases
involve noneconomic damage payments, the tort system is more e±cient in awarding damages for
permanent and catastrophic injuries than for temporary, insigni¯cant injuries. The damage payments
share of legal costs is lower for cases receiving noneconomic damage payments than for cases receiving
only economic damage payments.
Many important issues have been sidestepped, including the e®ects of victim's income and gender
on the incidence and magnitude of noneconomic damages, and whether compensations with economic
damages alone could provide a simple solution to the various problems related with noneconomic
damage compensations. It would be interesting, for example, to see whether more objective measures
could be developed to reduce the uncertainty and costs associated with noneconomic loss compensation
and how policies can be designed to encourage this. Finally, it is needed to point out that the omission
of variables re°ecting the victim's income and gender could well bias estimated coe±cients on some
of the variables included in the models.
Over all, the implications for policy are evident: the proponents of legal reform must be more
sophisticated and balanced than they have been in discussing the current performance of noneconomic
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4.9. Appendix
Table 4.1. Variable Definitions
Variable De¯nitions
NONECONOMIC DAMAGES Damages awarded for the purpose of compensating a victim for
physical pain and su®ering, mental or emotional pain or anguish,
loss of consortium, dis¯gurement, physical impairment, loss of
companionship and society, inconvenience, loss of enjoyment of
life, injury to reputation, and all other nonpecuniary losses of
any kind other than exemplary damages144
INCIDENCE OF NONECONOMIC DAMAGES Indicator with value 1 if non-economic loss is an element of dam-
age compensation, 0 otherwise.
AMOUNT OF NONECONOMIC DAMAGES The amount of noneconomic damage payment
FINANCIAL LOSS The amount of compensation for the victim's medical expenses,
lost income and out of pocket expenses.
EMPLOYED Indicator with value 1 if the victim is employed outside of the
home; 0 if the victim is unemployed or self-employed
COLLATERAL PAYMENT Indicator with value 1 if the victim collects collateral insurance
payment; 0 otherwise
INITIAL EXPENSE RESERVE The amount of the insurer's initial expense reserve.
STAGE Legal stage where settlement was reached. The stages are
- Settlement before trial;
- Settlement during or after trial
AGE The victim's age in years.
Injury Categorical variable indicating the type(s) of injury associated
with the claim, including death, amputation, burns, etc
144See Texas Statutes Civil Practice & Remedies Code, Chapter 41: Damages, Section 41.001(12).Access to Justice: An Economic Approach 100
Chapter 5
Jackpot Justice: The Value of Ine±cient Litigation
5.1. Introduction
Litigations are wars without bloodshed, yet more expensive and all-consuming than warfares with.
The total annual cost of tort litigation across the U.S. in 2006 comes to some $ 865:37 billion145 (6:5%
of U.S. GDP), which is more than the Pentagon budget, plus Iraq and Afghan con°icts combined;
however, less than 15 percent of that amount goes to compensate injured people (See McQuillan et
al. (2007)). In 2003, the U.K. had a 0:7% ratio of tort cost to GDP,146 the same size as its costs
of war in Iraq and Afghanistan (approx. $ 8 billion). Statistics estimate that tort cases in the
U.K. take, on average, ¯ve years to resolve and legal expenses exceed the damage paid (see NAO
(2001), Swanson (1998)). One might expect knowledge of the expensiveness of litigation to provide
incentives for litigants to engage frequently in negotiation as to avoid these expenses, and that only
strong cases are pushed towards trial, causing plainti® win rates (the frequency that the court rule
in favor of the plainti®) at trial to be large. However, empirical evidence147 shows that bargaining
between the litigants occurs only on an infrequent basis { the average personal injury case in the
United Kingdom receives fewer than two o®ers in its 5-year lifetime; while the average trial success
rate of the plainti® rests around 43%. Further inspection of disaggregated data shows that settlement-
litigation distributions and trial win rates depend crucially on plainti® characteristics such as the type
of accident and the way litigation is ¯nanced. Particularly, the plainti®s are less likely to go to trial
if their trial outcomes are more predictable and if they receive ¯nancial support for litigations; the
plainti®s are more likely to win at trial if they face less uncertainty about trial outcomes and if they
receive ¯nancial support. The theory presented in this chapter is an attempt to rigorously explain
these empirically signi¯cant observations of [1] partial bargaining148, [2] low plainti® trial success rate
and [3] party-dependent settlement-litigation behavior.
The chapter deals with the issue of litigation versus settlement by taking as its starting point
the asymmetric information between litigants and their attorneys. It examines the plainti® and her
attorney as an uniformed principal and an informed agent who are bargaining with another principal
{ the tortfeasor's insurer. For simplicity, I assume (as do Bebchuk (1984), Schweizer (1989), Watts
(1994) and Watanabe (2007)) that the interests of the insurer and his attorney are perfectly aligned.
So I can represent the insurer and his attorney as a single player called the \defendant". Given
asymmetric information on various aspects of pretrial bargaining, litigation can be explained as an
instrument a plainti® uses to extract information. Both the litigant and the attorney can be viewed
145These costs include, among others, administrative costs ($ 59 billion), claimant's attorney costs ($ 53 billion), ¯rst-
party defense costs ($ 39 billion), deadweight costs ($ 36 billion), and dynamic costs ($ 537.37 billion). The dynamic
costs include costs of accidental deaths ($ 7.51 billion), health care expenditures ($ 124 billion), reduced access to health
care ($ 38.78 billion), and lost sales of new products from less innovation ($ 367.08 billion). See McQuillan et al. (2007).
146This ratio was 0:6% in Denmark, 0:7% in France, 0:8% in Japan, 1:0% in Belgium and in Spain, 1:1% in Germany,
and 1:7% in Italy. See Tillinghast (2006).
147Two sets of data are included in the discussion of this section: Swanson's Taxed Cases Study (TCS) [see Swanson
(1988) and Swanson and Mason (1998)] and the Oxford Study by Harris et al. (1987).
148This term was ¯rst used by Swanson and Mason (1998). The term refers to the fact that the probability that the
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as lacking information about the case's prospects at trial. This chapter examines the case where the
attorney has better information. This is a reasonable assumption because attorneys, via repeated
and frequent litigation, acquire experience and knowledge about the statutes, precedents, and rules
of procedure and evidence which are rarely possessed by occasional plainti®s. A key matter for us in
considering the issue is the role played by information of claim strength (i.e., defendant's liability for
damages) in determining patterns of settlement and litigation.
The approach taken in this chapter to litigants' settlement-versus-litigation decision under asym-
metric information is based on the work of Myerson (1979). It involves the design of a contract o®er
by a plainti® that recognizes that her attorney may have an incentive to misinform her about the
perspective of the case in order to delay settlement and increase billable hours while working less. An
incentive-compatible contract in which a plainti® will commit to resort to costly litigation when her
case is reported to be weak can, however, be shown to be at least as good as any contract in which
the plainti® will settle all her dispute out of court. That is, since the plainti® does not know the
genuine strength of her case, the plainti® must set the attorney's reward as a function of some report
on the case prospects from the attorney, and the incentive contract must satisfy the constraint that
the attorney should have an incentive to report truthfully the information desired by the client. Be-
cause of this constraint, the settlement-versus-litigation decision can be optimal only in a constrained
sense,149 and expensive litigation results from the information asymmetry.
The major results in this chapter can be summarized as:
(a) A plainti® will not pursue litigation when she learns from her attorney that her case is strong
and that she is likely to prevail at trial. Bargaining may not occur, even if the plainti® could
obtain a higher payo® from bargaining than from going to trial without bargaining. The
intuition is easily conveyed: The attorney's productivity in settlement negotiation increases
with the case strength. The plainti®, therefore, wants to encourage the attorney to admit
that the case is strong, whenever it is true, so that the attorney will bargain hard with the
defendant to obtain a high damage award in settlement. However, to prevent the attorney from
misrepresenting the strength of the case when the case is strong, the plainti® must somehow
`punish' the attorney for reporting that the case is weak. Such punishment takes the form of
pushing cases towards trial without negotiation (hence no payment to the attorney).
(b) The pattern of the plainti®'s settlement-litigation decision depends on the probability distribu-
tion of the case strength and therefore on the risks associated with litigation and the plainti®'s
ability to monitor the attorney. Litigation occurs more frequently if it is a priori less pro¯table
for the plainti® to pursue. The intuition behind this result is as follows. The plainti®'s prospect
at trial increases with the strength of her case. With a stronger case, it is less costly for the
attorney to obtain favorable settlement terms from the defendant. Since the plainti® bears the
full costs of pretrial negotiation, out-of-court settlement (resp. litigation) becomes more (resp.
less) attractive an option for the plainti® when negotiation is less costly.
(c) Litigation occurs more frequently if it is a priori more risky for the plainti® to pursue. The
intuition behind this result is as follows. When the plainti®'s uncertainty about trial outcome
is low, she can better monitor her attorney's performance in settlement bargaining and the
principal-agent impediments to settlement is mitigated. Therefore, the plainti® pursues litiga-
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tion less often when the trial outcomes are more predictable. An implication of this result
is that institutional characteristics determining the degree of plainti® uncertainty about trial
outcomes ¯gure large in settlement-litigation strategies.
(d) There is another aspect of the attorney-client relationship regarding the ¯nancing of litiga-
tion that can a®ect a plainti®'s incentive regarding settlement: legal aid (for both settlement
and litigation) reduces the costs inherent in representative bargaining that impede settlement.
Therefore, plainti®s receiving legal aid go to court less often than those receiving no legal aid.
My model is able to explain key features of the U.K. tort settlement-litigation data { partial bargain-
ing, low plainti® win rate and heterogeneity between plainti®s: plainti®s with less uncertainty about
trial outcomes and receiving ¯nancial assistance in litigation go to court less often than those with
higher uncertain and receiving no ¯nancial assistance. The next section provides empirical evidence
by using detailed database of 242 cases developed by Swanson(1988) from the U.K. Royal Courts of
Justice. The U.K. database contains information on the legal expenses, trial outcomes, and various
characteristics of the litigants and their attorneys, allowing direct tests of the model's predictions.
The model is a good representation of many real civil dispute situations. The vast majority of tort,
prisoner and civil right lawsuits are characterized by the plainti®s' informational disadvantage vis-µ a-
vis the attorneys.150 This is because attorneys, via repeated and frequent play in the litigation game,
accumulate experience and knowledge about the statutes, precedents, and rules of procedure and
evidence which are rarely possessed by occasional plainti®s. Furthermore, In the process of pretrial
bargaining, as it relates to the decision to litigate or settle a civil dispute, attorneys exercise predomi-
nant control over and take responsibility for the dispute-resolution delegated to them by their clients.
Although clients usually participate in the litigation process, attorneys in personal injury cases often
enjoy considerable latitude in deciding how to resolve their clients' claims in settlement negotiation.
This study therefore provides a theory that explicitly incorporates this empirically signi¯cant facet
of the dispute resolution process into the game-theoretic analysis of litigation-settlement decision.
The chapter is organized as follows. I begin by reviewing the literature and by presenting ev-
idence on the litigation frequency and trial outcomes in UK tort liability litigation in section 5.2.
The evidence suggests a need to expanding existing litigation models to include the delegation of
pretrial negotiation. The game theoretic model is constructed in section 5.3: section 5.3.1 describes
the basic model of pretrial negotiation developed in previous work; the basic ingredients of my model
are discussed in section 5.3.2; the formal solution and properties of the litigant's settlement-litigation
decision are developed and illustrated in section 5.3.3; section 5.3.4 describes the variations in the
plainti®'s settlement-litigation pattern, corresponding to changes in her optimism/pessimism about
the trial outcome; section 5.3.5 discusses the e®ect of di®erent forms of litigation ¯nancing on plain-
ti®'s settlement-litigation decision; section 5.3.6 presents a result about how bargaining outcome and
litigation incidence change with changes in the risks associated with litigation. Section 5.4 concludes.
150Bebchuk (1984), Hylton (1993) and Boon (1995) make similar arguments. Using information on plainti® and
defendant identities in over 65,000 federal civil suits drawn from the Administrative O±ce of the U.S. Courts data set,
Siegelman and Waldfogel (1999) ¯nd that plainti®s in tort, prisoner and civil right cases usually su®er a more serve
informational disadvantage than in other types of cases.Access to Justice: An Economic Approach 103
5.2. Motivation
5.2.1. Theoretical Motivation
Two central puzzles in the U.K. tort litigation data from Swanson's Taxed Cases Study (TCS) are
the high proportion of cases which require ultimate resolution by a court and the low likelihood of
trial success of the plainti®s.151 These plainti®s must pay the costs of the entire legal process, usually
without getting compensated.152 Swanson's Taxed Cases Study (TCS)153 shows that in the tried cases
(i.e., cases that went to trial) the plainti®s incurred on average legal expenses in the neighborhood
of $5,300, approximately 68:5% of the damage payments received by the plainti®s in those cases.
However, more than 50% of the plainti®s received no damage payments after having incurred a
substantial amount of legal costs. Similarly in the U.S., plainti® trial success rate appears to be low.
Waldfogel (1995), for instance, empirically documents that the plainti®s only win approximately 50%
of the times at trial by using data from broad variety of cases (including contract, tort, civil right
and property disputes).
The decision to litigate or settle a civil dispute, as it relates to the process of pretrial bargaining,
has been the subject of extensive investigation in law and economics. Asymmetric information (AI)
models, starting with Cooter et al. (1982), P'ng (1983), Bebchuk (1984), and advanced by Reinganum
and Wilde (1986) and Nalebu® (1987), o®er possible explanations of the litigation puzzle. What most
of these models have in common is that the game is formulated in extensive form and essentially
consists of a sequence of two periods. After the suit has been ¯led, one litigant, in the ¯rst period,
making a settlement o®er which, in the second period, the other litigant either accepts or rejects.
If the last-moving litigant accepts, the case settles out of court at the proposed terms. Otherwise,
the case goes to trial. The way these models work is as follows: when one side in a legal dispute
has information that the other side does not have, incentives are created for the former to credibly
convey information to the latter; delays occur inevitably when the bene¯ts of establishing credibility
exceed the costs of waiting; informed parties proceed to trial only when they expect to win, causing
plainti® win rates at trial to be high. The central ¯nding of this literature has been that the presence
of asymmetric information yields a positive probability of trial.154
Central to all these models is the informational di®erence about trial outcomes between the
litigants. None of the informational di®erences, however, has been adequately explained by any
of these models; that is, it is not yet understood why this system might generate the divergent
expectations which must be the source of these di®erences in perspectives. The incorporation of
151In the U.S. however, the vast majority of cases that are ¯led settle out of court and countless others are settled
even before a lawsuit is ¯led. Less than 4 percent of the civil cases that are ¯led in the U.S. state court proceed to trial.
Only 2 percent of the civil cases that are ¯led in the U.S. federal court proceed to trial. See Ostrom et al. (2001) p.29.
152In the British legal system the losing litigant of a civil case has to pay the winner's court costs, in addition to her
own legal expenses. In the US as well as in many European jurisdictions, each side pays their own legal costs.
153In the U.K. the legal expenses are usually allocated to the \losing" party in the dispute. Since the reasonable legal
expenses must then be determined, a separate division of the judiciary has evolved to ful¯ll this function: the Taxing
Masters of the High Courts of Justice. In order to make fact-based determinations of claims for expenses, the regulations
of the High Court provide that a detailed account of the proceedings must be tendered to the Taxing Master. It was
this set of ¯les which were consulted for the construction of the data set in Swanson (1988)'s study. Swanson named
these legal cases as \taxed cases".
154For an excellent review of this literature, see Waldfogel (1998).Access to Justice: An Economic Approach 104
the attorneys as key participants in the bargaining game provides a crucial link in the analysis of
settlement-litigation decision. It explains why a di®erence in perspective on a lawsuit might exist;
and how this di®erence might plausibly lead to ine±cient litigation.
To my knowledge, this paper is the ¯rst attempt to rigorously analyze the role of the attorneys
in causing the informational di®erences between the litigants that gives rise to expensive litigation.
Other authors have investigated di®erent, but not less important, aspects of lawyer's role in settle-
ment and litigation.155 In these studies lawyers are not necessarily barriers to settlement; sometimes
their participation may facilitate settlement by furnishing information to their clients,156 or by pro-
viding credibility to party communications in pretrial negotiation.157 In another theory, the lawyer's
incentives regarding settlement depend on her fee arrangement with the client; some fee structures
are more likely than others to discourage the lawyer from seeking an early settlement.158 Within
this literature, perhaps the most closely related work to this chapter is that of Watts (1994). Watts
(1994) analyzes a three-player litigation model where the plainti®'s lawyer is able to learn part of the
defendant's private information regarding the trial outcome, at a lower cost than the plainti® could.
Watts (1994) shows that a lawyer paid by contingency fee may settle a case to avoid the expense of
preparing for trial, even when the plainti® could obtain a higher payo® from trial than from settle-
ment. Yet another theory by Choi (2003) shows that by using a contingent fee contract that provides
incentive to a lawyer, a plainti® can improve her bargaining position vis-µ a-vis a defendant in pretrial
settlement.159 Besides the by now standard analytical framework based on the theories of incentives,
two other approaches to lawyer's role in litigation are worth mentioning. By using evolutionary game
theory, Bar-Gill (2006) shows that attorneys with optimistic bias, by credibly threatening to resort to
costly litigation, succeed in extracting more favorable settlements than attorneys without optimism
bias.160 In this way, market-selection forces dictate an equilibrium with a positive level of optimism
and a positive probability of litigation. Instead of focusing on individuals incentives and behavior,
Had¯eld (2000) has taken a much wider scope to consider the e®ects of legal service market imper-
fections on the entire justice system.161 The consequence of a short supply of legal skills for litigation
costs and settlement patterns is discussed at length in Had¯eld's (2000) study. Had¯eld's (2000) at-
tributes the insu±cient supply of legal service to factors such as arti¯cial barriers to entry, demanding
cognitive skills, and a lack of opportunity for lawyers to gain litigation experience. With imperfect
competition on the market for legal skills, lawyers price their services beyond the marginal costs and
the terms of settlement do not mirror the court's decisions but the relative costs of lawyering for the
parties in the dispute.
Furthermore, existing AI theories do not explain the absence of bargaining (i.e., absence of set-
tlement o®ers in pretrial negotiation) observed in the TCS study,162 as will be elaborated in the
155See Section 1.3.1.4 for a somewhat more extensive review of this literature.
156See Menkel-Meadow (1984).
157See Gilson and Mnookin (1994).
158See, e.g., Miller (1987), Schwartz and Mitchell (1970), Miller (1987), Thomason (1991), Gravelle and Waterson
(1993) and Watts (1994).
159However, Choi (2003) does not address the problem of information asymmetry between the plainti® and the lawyer.
I am grateful to Kathryn Spier for pointing out the relevance of Choi's (2003) work to my work.
160I am grateful to an anonymous committee member for pointing out the relevance of this article to my work.
161I am grateful to an anonymous defense committee member for pointing out the relevance of Had¯eld's (2000) work
to my study.
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following section.
5.2.2. Empirical Motivation
The empirical features I focus on are the likelihood that the plainti® bargains with the defendant,
the frequency of litigation and the chance that the plainti® prevails in court in the event of a trial.163
Table 5.1 shows the frequency of bargaining of di®erent types of plainti®s. In my sample of 242 tort
cases from the U.K. Courts of Justice for the year of 1987, the majority of cases are bargained (74%)
and settled out of court (66%) for all plainti® types. However, a signi¯cant proportion of claims (26%)
are forced to trial without bargaining.
Disaggregate data reveals, however, a more confusing picture that cannot be explained by existing
models. Table 5.1 shows the frequency of bargaining of di®erent types of plainti®s. The majority
of cases are bargained (74%) and settled out of court (66%) for all plainti® types. The frequency of
litigation, however, appears to be highly dependent on the plainti®'s uncertainty about trial outcomes
and on the ¯nancing of litigation. For players whose disputes are governed by customary tort law164
that is characterized by a relatively high uncertainty of trial outcomes (these are motor accident
and medical negligence cases), the frequency is 41%. Union-represented plainti®s in workplace injury
lawsuits, who litigate under statutory labor law 165 that is characterized by a relatively low uncertainty
of trial outcomes166, settled all their claims out of court. Furthermore, for those who have inexpensive
Table 5.1. Distribution of Litigations and Settlements by Plaintiff's Type
All Types Privately-funded Legal aid Union assisted Union represented
Negotiated cases (%) 74% 68% 83% 71% 100%
Settled cases (%) 66% 59% 76% 63% 100%
Tried cases without
prior bargaining (%) 26% 32% 17% 29% 0%
Tried cases with
prior bargaining (%) 8% 9% 7% 8% 0%
Source. Author's calculations using data from Taxed Cases Study by Swanson (1988).
Notes: Privately funded plainti®s pay all their own legal expenses. Legal aid plainti®s receive ¯nancial aid from the government
that partially covers their legal expenses. Union assisted plainti®s receive ¯nancial assistance from trade unions that partially co-
vers their legal expenses. For union represented plainti®s, their trade unions retain attorneys on their behalf and cover all legal
costs associated with litigation and settlement.
in bargaining processes.
163My data come from the ¯les of the Taxing Masters in the U.K. Courts of Justice for the year of 1987 selected by
Timothy Swanson. See Swanson (1998) for a detailed description.
164Customary law is law not documented in the written code. It is not enacted by a legislative authority. It is an
established pattern of legal practice where courts enforce customary rules as if they had been enacted by the proper
legislative authority.
165Statutory law is written law enacted by a legislature.
166In England, the labor law which governs workplace injury disputes is largely a creature of Statute, (Acts of the
Parliament of the United Kingdom) rather than Common law. Legal outcomes under statutory law are usually more
predictable than under customary law. See O'Hara and Ribstein (2000) for a discussion on the di®erence in predictability
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Table 5.2. Distribution of Plaintiff Trial Success Rates by Plaintiff Types
All Types Privately-funded Legal aid Union assisted
Prior Bargaining 95% 92% 100% 100%
No prior bargaining 26% 17% 43% 50%
All 43% 33% 60% 61%
Source. Author's calculations using data from Taxed Cases Study by Swanson (1988).
Notes: The prior bargaining pool contains litigated cases that have undergone negotiation but have failed to settle.
The no prior bargaining pool contains cases that are forced to trial without negotiation. Privately funded plainti®s p-
ay all their own legal expenses. Legal aid plainti®s receive ¯nancial aid from the government that partially covers the-
ir legal expenses. Union assisted plainti®s receive ¯nancial assistance from trade unions that partially covers their leg-
al expenses.
access to legal services in litigations and pretrial negotiations, such as individuals receiving legal aid,
the frequency is 24%. Whereas for privately-funded players, the frequency is 41%. Union-represented
plainti®s in workplace injury lawsuits, who receive full reimbursement for their legal costs167, settled
all their claims out of court.
Table 5.2 shows the frequency of trial success for di®erent types of plainti®s. The empirical
evidence reveals three striking features. First, the majority of the cases (57%) actually brought to
verdict result in a judgment in favor of the defense.168; 169 Consequently, the court does not award
any compensation in these cases. Second, these win rates are drastically di®erent between bargained
and not-bargained cases { they are close or equal to 1 in the bargaining pool, which are consistent
with the basic implication of the asymmetric information theories; however, they rest in the middle
between 0 and 0.5 in the non-bargaining pool { an observation not explained by existing AI theories.
167In England, if an injury is closely related to employment conditions (workplace injury claims) or against the public
body, the plainti® is likely to be assisted in its action by its trade-union representatives. In this case, the action is the
plainti®'s in name only and is being conducted (and fully ¯nanced) for the plainti®'s bene¯t by the union.
168Similar empirical observations were recorded by Farber and White (1991), Vidmar et al. (1998), Sieg (2000) and
Spurr (2000). Farber and White provide evidence from 252 U.S. medical malpractice cases from 1977 to 1989 and show
that the defendants have won all the cases tried to completion. Vidmar et al. report that plainti®s prevail in 22:5%
of the California medical malpractice cases from 1991 through 1997. Using data on 8,306 medical malpractice cases in
Florida, Sieg shows that only 29% of tried cases result in a verdict for the plainti®. Spurr (2000) provides evidence from
424 medical malpractice cases in Michigan that, the cases that went to trial are drawn disproportionately from claims
that are weak.
169Priet and Klein's (1984) \divergent expectation model" o®ers a possible explanation for the phenomenon. Priest and
Klein (1984) predict that for cases that go to trial, the probability of the plainti® winning tends towards 50%. However,
Priest and Klein's (1984) result critically relies on the restrictive assumption that the chances that the plainti® and the
defendant make mistakes in observing their probabilities of winning at trial are the same. This assumption is unlikely
to hold for my sample observations where the defendant is a repeat player in the litigation game and the plainti® a
one-shot player. Furthermore, Shavell (1996) has shown that any plainti® win rare at trial is possible under more general
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Table 5.3. Probit Regression Parameter Estimates
Dependent variable BARGAINING RATE WIN RATE
Independent Variables
LEGAL UNCERTAINTY -0.729¤¤ -0.899¤
(0:215) (0:442)




Pseudo R-squared 0.060 0.152
Observations 242 63
Source. Author's calculations using data from Taxed Cases Study by Swanson (1988).
Notes: Values are estimated by probit equations, and standard errors are reported in pa-
rentheses. BARGAINING RATE means the likelihood that bargaining occurred before trial.
WIN RATE means the frequency that the plainti®s prevailed at trial. LEGAL UNCERTAINTY
is an indicator with value 1 if the case is medical negligence or automobile accident, 0 if
the case is workplace injury or against public body. FINANCIAL AID is an indicator with
value 1 if the plainti® received ¯nancial support, 0 if the case was privately-¯nanced.
y Signi¯cant at 10% level; * Signi¯cant at 5% level; ** Signi¯cant at 1% level.
Third, the win rates in the non-bargaining pool vary greatly between di®erent types. For those who
are assisted by legal aid or receive ¯nancial support from trade unions, the proportion winning in
court is more than 40%, whereas for self-¯nanced plainti®s, the proportion is around 17%.
The ¯rst column of tables 5.3 reports the results of a regression model that demonstrate the
in°uence of the two factors { the heterogeneity in plainti®'s uncertainty and the ¯nancing of litigation
on the incidence of bargaining. There are two important features of these results: ¯rst, for the types
of cases associated with more uncertain legal outcomes170, plainti®s are less likely to bargain with
the defendants than plainti®s involved in cases that are associated with less uncertainty171; second,
plainti®s receiving legal aid from the government or ¯nancial support from trade unions are more
likely to negotiate with the defendants than privately funded plainti®s.
The second column of table 5.3 reports the results of regression models that demonstrate the in°u-
ence of the plainti® ¯nancing and the heterogeneity in the levels of uncertainty associated with legal
outcomes on the likelihood of plainti® trial success for those cases that have not been bargained prior
to trial. The important features of these results are: ¯rst, the plainti®s in a litigation environment
associated with less uncertainty are more likely to win in court; second, plainti®s receiving legal aid
from the government and those receiving ¯nancial support from trade unions are more likely win in
court than privately funded plainti®s.172
Tables 5.1, 5.2 and 5.3 contain the key challenges for a theory of settlement-litigation decision.
First it must clarify the phenomenon of \partial bargaining" { the empirical observation that the
probability that parties engage in settlement negotiation is neither zero nor one. Second it must
elucidate why plainti®s would so often pursue expensive litigation when the chance of success is so
low. Third it must rationalize the variation in litigation frequency across plainti® types and identify
170They are motor vehicle accidents and medical negligence cases.
171These are plainti®s involved in workplace injury cases and cases against the public body.
172I do not discuss further the plainti®'s settlement-litigation decision and trial success rate for the negotiated cases,
because it is not of interest in this study and the sample in the bargaining-pool is too small (the number of observations
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factors that are relevant for settlement-litigation incentives. Finally, it must explain the heterogeneity
in win ratios between di®erent types of plainti®s. My model is an attempt to unravel these paradoxes.
This article broadens the discussion of the strategic settlement-litigation decision. The most
important distinction between my work and previous game theoretic analysis of pretrial bargaining
is the principal-agent impediment to settlement. Previous studies ignore the fact that settlement
negotiations are costly in themselves: attorneys spend time on discovery, establishing contact, and
searching for legal precedents; they have incentive to increase the time to settlement and billable
hours by ¯elding unattractive bids and encouraging clients to refuse early settlement o®ers. My
model emphasizes the role of agency costs in bargaining processes.
5.3. Theoretical Analysis
5.3.1. Pretrial Bargaining without Attorney
The main di®erence between my model and previous game theoretic models of pretrial bargaining
is that my model incorporates the attorney as a key participant in the bargaining game { it focuses
on the principal-agent aspect of the problem. Before I start my analysis, however, Bebchuk's (1984)
canonical model of settlement bargaining deserves some review. Bebchuk considers the case where a
plainti® has been injured in a tort accident. The plainti® then ¯les a lawsuit against the defendant.
The plainti® and the defendant then play a bargaining game. The bargaining game has the following
structure:
Let µ represent the strength (\legal quality" and \state of the world" are synonyms) of the plain-
ti®'s case, which re°ects the likelihood that the plainti® receives damage award at trial. The strength
of the case depends on the quality of evidence, the law de¯ning liability and the burden of proof.
Higher values of µ indicate greater strength of the plainti®'s case. The defendant is aware of the
strength of the claim, but the plainti® is not.173 This is a reasonable assumption as usually the
defendant is privately informed about whether he behaved negligently while the plainti® is not.
Following the Bayesian approach, assume that the plainti® has some subjective prior probability
distribution for the unknown parameter µ prior to receiving any report from her attorney on the
perspective of her suit. Let µ be distributed on £ = [µ;µ] according to a density function f(¢) with
f(µ) > 0 for all µ 2 £. Let F(¢) be the cumulative distribution function.
If the plainti® goes to trial, a court will conduct its own independent investigation.174 Without
loss of generality, normalize the probability that the plainti® prevails at trial to µ and normalize the
amount of judgment (\value of damage" is a synonym) to unity.175
173P'ng (1983), Bebchuk (1984), Nalebu® (1987), Spier (1992) and Sieg (2000) make the same assumption that the
defendant has private knowledge about the outcome at trial. Rubinfeld and Scotchmer (1993) assume that there is
asymmetric information between attorneys and clients and derive endogenously the optimal fee arrangements arising in
litigation in response to this asymmetry. But these authors did not investigate the role of agency problems in bargaining
processes.
174A variety of papers in the literature weaken or manipulate some of these assumptions. See Daughety and Reinganum
(2005).
175The model can be easily extended to a case where the size of the judgment, and not only the defendant's liability,
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Plainti® makes settlement


























Figure 5.1 Timing of Litigation without Attorney
The sequence of the game is as follows: the plainti® makes a settlement demand, x, to the
defendant, who either agrees to pay x or refuses. Refusal means that the case proceeds to trial. Each
party must pay their own court costs, denoted k (with k > 0) for the plainti® and K (with K > 0)
for the defendant (respectively), if bargaining fails and they go to trial. Assume that litigation has a
positive value for the plainti® even if the case is of the lowest type, that is, µ > k for all µ 2 [µ;µ].176
This assumption is made to rule out the possibility that the plainti® will not actually go to trial even
if he gets no payment whatsoever from the defendant in pretrial negotiation. The game is illustrated
in Figure 5.1.
To simplify the exposition, assume that the plainti® and the defendant are risk neutral.177 The
plainti® must decide on an optimal settlement demand, x. The plainti® knows that the defendant
will only agree to pay x if x · µ + K. The plainti® maximizes her expected payo® by solving
max








f(~ x ¡ K)
1 ¡ F(~ x ¡ K)
: (56)
To illustrate, consider the equilibrium for the case where µ is uniformly distributed on [1
2;1]. By
solving the problem in equation (56) above, one can show that the equilibrium settlement demand is
~ x = 1¡k. This is an equilibrium as long as k +K < 1
2, so the limits on the integral are not violated.
Then, the likelihood of settlement is 1 ¡ F(~ x ¡ K) = 2(k + K). This model provides a number of
implications; I list a few here. First, the plainti®'s equilibrium settlement demand is decreasing in
her trial costs. Second, a decrease in either litigant's trial costs leads to a reduction in the likelihood
of settlement. Third, redistribution of trial costs from one litigant to the other (that is, adjustments
in k and K, holding k + K ¯xed) has no impact on the likelihood of settlement.
Up to this point it has been assumed that the plainti® cannot obtain better information about
her prospect at trial from professionals. In that case, settlement failure arises from inevitable in-
formation asymmetry. In reality, however, the plainti® is usually able to obtain information on the
strength of her claim. Furthermore, the model so far ignores the fact that settlement negotiations are
costly in themselves: in order to negotiate, attorneys spend time on discovery, establishing contact,
and searching for legal precedents. Finally, by construction the model cannot explain the absence
176P,ng (1983), Reinganum and Wilde (1986) and Spier (1992) make the same assumption. The assumption is made
to rule out the possibility that the plainti® will not go to trial even if he get no payment whatsoever from the defendant
in pretrial bargaining.
177Bebchuk (1984), Nalebu® (1987), Spier (1992) and Sieg (2000) make the same assumption that the plainti® is
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of bargaining observed in the TCS study. The next section incorporates these considerations into a
simple model that includes the plainti®'s attorney as a key player in the litigation game.
5.3.2. Pretrial Negotiation with Attorney
My model has three players. All players are assumed to be risk-neutral. I take the same structure
as Bebchuk's model but assume that the plainti® retains an attorney (\agent" is a synonym) to work
on her behalf to conduct pretrial bargaining with another principal { the tortfeasor's insurer. The
plainti®-attorney and the defendant are aware of the strength of the claim µ, but the plainti® is not.




f(µ) < 0, for all µ 2 £. Several common distributions, including the uniform
distribution, satisfy this condition.178 This assumption is used to prove propositions 1 and 2.
Let °(µ) = µ + K be the maximum amount the defendant is willing to o®er to avoid litigation in
state µ, and let °(µ) = µ ¡k be the minimum amount the plainti® would be willing to accept in case
she would know µ.
Assume that, in state µ, any agreement inside of the interval [°(µ);°(µ)] can be achieved by the
attorney provided that he spends su±cient time (\costs" and \e®ort" are synonyms).179 Let t(x;µ)
denote the amount of time needed to negotiate settlement x in state µ. Furthermore, assume that
t(x;µ) is di®erentiable and absolutely continuous180 in µ for all x ¸ 0. I shall make three important
assumptions:
Assumption 5.1. For all µ 2 £,
@2
@µ@xt(x;µ) < 0 for all x 2 (°(µ);°(µ)]; [5.1.1]
t(x;µ) = 0 for all x 2 [0;°(µ)]; [5.1.2]
limx!°(µ) t(x;µ) = +1. [5.1.3]
Recall that µ represents the plainti®'s optimism in pretrial negotiation. When µ is high (resp. low),
the plainti® is more optimistic (resp. pessimistic) about the trial outcome. Then it is less (resp.
more) time consuming for the attorney to improve settlement terms. This is captured by assumption
5.1.1. Assumption 5.1.2 is a normalization implying that it is costless for the attorney to obtain a
settlement that is (weakly) lower than the plainti®'s trial payo®. Assumption 5.1.3 is a normalization
implying that it is impossible for the attorney to obtain a settlement that is (weakly) larger than the
defendant's trial payo®.
178This condition is also satis¯ed by normal, logistic, chi-squared, exponential, and Laplace distributions. See Bagnoli
and BergstrÄ om (2005) for a complete list and for results allowing the identi¯cation of distributions with monotone hazard
rates.
179To concentrate on the principal-agent aspects of the problem, I abstract away from any bargaining aspects of
negotiated settlement. In addition, strategic aspects of attorney choice will not be studied (see Jones (1989)). I am
grateful to Jan Boone and Suzanne Scotchmer for making this suggestion.
180The function t : £ £ I R ! I R is absolutely continuous on £ if for every positive number ", there is a positive
number ¹ such that whenever a sequence of pairwise disjoint sub-intervals [µk;#k] of £ satis¯es
P
k j #k ¡µk j< ¹ then
P
k d(t(x;#k);t(x;µk)) < ". Absolutely continuity of t(x;¢) ensures that the attorney's value function is di®erentiable
almost everywhere and can be represented as an integral of its derivative. See Milgrom and Segal (2002) Theorem 2
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Figure 5.1. State-dependent Attorney Hours
In order to keep the presentation simple I impose two regularity conditions:
Assumption 5.2. For all µ 2 £
@3
@x2@µt(x;µ) < 0 and @3
@x@µ2t(x;µ) > 0 for all x 2 (°(µ);°(µ)]; [5.2.1]
d
dxt(x;µ) jx=°(µ)= 0. [5.2.2]
Assumption 5.2.1 states that the attorney's bargaining technology exhibits diminishing marginal
returns to both time and case strength.181 This assumption is used in the proofs of propositions 5.2
(i) and 5.3. Assumption 5.2.2 states that a small but positive increase in settlement amount from
°(µ) will not lead to increase in the attorney's time. Since the plainti® obtains °(µ) at trial, this
assumption implies that the plainti® is (strictly) worse o® pursuing the case to trial than settling out-
of-court in each state of the world. This assumption is used to prove complete information solution
1.
Figure 5.2 illustrates the relationship between two di®erent attorney time schedules t(x;µH) and
t(x;µL) in two distinct states µL and µH, where µH > µL.
Furthermore, assume that if the plainti® forces her case to trial, the trial outcome will be inde-
pendent of the attorney's time spent in pretrial negotiation.182
In seeking resolution, the plainti® weights the bene¯ts and costs of settlement and litigation and
has three basic instruments available to achieve her objective: (i) the plainti® can decide whether to
go to trial or to engage in negotiation; (ii) if she decides to negotiate, then she will demand a sum
of settlement; and (iii) the attorney may be given a reward (\monetary transfer" is a synonym) for
handling the suit.
181See Fudenberg and Tirole (1991) A8 (pp. 263) and A10 (pp. 267).
182One way to justify this assumption is as follows. The English legal profession is formally divided into two divisions,
solicitors and barristers. While solicitors usually conduct pretrial negotiation, barristers are best known for their role
as courtroom advocates. In addition, practice rules in England prohibit joint practice between barristers and solicitors.
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Figure 5.2 Timing of Litigation with Attorney
Formally, I shall describe a contract between the plainti® and the attorney by three outcome functions
s = hÁ;x;ri, to be interpreted as follows. For any ^ µ 2 £, if the plainti® chooses s after receiving report
^ µ, the plainti® instructs her attorney to negotiate if Á(^ µ) = 1 and she litigates without negotiation
if Á(^ µ) = 0; If the plainti® decides to settle her claim, then x(^ µ) is the sum of settlement she will
demand; r(^ µ) is the amount of reward the attorney receives in pretrial negotiation or in litigation.
The plainti® can \write" litigation into any contract entered into with her attorney because it is ob-
servable and veri¯able (as the damage compensation that the attorney obtains from the defendant).
Let S denote the set of contracts.
Now using the revelation principle (see Myerson (1979)), we may consider only plainti®'s choices
under which the attorney's report will truthfully reveal the case strength parameter µ, so the plainti®'s
choices can be made as functions of µ. To simplify presentation, I suppose that the plainti® designs
the contract. This assumption puts the whole bargaining power (in the pair plainti®-attorney) on
the plainti®'s side, although generally the plainti® and the attorney bargain over reward and discuss
settlement-litigation strategy.183
To further simplify exposition, I focus on deterministic contracts.184
Given the plainti®'s choice s, if the case strength parameter is µ, and if the attorney reports µ
truthfully, the attorney's expected utility u(µ) is
u(µ) = r(µ) ¡ t(x(µ);µ)Á(µ): (57)
If the attorney were to misrepresent the strength of the case and report ^ µ, when µ is the true case
strength parameter, its expected utility would be
u(^ µ;µ) = r(^ µ) ¡ t(x(^ µ);µ)Á(^ µ):
The attorney's utility of the outside option is the same across the states and is normalized to be zero.
Figure 5.3 illustrates this game.
The plainti®'s objective is then to select a contract s and maximize
Z
£
f (x(µ) ¡ r(µ))Á(µ) + (µ ¡ k ¡ r(µ))(1 ¡ Á(µ)) gf(µ)dµ;
subject to
183This assumption is not meant to be realistic but rather to avoid the signaling phenomena that arise in situations in
which the informed attorney takes part in contract design. See La®ont and Tirole (1993) A10 (pp.39).
184Under the assumptions that the attorney is risk neutral and that the attorney's cost function is monotonic, it is
not worth considering stochastic contracts, that is contracts for a given report of type draw from a nondegenerate
distribution the settlement-litigation decision, the reward the attorney receives and the settlement demand the attorney
produces. See La®ont and Tirole (1993) and Strausz (2006).Access to Justice: An Economic Approach 113
u(µ) = max^ µ u(^ µ;µ) 8 µ 2 £; [®]
u(µ) ¸ 0 8 µ 2 £. [¯]
Here, condition (®) represents the incentive compatibility constraint. This condition formalizes the
notion that the attorney must not prefer to misrepresent the strength of the case as ^ µ when the true
state is µ. Condition (¯) represents the individual rationality constraint; the attorney's utility cannot
be lower than what is obtained in an alternative lawsuit (which is normalized to zero). We shall say
a contract is feasible if it satis¯es conditions (®) and (¯).
Following the notations in Section 1.1., let measure of unfairness ½ be given by di®erence between
what the plainti® is legal entitled (i.e, µ) to and what actually he receives from the defendant in




j µ ¡ [x(µ)Á(µ) + µ(1 ¡ Á(µ)] j f(µ)dµ:




j µ ¡ x(µ) j Á(µ)f(µ)dµ
Once we are equipped with the measure of unfairness, we can put it to use in comparative static exer-
cises. In the following section, I will examine the comparative statics of equilibrium level of unfairness
with respect to the changes in magnitude of information asymmetry in parametric examples.
5.3.3. Analysis of Optimal Settlement-Litigation Decision
5.3.3.1. Preliminary Analysis: Complete Information
As a preliminary, we solve the plainti®'s problem under complete information. Let c = hÁc;xc;rci be
the plainti® 's complete-information solutions. We have,
1. When the plainti® has complete information about the strength of the case, there is no litigation:
Ác(µ) = 1 for all µ 2 £; and
2. When the plainti® has complete information about the strength of the case, the attorney earns no
pro¯t and his e®ort is optimal:
rc(µ) = t(xc(µ);µ) and
d
dx
t(xc(µ);µ) = 1 for all µ 2 £:
Proof. I shall prove that solutions 1 and 2 hold simultaneously. It follows from assumption 5.1.3
that xc(µ) < °(µ) for all µ. This immediately implies that the defendant will always accept xc(µ). This
is because if the defendant rejects xc(µ) the plainti® will go to trial since µ > k for all µ 2 £. Then the
defendant would pay °(µ) at trial, which is more than the settlement demand. Suppose that 2 is true
so that rc(µ) = t(xc(µ);µ). Further, d
dxt(x;µ) jx=°(µ)= 0 for all µ 2 £ implies that , given any ² > 0,
we can ¯nd a ¢ > 0 and an ~ s 2 S such that t(x~ s(µ);µ) < ² provided that µ ¡ k < x~ s(µ) < ¢ + µ ¡ k,
for all µ 2 £. Or equivalently, there exists ~ s such that x~ s(µ) ¡ t(x~ s(µ);µ) > µ ¡ k, for all µ 2 £. But
c is optimal implies that xc(µ)¡t(xc(µ);µ) ¸ x~ s(µ)¡t(x~ s(µ);µ) for all µ 2 £. Therefore, the plainti®
is better o® settling all her case out-of-court. Given that solution 1 holds, solution 2 is familiar from
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Of course, this contract o®er to attorney is not feasible for the plainti® when µ is unknown, because
it does not satisfy the incentive-compatibility constraint (®). The attorney would have incentives to
misrepresent the strength of the claim by reporting states lower than the true µ. It will be instruc-
tive to compare this complete-information solution to the optimal litigation-settlement decision under
incomplete-information, to be derived in what follows. k
Example 5.1. Complete Information.
Let K = 1. Suppose that attorney's cost function is given by t(x;µ) = ln(k + 1) ¡ ln(µ + 1 ¡ x).
The reader can easily check that for this cost function, the optimal settlement term under complete
information is:
xc = µ; for all µ 2 £;
which is increasing in µ and has range [µ; ¹ µ]. The optimal reward and attorney time are given by
rc(µ) = t(xc(µ);µ) = ln(k + 1); for all µ 2 £:
This contract is not feasible for the plainti® under incomplete information. To see this, suppose that
the attorney were to misrepresent the strength of the case and report ^ µ, when µ is the true case
strength parameter. Then the attorney's payo® is
u(^ µ;µ) = rc(^ µ) ¡ t(xc(^ µ);µ) = ln(µ ¡ ^ µ + 1);
which is strictly decreasing in ^ µ. Therefore, the attorney will always report that the strength of case
is µ. Thus, as µ is increased, the attorney's payo® is increased, as it becomes easier to negotiate
settlement terms with the defendant. But the settlement term is unchanged for the plainti® because
of the attorney's misreport.
5.3.3.2. Settlement-Litigation Decision under Incomplete Information
Now we turn to the central part of this chapter. The objective here is to demonstrate how ine±cient
litigation can arise as an instrument for the plainti® to extract information concerning the strength of
cases from the attorney. The key point here is that if a plainti® pushes weak cases toward trial, then
the incentive compatibility problem, embodied in equations (®), is mitigated. This occurs because
the attorney has less incentive to sell out when the cases are strong.
The ¯rst result demonstrates how a plainti® could improve her net gain from settlement by
pushing some weak cases toward trial. The plainti®'s optimal settlement-litigation decision has four
properties:
Proposition 5.1.
(i) The optimal contract s¤ entails that the plainti® will only force weak cases to trial and do so
without bargaining with the defendant, i.e., there is a µ¤ 2 £ such that the plainti® will go to
trial if µ < µ¤.Access to Justice: An Economic Approach 115
Further, the plainti®'s unique optimal contract hÁ¤;x¤;r¤i entails
(ii) The optimal cuto® level µ¤ is given by












(iii) If the plainti® decides to go to trial, the attorney's utility is zero, i.e., u(µ) = 0 for µ 2 [µ;µ¤].







t(x¤(~ µ); ~ µ)gd~ µ for µ 2 [µ¤;µ]:
Proof. The proof of (i) is standard, see appendix. Let a feasible contract s 2 S be given.185
Due to (1), the plainti®-attorney's surplus in settlement is u(µ) = max^ µfr(^ µ) ¡ t(x(^ µ);µ)g. Due to







This immediately implies that u(µ) = u(µ¤) ¡
R µ
µ¤f d
dµt(x¤(~ µ); ~ µ)gd~ µ. The optimal contract on [µ;µ¤]
follows from the fact that incentive compatibility constraint is maintained when the individual ratio-
nality constraint holds in equality. So the plainti® can maximize her expected utility without violating
conditions [®] and [¯] by setting u(µ¤) = 0. Thus, I have shown that (iii) and (iv) hold.
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Substituting (59) into (58) and di®erentiate, we obtain






Furthermore, due to envelop theorem, d












f(µ) < 0 and d
dµt(x;µ) < 0 and @2






dµt(x¤(µ);µ)g < 0. It follows that expression (58) is strictly concave, so
the unique maximizer of (58) is given by the ¯rst-order condition.
It remains to determine the plainti®'s optimal settlement demand. u(µ) = r(µ) ¡ t(x(µ);µ):










t(x(~ µ); ~ µ)d~ µ gf(µ)dµ: (60)
185As de¯ned in Section 5.3.2, a contract is called `feasible' if it satis¯es conditions (®) and (¯).
186See Milgrom and Segal (2002) for a general formulation of the envelope theorem.Access to Justice: An Economic Approach 116













































t(x¤(µ);µ) = 1: (63)
By construction expression (62) is strictly concave, so the unique maximizer of (62) is given by the
¯rst-order condition. ¥
A contract s¤ that maximizes the plainti®'s expected payo® is called the optimal contract. In the
optimal contract, x¤(^ µ) is the sum of settlement the plainti® will demand after she receive report ^ µ
from the attorney. Facing the dual problem of expensive, jackpot-like litigation and informational
disadvantage against her attorney, the plainti® uses one problem to solve another. The optimal cuto®
level µ¤ partitions £ into two regions. Ine±cient litigation (resp. e±cient settlement) occurs whenever
the strength of the case is below (resp. beyond) µ¤. In equilibrium, there must be no unexploited
arbitrage opportunity for the plainti®: at µ¤ her net gain from going to trial (i.e., µ¤ ¡k) must equal





Existing theories uniformly predict that, under asymmetric information (AI), informed parties
proceed to trial only when they expect a high likelihood of winning.187 I predict the exact opposite:
upon receiving truthful report concerning the prospects of their suits, `informed' plainti®s proceed to
trial only when they expect a low likelihood of winning, causing plainti® win rates at trial to be low.
In this way, pretrial settlement selects likely plainti® winners from the ¯led pool, causing a tendency
towards low plainti® win rates at trial. If we compare this to the complete-information solutions
1 and 2 from an ex post point of view, it may seem ine±cient and paradoxical for the plainti® to
ever force weak cases to trial. To understand why this may be optimal, observe that the plainti®
wants to encourage the attorney to admit that the case is strong, whenever it is true, so that the
attorney will bargain hard with the defendant to obtain a high damage award in settlement. But
to prevent the attorney from misrepresenting the strength of the case when the case is strong, the
plainti® must somehow `punish' the attorney for reporting that the case is weak. Such punishment
takes the form of pushing cases towards trial without negotiation (hence no payment to the attorney).
187See Waldfogel (1998) for an excellent summary of this literature. Waldfogel (1998) presents empirical evidence from
over 65,000 federal civil cases, indicating that the settlement process (the selection of cases for trial) does not obey
the basic implications of these AI theories. However, Waldfogel does not provide rigorous explanations to justify his
empirical ¯ndings.Access to Justice: An Economic Approach 117
Example 5.2. Incomplete Information.
We continue from example 5.1. Let us further assume that µ is uniformly distributed on [a;1], so that
f(µ) = 1=(1¡a). Suppose the plainti®'s trial costs, k, are su±ciently low, so that k2 · 1¡a. Due to
proposition 5.2, one can show that the optimal cuto® level is µ¤ = 1¡k2. Thus the likelihood of trial
is F(1¡k2) = 1¡k2=(1¡a). The optimal settlement demand is x¤(µ) = µ¡(1¡µ)
1
2 if µ 2 [1¡k2;1],
which is increasing in µ. A number of implications arise: First, the likelihood of settlement is in-
creasing in the plainti®'s trial costs. Second, an improvement in the plainti®'s knowledge about her
prospects at trial (captured by an increase in a) leads to an increase in the likelihood of settlement.
Third, the plainti®'s settlement demand is increasing in her case strength. Furthermore, it follows
from the de¯nition of unfairness that ½(µ) = (1 ¡ µ)
1
2k2=(1 ¡ a). There is a number of implications:
First, the degree of unfairness is increasing in the plainti®'s trial costs. Second, an improvement in the
plainti®'s information about her trial outcome (captured by an increase in a) results in an decrease
in the degree of unfairness. Third, the degree of unfairness is deceasing in the plainti®'s case strength.
5.3.4. `Risk-Classes': Ranking of Litigation Lotteries
Now we arrive at the principal results of the chapter. My objective here is to show that the plainti®'s
settlement-litigation decision necessarily depends on the risks inherent in the legal process and the
plainti®'s prior information about her prospects at trial. Particularly, it is shown that when the
plainti® is more pessimistic about her trial outcome, i.e., the distribution of case strength has relatively
more probability mass to the left, her attorney would bargain harder in pretrial negotiation and obtain
more favorable settlement terms from the defendant. The plainti® litigates more frequently when her
case is a priori weaker.
Plainti®s who share a common prior distribution function are called a `risk-class'. We want to
consider a group of plainti®s that consists of a number of risk-classes and analyze the implications
of alternative settlement-litigation decisions in the presence of such heterogeneity. First we formalize
the notion that one prior distribution has a higher expected case strength than another. My approach
here is a direct application of the theory of Stochastic-Dominance.188
5.3.4.1. Ranking of litigation lotteries
Consider two probability distribution functions, F1 and F2, both satisfying Fi(µ) = 0, Fi(¹ µ) = 1 and
Fi(µ) is weakly increasing in µ, i = 1;2. The conditional probability that the plainti®'s case strength
is µ (given that her case is stronger than µ), ¸i(µ) ´
fi(µ)
1¡Fi(µ), is termed the hazard-rate associated
with Fi(µ). We say that F1 ¯rst-order stochastically (strictly) dominates F2 if F1(µ) < F2(µ) for all
µ 2 (µ;µ). The following de¯nition is central to the analysis of this section.
Definition 5.1 (Hazard-rate Dominance) : We say that F1 (strictly) dominates F2 in terms of haz-
ard rate if ¸1(µ) < ¸2(µ) for all µ 2 (µ;µ).
In words, hazard rate dominance implies that, the rate of increase of the plainti®'s chance of having
a better case (i.e., d
dµ ln(1 ¡ F(µ)) = ¡
f(µ)
1¡F(µ) ), is larger at all possible case strength with distribu-
188I am grateful to Jan Boone and Eric van Damme for suggesting me to apply the theory of Stochastic-Dominance in
analyzing the dependence of settlement-litigation decision on the risks inherent in the legal process.Access to Justice: An Economic Approach 118
tion 1 than with distribution 2. Now let's explore two important implications of de¯nitions 5.2 and 5.3.
Lemma 5.1.1. If F1 dominates F2 in hazard rate, then F1 ¯rst order stochastically dominates F2.
Proof. The proof is standard, see appendix B.





Proof. By Lemma 5.1.1, if F1 dominates F2 in hazard rate, then F1 < F2 for all µ 2 (µ;µ). Since
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We obtain the conclusion of the lemma. ¥
In words, lemma 5.1.2 states that the strength of the plainti®'s case is a priori higher with distribution
1 than with 2. Following lemma 5.1.2, we say that the plainti® is more optimistic about her trial
outcome under F1 than under F2, if F1 dominates F2 in hazard rate.
5.3.4.2. Risk-class settlement-litigation pattern
Let µ¤
i denote the optimal cuto® level, corresponding to distribution i = 1;2. The equilibrium levels of
settlement and attorney surplus are denoted as x¤
i and u¤
i, respectively. To further simplify notation,
write ­¤ ´ [µ¤
1;µ] \ [µ¤
2;µ].
My next proposition states a comparative-static result about how the optimal cuto® level, optimal
settlement demand, attorney's payo®, equilibrium probability of litigation and plainti®'s probability
of winning at trial change with changes in the distribution of plainti®'s optimism about her trial
outcome. This comparative static is important for empirical work, since it leads to counterintuitive
and testable predictions about how bargaining outcome and litigants' welfare vary with changes in






i) denote the plainti®'s equilibrium (conditional) probability of winning
at trial, corresponding to distribution i = 1;2.189







2(µ) for all µ 2 ­¤;
(iii) u¤
1(µ) < u¤










µ µfi(µ)dµ is the probability that the plainti® wins at trial under Fiinequilibrium; Fi(µ
¤
i ) is the
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Figure 5.4. F1 dominates F2 and F1(µ¤
1) < F2(µ¤
2)
Proof. I will start by proving (ii) of the proposition. Expression (62) is a strictly concave function




















j(µ);µ) gfi(µ)dµ; for i;j = 1;2 and i 6= j:






















Due to assumption 5.1.1, d





f1(µ) < 0. Therefore, x¤
2(µ) > x¤
1(µ) for all µ 2 ­¤ as required.





for all µ 2 ­¤ then ¡ d
dµt(x¤
1(~ µ); ~ µ) < ¡ d
dµt(x¤
2(~ µ); ~ µ) for all µ 2 ­¤, by assumption 5.1.1. Integrat-








2(~ µ); ~ µ)gdµ. The last
inequality implies that u¤
1(µ) < u¤
2(µ) for all µ 2 ­¤ due to (iv) of proposition 5.1.
It remains to show that µ¤
1 > µ¤





2) = 0 due to (ii) of proposition 5.2.
Step B. u¤
2(µ) > u¤
1(µ) for all µ 2 ­¤ implies that u¤
2(µ¤
1) > 0 by step A.
Step C. u¤
2(¢) is continuous and monotone increasing on [µ¤
2;µ] due to (iii) of proposition 5.2; further,
u¤
2(µ) = 0 for all µ 2 [µ;µ¤
2] due to (ii) of proposition 5.2. Therefore, u¤
2(µ¤





1 (see Figure 5.3).
Therefore, we obtain that if u¤
1(µ) < u¤
2(µ) for all µ 2 ­¤, then µ¤
1 > µ¤
2. This together with proposi-
tion 5.2 (iii) imply µ¤
1 > µ¤
2.






























2) = 0. In addition, by construction, d
dµt(x¤
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1) < 0 and d
dµt(0;µ¤
2) < 0,




















dµ ln(1 ¡ F1(µ¤
1)) ¸ 0 and d
dµ ln(1 ¡ F2(µ¤












2))dµ if and only if ln(1 ¡ F1(µ¤
1)) > ln(1 ¡ F2(µ¤
2)):
Since ln(¢) is monotone increasing, we have F1(µ¤
1) < F2(µ¤
2) as required (see Figure 5.4).
It remains to show that !¤
1 > !¤
2. The proof proceeds in three steps.
Step A. [µ;µ¤




µ Fi(µ)dµ < 1, i = 1;2.
Step B. Due to proposition 5.4, F2(µ¤
2) > F1(µ¤






















































2) and the proposition follows. ¥
The intuition of the comparative statics of the ¯rst result is as follows. Since with a low settlement
the plainti® cannot tell whether her case was weak or her attorney \sold out", the attorney uses the
court as an \auditor" to help him to verify to his client that the case was indeed lack of merits. With
a better distribution, the plainti® becomes more optimistic about her prospects at trial. Hence she
is less easily convinced when the attorney says \times are tough". In this way, more strong cases are
pushed towards trial as they more often fail to meet the optimism of the plainti®.
The second result of Proposition 5.2 means that, hard bargaining takes place when the plainti®
believes her case to be weak: she would demand more (resp. less) damage award from the defendant
in settlement if she is more pessimistic (resp. optimistic) about her prospects at trial. In other words,
an aggressive bargaining strategy (i.e., x¤
2(µ) > x¤






The third result of Proposition 5.2 states that the attorney earns less (resp. more) surplus when the
plainti® is more optimistic (resp. pessimistic) about her prospects at trial. The intuition underlying
the comparative statics is as follows. The plainti® obtains settlement payment achieved by the
attorney but has to compensate the attorney for his time spent on the case. Further, in order to
convince the attorney to reveal the true case strength, the plainti® has to pay an informational
rent. Since the attorney's productivity improves with the strength of the case, he is a priori more
productive under F1 than under F2. It is therefore harder for the attorney to convince the plainti®
that he needs to be compensated more for his time under F1 than under F2.Access to Justice: An Economic Approach 121
The fourth result of Proposition 5.2 states that the probability of trial is decreasing in the unin-
formed player's expected trial return (i.e.,
R
£ µf(µ)dµ). This result stands sharply in contrast with
those obtained from models that restrict attention to information asymmetry and strategic interac-
tions between litigants (see Bebchuk (1984) and Spier (1992)). Although this surprising result may
seem counterintuitive at ¯rst sight, its logic can be easily explained: the magnitude of expected trial
return re°ects the productivity of the attorney. The better the plainti®'s prospects at trial, the more
optimistic the plainti® is, the less costly it becomes for the attorney to obtain favorable settlement
terms from the defendant. Since the plainti® bears the full costs of negotiation, settlement (resp.
litigation) becomes a more (resp. less) attractive option when negotiation is less costly.
The last result of the proposition means that, given that litigation occurs, the plainti® is more likely
to win with a better distribution. With a better distribution, the plainti® litigates less often (F1(µ¤
1) <
F2(µ¤
2)) but brings more strong cases to trial (µ¤
1 > µ¤
2). k
Example 5.3. Stochastic Dominance.
Continuing from example 5.1, let us further assume that µ is uniformly distributed on [a;1] with
distribution F1, and uniformly distributed on [b;1] with distribution F2, where 0 < b < a < 1.
F1 thus ¯rst order stochastically dominates F2. From the results of example 5.2, we have that the
equilibrium likelihoods of trial are
F1(µ¤













(1 + a ¡ k2) >
1
2
(1 + b ¡ k2) = !¤
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Up to this point, it has been assumed that the litigation is privately funded. In that case, litigation
results when the informational rent is too high for the plainti® to bear. The objective of this section is
to understand the e®ect of such ¯nancial aid on the likelihood of settlement. It is shown that ¯nancial
assistance (for both pre-litigation settlement and litigation) reduces the costs inherent in principal-
agent problem between the plainti® and her attorney, mitigates the negative e®ect of information
asymmetry, thereby facilitates e±cient settlement.
Formally, let 1 ¡ % (with % 2 [0;1]) denote the proportion of legal costs ¯nanced by a third party
(e.g. a trade union or legal aid funds) in settlement and litigation. Suppose that if the plainti® decides





fxp(µ) ¡ % rp(µ)gf(µ)dµ
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Figure 5.6. Financial Aid Discourages Litigation
Further, suppose that if the plainti® chooses to litigate a fraction of her cases, some feasible




fµ ¡ % kgf(µ)dµ +
Z µ
µq
fxq(µ) ¡ % rq(µ)gf(µ)dµ:
Definition 5.2 (Incentive to Settle): The plainti®'s incentive to settle is de¯ned as
±(%) ´ ¼p ¡ ¼q:
Clearly, when ±(%) > 0 the plainti® is better o® settling all her claims out of court; when ±(%) < 0
the plainti® would have incentive to force some of her weak cases to trial.
Proposition 5.3. For any distribution F, there exists ~ % > 0 such that for all % < ~ %, ±(%) > 0. That
is, the plainti® is (strictly) better o® settling all her cases provided that her claim
is su±ciently aided, irrespective of the magnitude of risks in litigation.
Proof. Suppose that ±(1) < 0, i.e., when the plainti®'s claim is privately funded, the plainti®
















However, there exists a feasible contract p such that xp(µ) > µ by construction. Hence, ±(0) > 0.
Since ±(¢) is continuous on [0;1], by intermediate value theorem we can ¯nd a ~ % 2 [0;1] such that
±(~ %) = 0. Further since ±(¢) is monotonically decreasing in %, it follows that ±(%) > 0 for all % 2 [0; ~ %]
as required (see ¯gure 5.6). ¥
Proposition 5.3 implies that for the types of people and legal matters that would be su±cientlyAccess to Justice: An Economic Approach 123
covered by third party ¯nancing, settlement will always occur irrespective of the plainti®'s prior in-
formation and the direct trial costs. The intuition underlying the comparative statics is as follows.
Litigation is costly for the plainti®. However, in order to e®ectively monitor her attorney's perfor-
mance in settlement negotiation when the attorney has more information than her concerning the
characteristics of the lawsuit, the plainti® uses litigation as a device for extracting information. Third
party ¯nancing mitigates the cost of information asymmetry inherent in representative bargaining.
Therefore, plainti®s receiving ¯nancial support, go to court less often than those receiving no ¯nancial
support. k
5.3.6. Varying Uncertainty Levels: An Example
I now turn to an example in which the plainti®'s uncertainty about her trial outcome is represented
by the spread of a uniform distribution. My purpose here is to show that it is possible for the model
to reproduce some key features of the data when we make plausible assumptions about the model's
parameters. I use the uniform distribution, since in this case the equilibrium can be derived in closed
form. Numerical calculations with other distributions such as a truncated normal distribution, suggest
that my distributional assumption is not crucial to the results.
To illustrate our optimal solution, let us continue from example 5.1. Suppose that µ is uniformly
distributed on [¹¡d;¹+d] so µ has a mean of ¹ and a variance of d2=3. Thus, by varying d, I can vary
the level of uncertainty without changing the mean of the distribution. In particular, the standard
deviation increases linearly from 0 as d increases from 0. I refer to d as the level of uncertainty.
Further I assume that k + d · ¹ · 1 ¡ d.
My last proposition states a comparative-static result about how bargaining and litigation out-
comes change with changes in the level of uncertainty. This comparative static is consistent with the
literature.
Proposition 5.6. In the equilibrium with uniform uncertainty with t(x;µ) = ln(k+1)¡ln(µ+1¡x),
(i) The equilibrium probability of trial is
F(µ¤) =
8
> > > > <
> > > > :




2k2 < d · 1
2 ¡ k;
1 ¡ k2
1¡2k if d > 1
2 ¡ k:
(ii) The equilibrium settlement amount is x¤(µ) = µ¡
p
¹ + d ¡ µ, for µ 2 [µ¤;¹+d],
where µ¤ = ¹ + d ¡ k2 if d > 1
2k2 and µ¤ = ¹ ¡ d if d · 1
2k2.
(iii) In the incidence of a trial, the plainti® wins with probability !¤ = ¹ ¡ k2.
Proof. It follows from result (ii) of Proposition 5.1 that the optimal cuto® level is given by
µ¤ = ¹ + d ¡ k2. d
dxt(x¤(µ);µ) = 1=(1 ¡ x¤(µ) + µ). @2
@x@µt(x¤(µ);µ) = ¡1=(1 ¡ x¤(µ) + µ)2.
1 ¡ F(µ)=f(µ) = ¹ + d ¡ µ. Substituting into equation (50), and we obtain (ii). (i) and (iii) fol-
low by construction. ¥
One critical parameter that cannot be estimated directly from the data is the level of uncertainty d.
It is important, therefore, to look at how the bargaining outcome changes with the level of uncertainty
increases from 0. A remarkable feature of this model is that likelihood of settlement depend only onAccess to Justice: An Economic Approach 124



















Figure 5.6. Varying Uncertainty Levels (¹ = 0:5, k = 0:33, µ = 0:5)
d and k but not on the expected trial outcome or any other parameters of the model. Assume trial
costs of 0:33 and mean prior probability winning of 50 percent. The likelihood of litigation increases
from 0 to 67 percent as we move from little uncertainty to maximal uncertainty (see ¯gure 5.6).
The equilibrium settlement amount is decreasing in the mean and dispersion of probability, in-
creasing in µ (holding constant the distribution of probability) but invariant to trial costs k. With
higher risk it is more expensive for the plainti® to negotiate settlement payment via her attorney,
implying that the plainti® will demand less in settlement.
Now consider how the plainti®'s ex post probability of winning varies with the level of her uncer-
tainty. The plainti®'s win rate is insensitive to her uncertainty. Figure 5.6 shows that for trial costs
of 0:33 and mean prior probability of winning of 50 percent, the plainti®'s equilibrium win rate is
¯xed at 38:9 percent. This occurs because a proportional increase in likelihood of litigation following
an increase in the plainti®'s uncertainty results in an equal proportional increase in the strength of
litigated cases.
5.4. Conclusion
My main observation is that when the plainti® has an informational disadvantage vis-µ a-vis her
attorney concerning the strength of her lawsuit and her chance of winning at trial, the plainti® can use
litigation as an instrument for extracting information. But, counterintuitively, litigation will occur
only when the plainti® is pessimistic about her prospects at trial. The plainti® is more likely to sue
if she is more pessimistic about winning the case. This is because, the attorney \passes the buck" to
the court provided that his client may not believe him if he says \times are hard" and that he may
be blamed for a poor performance. This, in turn, is a rational strategy for the plainti® to pursue
because if she does not commit to litigating her weak cases she may encourage \selling out" by her
attorney. In this way, pretrial settlement selects likely plainti® winners from the ¯led pool, causing a
tendency towards low plainti® win rates at trial.
Two factors are crucially important in determining the plainti®'s settlement-litigation decision:
the level of uncertainty associated with the legal outcomes and the ¯nancing of litigation. Pre-
dictability of legal outcome improves the plainti®'s ability to monitor her attorney's performance,
and therefore mitigates the principal-agent problem inherent in representative negotiation and facili-
tates successful settlement. Hence, more experienced plainti®s go to court less often. There is anotherAccess to Justice: An Economic Approach 125
aspect of attorney-client relationship regarding the ¯nancing of litigation that can a®ect a plainti®'s
incentive to litigate: legal aid reduces the costs inherent in representative bargaining thereby pro-
moting e±cient settlement. Therefore, plainti®s receiving legal aid in litigation, go to court less often
than those receiving no legal aid.
There are four important extensions to this research. The ¯rst is to introduce renegotiation
possibilities into the analysis. After a report from the attorney on the strength of her case, the
plainti® usually has option to change her litigation-settlement decision while proposing a change in
the attorney's compensation scheme. Since the attorney will take these into account, renegotiation
may erode the commitment e®ect of litigation.
The second extension is to introduce moral hazard on the part of the attorney in the litigation
stage. In my analysis, the trial outcome is not in°uenced by the settlement-attorney's e®ort. This
might not be a plausible assumption for the some systems. For instance, in the American legal system
the trial outcome is usually a function of e®ort by the attorneys who handle both pretrial negotiation
and litigation. Then it will be e±cient to have a division of rents between the plainti® and the
attorney for litigated cases. This might erode the e®ect of litigation as a tool for the plainti® to
monitor her attorney's performance in settlement negotiation.
The third extension is to consider the principal-agent problem on both sides of the bargaining table.
In my model, information asymmetry only exists on the plainti® side. In principle, this setting can
be extended by allowing also the defendant to have informational disadvantage vis-µ a-vis the defense
lawyer. In this case, however, the characterization of the equilibrium becomes more complicated
because two-sided delegation leads to a four-person bargaining game. This poses a challenge for
future research.
Finally there is more research to be done to account for the relatively rigid payment systems in
Europe and not general availability of contingency fees. An attorney paid by an hourly fee may, for
instance, postpone settlement until the last moment in order to make more money or simply to get
his day in court in order to accumulate practical litigation experience.190 Given the di®erence in
legal rules and methods of payment of legal fees between the UK and continental Europe, it would be
interesting to see how these di®erences would a®ect the process and outcome of bargaining, and where
compensation is better structured to tie the interests of lawyers and clients. More analysis could be
done in this avenue by using the mechanism-design approach to litigation and settlement. Since such
an approach permits the analysis of litigation and settlement outcomes without the speci¯cation of a
particular game-form, it may be possible to ¯nd general properties for the pattern of settlement under
an hourly fee arrangement and how policies can be designed to encourage e±ciency and fairness in
the system.
190See, e.g., Had¯eld (2000) for evidence on the limited opportunity for lawyers to gain access to trial and discussions
on the lawyers' incentives to accumulate litigation experience.Access to Justice: An Economic Approach 126
5.5. Appendix
Appendix A
Proof of Proposition 5.1 (i).
Given that the plainti® chooses hÁ;x;ri, if the case strength is µ, and if the attorney reports µ truthfully, its
expected pro¯t u(µ) is u(µ) = r(µ) ¡ t(x(µ);µ)Á(µ); if the attorney were to misrepresent the strength of the
case and report ^ µ, when µ is the true strength of the case, its expected payo® is u(^ µ;µ) = r(^ µ)¡t(x(^ µ);µ)Á(^ µ):
Condition (®) requires that
u(µ) ¸ u(^ µ;µ) = u(^ µ) + Á(^ µ)[t(x(^ µ); ^ µ) ¡ t(x(^ µ);µ)]: (65)
Thus,
Á(^ µ)[t(x(^ µ); ^ µ) ¡ t(x(^ µ);µ)] · u(µ) ¡ u(^ µ) · Á(µ)[t(x(µ); ^ µ) ¡ t(x(µ);µ)]; (66)
where the second inequality follows from the analogue of (11) with the roles of µ and ^ µ reversed. Then µ > ^ µ
implies that t(x(^ µ); ^ µ) > t(x(^ µ);µ) and t(x(µ); ^ µ) > t(x(µ);µ) since d
dµ
1¡F(µ)
f(µ) < 0, for all µ 2 £; now suppose
in negation that Á(µ) < Á(^ µ). By construction of the characteristic function, we must have that Á(µ) = 0 and
Á(^ µ) = 1. But then
Á(^ µ)[t(x(^ µ); ^ µ) ¡ t(x(^ µ);µ)] = t(x(^ µ); ^ µ) ¡ t(x(^ µ);µ) > 0 = Á(µ)[t(x(µ); ^ µ) ¡ t(x(µ);µ)]
which is a contradiction to (46). Therefore, there exists a µ¤ 2 £ such that for all µ ¸ µ¤;Á¤(µ) = 1 and for all
µ < µ¤;Á¤(µ) = 0. ¥
Appendix B
Proof of lemma 5.1.1.






if an donly if
d
dµ
ln(1 ¡ F1(µ)) >
d
dµ
ln(1 ¡ F2(µ)) for all µ 2 (µ;µ):















d~ µ ln(1 ¡ F1(~ µ))d~ µ = ln(1 ¡ Fi(µ)), i = 1;2. Inequality (54) thus becomes
ln(1 ¡ F1(µ)) > ln(1 ¡ F2(µ)) for all µ 2 (µ;µ):
Since ln(¢) is monotone increasing, it follows that 1 ¡ F1(µ) > 1 ¡ F2(µ) or equivalently F1(µ) < F2(µ) for all
µ 2 (µ;µ). ¥
Appendix C
Dropping the suit.
Let's now assume that µ < k for some µ 2 £ and allow the plainti® to drop her claim upon receiving report
from the attorney on the case strength.Access to Justice: An Economic Approach 127
Definition 5.3 (settlement-litigation-dropping decision): For any ^ µ in £, provided that the attorney re-
ports that the strength of the claim is ^ µ, a settlement-litigation-dropping decision ' : £ ! f¡1;0;1g is a





1 if the plainti® instructs her attorney to negotiate;
0 if the plainti® litigates without negotiation;





k (~ µ ¡ k)f(~ µ)d~ µ +
R µ




d~ µt(x¤¤(~ µ); ~ µ)gf(~ µ)d~ µ
o
: (68)
If the plainti® drops her lawsuit, she will receive no damage award. The net expected gain for the plainti®













demand x(^ µ); or




























Figure 5.7. Timing of Litigation with Attorney (dropping cases)
The equilibrium takes a simple form. If µ is su±ciently low (below k), the plainti® decides to drop the case;
if µ is su±ciently high (greater than a cuto® level µ¤¤, the plainti® decides to settle; otherwise (k < µ · µ¤¤)
The following proposition is an extension of proposition 5.2.
Proposition 5.5. The plainti®'s optimal contract hÁ¤¤;x¤¤;r¤¤i entails
(i) The plainti® will bargain with the defendant and settle the dispute if µ ¸ µ¤¤, where µ¤¤ is given by












@x@µt(x¤¤(µ);µ) = 1. She will go to trial if k · µ · µ¤¤.
She will drop the case if µ < k.
(ii) u(µ) = 0 and fx¤¤(µ);r¤¤(µ)g = f0;0g for [µ;µ¤¤];
(iii) u(µ) = ¡
R µ
µ¤¤f d
d~ µt(x¤¤(~ µ); ~ µ)gd~ µ for µ 2 [µ¤¤;µ].
Proof. I only give the proof of (i) of the proposition. The proofs of (ii) and (iii) are similar to those in
proposition 5.2. Suppose in negation that will go to trial at some µ1 < k in state µ1. Then, the plainti® earns
net payo® µ1 ¡ k < 0. But she could earn 0 by dropping the case at µ1 while setting x(µ1) = 0 and r(µ1) = 0
without violating conditions (®) and (¯). Therefore, going to trial at µ1 < k cannot occur in equilibrium. So
we have arrived at a contradiction. ¥Access to Justice: An Economic Approach 128
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